THE RIGHT TO A ‘WORLD CLASS CITY’?: STREET TRADING, PUBLIC SPACE AND URBAN GOVERNANCE IN THE CAPE TOWN CITY CENTRE

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Jens Horber

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There is a long history of street trading restriction in South Africa, and the relocation of traders from key public spaces in Cape Town, in connection with renovation and construction for the 2010 FIFA World Cup, highlighted the contested nature of street trading in the Cape Town city centre. The Grand Parade, South Africa’s oldest public space, sits adjacent to the city’s major public transport hub, and plays a vital role in the daily lives of many city residents. Therefore, public space contestations, and the informal sector’s importance in job creation and poverty reduction, necessitate an investigation into the impacts of the City of Cape Town’s street trading management approach on the livelihood strategies of traders on the Parade.

I review relevant literature on street trading management, and develop criteria for assessing the City of Cape Town’s street trading management approach. These criteria are linked to Lefebvre’s (1968) and Fainstein’s (2010) concepts of ‘the right to the city’ and ‘the just city’ respectively. The main research question thus asks: What is the impact of the City of Cape Town’s street trading management approach on the livelihood strategies of traders on the Grand Parade? The research uses the case study and discourse analysis methods to address this question. Data is collected through non-participant observation and individual semi-structured interview techniques. The focus is on capturing the views and experiences of traders on the Grand Parade.

The research findings indicate that the City of Cape Town tends to adopt a more restrictive approach to managing traders on the Grand Parade, and that this has, effectively, a negative impact on trader livelihoods. This approach serves to produce informal arrangements, aggression and resistance on the part of traders. A disjuncture is found between the stated developmental approach of the City’s Informal Trading Policy (informed by national developmental policies) and its practices. The combination of organisational restructuring processes, confused mandates as well as the low political and funding priority given to street trading management has meant that the complex of socio-economic factors and persistent management issues on the Parade, that require interdepartmental cooperation to address, continue to negatively impact trader livelihoods.

I recommend that the City of Cape Town, in line with the aims contained in its Informal Trading Policy, and inspired by the ‘eThekwini model’, implement a more progressive street trading management approach that is based on participatory and area-based approaches. A dedicated focus on capacitating trader organisations through training initiatives is recommended, as well as changes to trading permit application processes and conditions. Lastly, specific recommendations are also made to better enable livelihood strategies of street traders on the Grand Parade.
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LIST OF ACRONYMS

CCID  CENTRAL CITY IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT
CJP   CENTRAL JOHANNESBURG PARTNERSHIP
COCT  CITY OF CAPE TOWN
COJ   CITY OF JOHANNESBURG
CTP   CAPE TOWN PARTNERSHIP
GPMA  GRAND PARADE MERCHANTS ASSOCIATION
GPUTA GRAND PARADE UNITED TRADERS ASSOCIATION
MTC   METROPOLITAN TRADING COMPANY
NIBUS NATIONAL INFORMAL BUSINESS UPLIFTMENT STRATEGY
NPM   NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT
ODTP  ORGANISATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSFORMATION PLAN
RID   RETAIL IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT
SANTRA SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL TRADERS AND RETAILERS ALLIANCE
SAPS  SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE SERVICES
UKITA UNITED KHAYELITSHA INFORMAL TRADERS ASSOCIATION
WCITC WESTERN CAPE INFORMAL TRADERS COALITION
Figure 1.1: The Grand Parade in the context of the Cape Town city centre - Grand Parade at centre (Source: Google Earth, 2017)
CHAPTER 1:
INTRODUCTION
1.1. Purpose of this Chapter

I did this because there was no way for me to get by and I thought, let me find a way.

Female trader in the Cape Town city centre (Sassen, 2014: Online)

This dissertation investigates the impact of the City of Cape Town’s street trading management approach on the livelihood strategies of traders on the Grand Parade, a historic public space in the Cape Town city centre. This chapter serves to introduce the issue under investigation, together with the main research question of the study. The first section defines the meanings of ‘informal trading’ and ‘street trading, and why I make use of the latter term in this dissertation. This is followed by a discussion of the context for establishing the research issue by presenting an overview of the history of informal trading policy in South Africa. The third section establishes the issue under investigation, and the case study area, namely the Grand Parade, is introduced. The aim of my research is then discussed in the fourth section. The main research question is presented in the fifth and final section of this chapter, followed by a brief outline of the structure of the remainder of this dissertation.

1.2. Informal Trading and Street Trading

In defining ‘informal trading’, I seek to adopt a more nuanced understanding of what this term entails. Through presenting the myriad meanings of ‘informal trading’, I refrain from attempting to establish universal categories that supposedly apply everywhere. By establishing universal categories, research can fall into the trap that postmodern, poststructural, postcolonial and decolonial scholars argue against.

Castells and Portes (1989:15) define ‘informal’ activities as means of income generation that are “unregulated by the institutions of society, in a legal and social environment in which similar activities are regulated”. One can view informal trading as part of the ‘smaller-scale’ informal economic sector. I use the term ‘smaller-scale’ here to distinguish between ‘larger-scale’ drug/human trafficking, money laundering, etc. (Simone, 2001) and, for example, selling goods on a pavement without a permit. There has long been a view that marginalised people use an economically and spatially contained ‘informal sector’ temporarily for survival until they can enter the ‘formal sector’ (Skinner and Haysom, 2016). A number of commentators note this has been replaced by a realisation of informality’s permanence for many new urban citizens. It defines the landscape, economy and politics of contemporary African cities (Skinner and Haysom, 2016; Tranberg-Hansen and Vaa, 2002; Simone, 2004).

It is important to understand how the City of Cape Town defines informal trading. The Informal Trading By-Law of 2013 (CoCT, 2013:4) defines informal trading as “the trading in goods and services in the informal sector by an informal trader”. This includes trading in streets, pedestrian malls, markets, transport interchanges, and public open spaces. Other forms listed include “mobile trading, such as from caravans, and light delivery vehicles, roving traders, trading at special events …[and] beach trading.” (ibid.). The By-law also defines an ‘informal trader’ as “a person, or an enterprise which is not registered or incorporated in terms of the corporate laws of South Africa and which engages in informal trading” (ibid.). A ‘market’ is defined as “a demarcated area within a trading area which is designated as such in a trading plan and which is managed in a coordinated manner” (ibid.).

The types of trading occurring on the Grand Parade (cf. Chapter 3) most closely correspond to the following three categories as defined by the City’s Informal Trading Policy (CoCT, 2013): Public Markets, Trading in Public Open Spaces and Street/kerbside trading. “Public Markets” are markets operating on public land such as flea and craft markets, among others. “Trading in Public Open Spaces” refers to trading that occurs in public open

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1 Livelihood strategies are defined as those activities undertaken by households to provide a means of living (Eneyew and Bekele, 2012).

2 Stats SA (2016:xxiii) define the informal sector as having: “i) Employees working in establishments that employ fewer than five employees, who do not deduct income tax from their salaries/wages; and ii) Employers, own-account workers and persons helping unpaid in their household business who are not registered for either income tax or value-added tax.”
spaces including parks, parking areas and cemeteries. Lastly, “Street/kerbside trading” is trading that occurs from city-allocated bays on pavements and kerbs (CoCT, 2013:9).

Bénit-Gbaffou (2015) draws on Castells and Portes’ (1989) definition of the informal, and argues that the idea of informality is thus linked to management and by-laws, and the way in which these are defined. The by-laws define the boundary between informality and formality. This boundary is not fixed; it shifts often (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015). Depending on by-laws, or for example a trader’s location in a demarcated or prohibited area, they are either formal or informal. Traders in markets or buildings can thus also be seen as either formal or informal (ibid.).

Bénit-Gbaffou (2015) argues that ‘street trading’ is any trade occurring on a street: commonly a pavement, but also including pedestrianised streets that can be seen as extensions of pavements. It is important to use the term ‘informal’ when referring to street trading, so as to distinguish ‘informal street trading’ from other legal activities that take place along public streets, like, for example, outdoor cafes.

Furthermore, I draw a distinction between informal street traders who have legal permits to trade and informal street traders who are rendered illegal by not being able to access a permit. There are more than two types of trading in public spaces: i.e. legal traders (who tend to be concentrated in designated spaces) and illegal traders (who are ‘unregulated’ and who ‘infringe’ upon by-laws). However, as the focus of my research is ‘public space’ I maintain this distinction between legal and illegal in order to analyse the processes that serve to legalise or criminalise trading in public space.

The use of the term ‘informal’ in my study is to denote unregulated (smaller-scale) economic activities (that take place in public spaces). While informal trading on the Grand Parade takes place both in a public open space, a market and as street/kerbside trading, for the purposes of this study I use the term ‘street trading’, as a form of shorthand. For the rest of this chapter and in Chapter 2, I also use it as a synonym for ‘informal trading’ when this occurs on streets (and other public spaces), as many authors and city authorities use these terms interchangeably. From Chapter 3 onwards, I use the term ‘street trading’ exclusively.

1.3. The Background to the Study: an overview of the history of informal trading policy in South Africa

South Africa has a long history of informal trading. Colonial and apartheid policies sought to eliminate informal trading from city centres and ‘white areas’ by using forceful means to harass ‘hawkers’ – as informal traders were pejoratively called. For example, during the colonial period, authorities in major centres such as Cape Town engaged in tight control of informal trading by limiting the number of trading licenses issued (Rogerson and Hart, 1989). This was a tactic to ensure that access to this form of livelihood opportunity was strictly limited. License limitation was not effective in preventing people from trading, as the numbers of unlicensed traders increased despite facing harassment and confiscation of goods (ibid.).

Beall and Preston-Whyte (1985) highlight the manner in which informal trade was curtailed by colonial authorities in Durban in the early twentieth century. Nesvag (2000) argues that, until the 1930s, the regulation of street trade was not as punitively regulated as it would be under the Apartheid regime. Policies were only moderately effective, as they were often contradictory and contained many loopholes (Nesvag, 2000).

Many of these loopholes were addressed by the Apartheid legislation that followed. Specifically, these were the Group Areas Act (1950) and the Black (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act (1945). The first prevented black South Africans access to better trading sites in city centres declared for ‘whites’, and the second even restricted economic activities in so-called ‘black urban areas’, which were often townships located on urban peripheries. According to Rogerson and Hart (1989: 32), South African city authorities “fashioned and refined some of the most sophisticated sets of anti-street trader measures anywhere in the developing world”. They note that until the early 1980s, traders in South Africa were subject to “a well-entrenched tradition of repression, persecution and prosecution” (ibid.). During the mid-1980s, influx control laws became less enforceable and were repealed in 1986, while in 1991, the Businesses Act removed many barriers to informal economic activity,
and made enforcement of the ‘move-on’ laws an offence (Skinner, 2008b). Skinner observes that this relaxation of legislation controlling informal street trading in the early 1990s led to a dramatic increase in trading in all South African cities and towns.

Only since the fall of Apartheid, has the informal sector been recognised as pivotal for the growth of the national economy and essential in job creation and poverty reduction. Rogan and Skinner (2017) estimate that more than 2.5 million people are employed in the informal economy in South Africa, making up 16.4% of the total workforce. Just over half of them are self-employed, and the remainder are employees. This is significant in the context of a country with high unemployment. The informal economy plays a large role in access to employment for the poorest and most vulnerable sections of society, with around 37% of South Africa’s working low-income individuals involved in the informal economy (Turok et al., 2017). Sokanyile (2016) notes the City of Cape Town’s economic performance figures indicate that informal trade is the city’s second largest employment sector, providing more than 160 000 jobs, with significant growth in jobs occurring in recent years. Informal trading is vital not only for job creation and poverty reduction, but also in improving self-worth, as shown by the words of a female trader on the Grand Parade:

*I had a very long period where I was unemployed, but since trading here I must say I feel my dignity as a mother has been restored*  
(Sokanyile, 2016: Online).

However very little has in fact been done to support informal trading, and most actions taken can be seen as efforts at ‘formalisation’, such as creating restricted trading areas and making license payments a condition of recognition (Steck et al., 2013). There has been an increase in harassment of traders through the enforcement of municipal by-laws, with many of these drawing on colonial era by-laws (Skinner, 2008b). A contemporary case of harassment is seen by the mass evictions of around 7000 street traders in Johannesburg in October 2013 as part of the City of Johannesburg’s ‘Operation Clean Sweep’ (SERI, 2015). Operation Clean Sweep resulted in stock confiscations and deprived traders of their trading locations, with police giving no cohesive explanation for the evictions (Nxumalo, 2013). Commentators have called the operation a “brutal, arbitrary, and contemptuous way for the state to solve urban issues” (Benit-Gbaffou et al., 2014:3).

1.4 Identifying the issue under study

The National Development Plan (NDP) outlines the need to “pilot mechanisms and incentives to assist the unemployed to access the labour market” (National Planning Commission, 2012). The principle of spatial justice in the Spatial Planning and Land Use Management Act of 2013 (SPLUMA), calls for “past spatial and development imbalances [to] be redressed through improved access to and use of land”, and “the inclusion of persons and areas previously excluded” (SPLUMA, 2013: 18). Secondly, the principle of good administration in this Act calls for the inclusion of “transparent processes of public participation that afford all parties the opportunity to provide inputs on matters affecting them; and policies, legislation and procedures [that] must be clearly set in order to inform and empower members of the public” (ibid.). Informal traders have been included in participatory and consultative processes in the city of Cape Town. However, the degree of participation is often uneven, the representivity often contested and the level of bargaining power often minimal (Steck et al., 2013). Deakin (1999:2), in an effort to define social equity in planning, notes that equity, fairness, and justice can function as synonyms, and defines the meaning of justice as having “a basis in fact, and [following] established rules and procedures to produce an impartial result”. Planners need to be aware that justice requires an examination of how gains and losses are distributed, and that compensatory action is sometimes required (Deakin, 1999). Planning can be seen as a means to
improve physical and economic conditions for people, particularly for the most under-resourced, and thus the challenge for planners is how to promote participatory democracy and positive social change (ibid.).

The motivation for doing this research is that equitable planning processes and outcomes are important for informal traders. This is due to the long history in South Africa of repressive policies towards informal trading, and that post-1994 there has been little in the way of support for informal trading in urban centres, or even the creation of an enabling environment for trading to occur. Municipal governments seldom see informal traders as actors with agency, who can actively engage with authorities and have an impact on planning processes and outcomes that affect their livelihoods. The fragmentary relationships between informal trader organisations are a contributing factor (Pezzano, 2011; Didier et al, 2012). Equitable informal trading management processes could have a significant impact in creating outcomes that are more supportive and enabling of traders’ livelihood strategies.

But why focus on informal trading in the inner city of Cape Town specifically?

Miraftab (2007) argues that since the 17th century, white settlers in the Western Cape have dispossessed Khoisan people of land and cattle (and thus wealth), exploited the slave labour of Africans and South and South East Asians, and extracted natural resources to support wealth accumulation by the “expansionist mercantile capitalist class in the [Cape Town] metropol” (Miraftab, 2007:603). Miraftab draws a line from here, via the 1913 Land Act that confined indigenous people to ‘homelands’ and excluded them from cities, to the 1950 Group Areas Act that further socially structured urban space to the exclusion and exploitation of a “racialised urban labour force” (ibid.). The argument that Miraftab makes is that the urban management strategy adopted by Cape Town since 2000, as implemented by the Central City Improvement District (CCID) in the central city “restructure[s] urban space to serve the ideal of a world-class city integrated into the global economy, at the cost of the city’s social and spatial integration” (Miraftab, 2007:603). It is thus a continuation of the exclusionary practices of the past. However, Miraftab notes, as the CCID’s “contentious neoliberal processes try to marketise public urban spaces, [they are] challenged both within and outside the [CCID’s] management structures” (ibid.). She argues that the tensions that the CCID embodies “are rooted in Cape Town’s colonial struggle between dispossession and citizenship claims, between imposed elitist fantasies of urban planning and the local realities”, that this encounter is far from approaching equilibrium, and that the manner in which these tensions will be resolved is not clear (ibid.).

In this study, I focus on the historic core of Cape Town, loosely defined as the central business district (CBD), which was a designated “white area” under Apartheid. This is done for the following two reasons: firstly, the historical significance of the area as a “contested space central to the struggle over citizenship and the right to the city ever since the first Western settlers arrived” (Miraftab, 2007:603); and secondly, the significant economic contribution of the area to the tax income of the City of Cape Town, as well as its vital role in the lives of the city’s low income residents, whose livelihood strategies are closely connected to the city centre’s public transport hub, informal markets and public squares (Miraftab, 2007). The specific case study area is the Grand Parade, a public square that sits adjacent to the Cape Town station and plays a prominent role in these livelihood strategies.

The Grand Parade is South Africa’s oldest public space and is a declared Provincial Heritage Site. It sits in the historic core of Cape Town, bordered by some of the City’s most iconic buildings, and is at the heart of a civic spine leading from Parliament to the Civic Centre. It has served as a multifunctional place where the diverse people of Cape Town have traded, bought food, debated, protested and been entertained. It was the place where Nelson Mandela’s first public address occurred after his release from 27 years in prison on Robben Island. The historical significance of the site stretches back to pre-
colonial times, as Stone Age tools have been discovered in the vicinity of the Grand Parade, and seasonal pastoralist settlements are known to have been located on the site (Abrahams, 1993).

Despite the strategic metropolitan importance of the Grand Parade as a public open space that acts as a link between the city centre, the Castle, Cape Town Station, and the City Hall, there is currently no public policy position or plan for the future of the site. While the Central City Development Strategy (CTP, 2008) and the Fringe Urban Design Framework (GBUSPD, 2012), both produced for the Cape Town Partnership and the City of Cape Town, outline plans for the broader ‘East City’ context, little mention is made of the Grand Parade. When the Parade is directly addressed, it is stated that it “(will) continue to be a multi-use public space, but in a more formalised way” and that it will “become a more internally focused space with its edges (such as the north side abutting the bus terminus) attracting new investment such as office and commercial developments.” (GBUSPD, 2012:16). This leads one to speculate as to whether the Grand Parade is part of a process to ‘formalise’ and ‘package’ the site for future development.

Both the Cape Town Partnership and the City of Cape Town acknowledge that these two policy documents are outdated, however no revised policy documents have replaced them, and as such confusion is created as to the future of the Grand Parade and the broader East City Precinct. As the City is currently perceived by certain sectors of the public as having a pro-developer focus (Gosling, 2017), one wonders what this policy confusion could mean for the traders on the Grand Parade and their dependants, as well as the broader public who on a daily basis make use of this vital historic open space in a multitude of ways.

While the City of Cape Town recognises the importance of informal trading, which it says “contributes around 12% to Cape Town’s economy and is a major creator of employment” (CTP, 2017), there is clearly more that can be done to enable informal trading in the Cape Town city centre and on the Grand Parade.

1.5. Establishing the Aim of the Study

The contested nature of the Grand Parade necessitates an investigation into the impacts of the City of Cape Town’s street trading management approach on the livelihood strategies of traders on the Parade. A detailed understanding of these impacts can aid in crafting policy and management proposals to better enable these livelihood strategies.

Accordingly, this study aims to:

• Identify, describe, and analyse the impacts of the City of Cape Town’s street trading management approach on the livelihood strategies of traders on the Grand Parade
• Provide City officials and planners with recommendations on how better to enable the livelihood strategies of street traders on the Grand Parade

These are the over-arching aims of my research. It is to a discussion of the main research question that this chapter now turns.

1.6. Establishing the Main Research Question

The main research question, which is shaped by the issue identified above, as well as the aims of the research, asks:

What is the impact of the City of Cape Town’s street trading management approach on the livelihood strategies of traders on the Grand Parade?

In order to answer the main research question, a selection of research methods and techniques will be employed. The former consists of the case study and discourse analysis methods. The latter entails the use of semi-structured interviews, both with informal traders and city officials, as well as field observations of informal trading on the Grand Parade. The fact that I will make use of two different research techniques, namely interviews and field observations, will allow for verification of the qualitative research findings. Each will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. The next chapter (Chapter 2) contains a literature review that is used to establish subsidiary research questions and assessment criteria against which the findings are analysed. However, before turning to the next chapter, this chapter concludes with
1.6. Structure of the Dissertation

The rest of the dissertation is structured as follows:

Chapter 2 contains an in-depth review of the relevant literature. This literature review will be used to establish subsidiary research questions. In turn, criteria for assessing the impact of the City of Cape Town’s street trading management approach on the livelihood strategies of traders on the Grand Parade will be derived from these subsidiary research questions.

Chapter 3 outlines the qualitative research methods and techniques used to undertake this study. Case study and discourse analysis research methods, and the related techniques, will be identified and discussed at length in this chapter. The case under study will be introduced in more detail. In turn, the limitations of the methods and techniques used to collect data for this study will be discussed. The chapter will end with a discussion on how the data will be analysed.

Chapter 4 provides a context of the history of street trading on the Grand Parade, as well as current management arrangements.

Chapter 5 describes and analyses the data collected using the assessment criteria established in Chapter 2 to evaluate the impact of the City of Cape Town’s street trading management approach on the livelihood strategies of traders on the Grand Parade.

Chapter 6 begins by providing answers to the main and subsidiary research questions. In so doing, the research findings are synthesised. The chapter will then go on to present policy and other planning recommendations on how the issues identified in the study might be resolved. Some of the recommendations are developed from the ‘solutions’ suggested by the literature. Other recommendations are drawn from the research findings, and are hence situated and context-specific.
Figure 1.2: The Grand Parade and surrounds (Source: Google Earth, 2017)
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1. Introduction

The central political challenge is to empower insurgent interests in the city to claim their rights, entitlements and interests through the available participatory democratic forums.

(Pieterse 2004:101)

The purpose of this chapter is, firstly, to review the relevant literature on the issue under study. Secondly, it is to establish subsidiary research questions for the purpose of guiding my fieldwork, in pursuance of the aim of this study (cf. Chapter 1). Criteria against which the case will be evaluated are also established, with research findings presented in Chapter 5.

The structure of this chapter is as follows: section 2.2 begins with a discussion of the importance of the informal economy in South Africa. Section 2.3 gives an overview of the informal sector policy environment at national and provincial levels. Section 2.4, in turn, establishes the disjuncture between developmental state policies and restrictive municipal street trading management practices. This discussion covers concepts such as the right to the city, the just city and the nature of participatory spaces in urban decision-making in South Africa. Section 2.5 contains an interrogation of the meanings surrounding management and regulation, and then goes on to discuss the elements of both progressive and restrictive street trading management approaches. Section 2.6 discusses the value and importance of ‘genius loci’, or ‘a sense of place’, for planning and trading in public spaces, while section 2.7 summarises local and global South case examples that demonstrate innovative and progressive street trading management approaches. Common elements are also identified from these approaches. Section 2.8. turns to a discussion of street trader organisations and politics. This chapter concludes, in section 2.9, with the main arguments put forward, and a summary table of the subsidiary research questions asked and the accompanying assessment criteria identified.

2.2. The importance of the informal economy

The South African informal sector, though smaller than in other developing countries (Skinner and Haysom, 2016), is an important employment source, and contributes 5.2% to the country’s gross domestic product (Stats SA, 2016). It represented 16.4% of total employment in the country in 2016, with women making up 38% of total informal sector employment (Stats SA 2016). Foreign migrants are common in the sector, but not well captured in national survey data (Skinner and Haysom, 2016). This is because they are often excluded from formal jobs and have to create their own employment (Crush et al. 2015). For example, a survey of Zimbabwean migrants in Johannesburg and Cape Town in 2010 showed that 20% of all migrants were employed informally (Crush and Tawodzera 2011). Trading made up 40.5% of all informal sector activity in 2016 (Stats SA 2016), and Skinner and Haysom (2016) note that the informal and the formal sectors are closely intertwined, with mutual trading and exchange occurring.

2.2.1. Food security

In 2014, 67% of street traders in South Africa were selling food (Stats SA, 2014), showing that food trade dominates informal retail. A survey of street traders in Durban in 2003 found that 60% were selling food (Skinner 2008b), while a 2012 study of Delft in Cape Town showed that 64% of informal businesses were selling food and/or beverages (Charman et al 2012). Informal trading is a vital source of employment and income for poor households, aiding access to food (Skinner and Haysom, 2016). There is an interdependent relationship between street traders and formal fresh produce markets in Cape Town (Ortiz 2015 in Skinner and Haysom, 2016), surfacing the existence of informal – formal linkages.

The importance of the informal sector in food sourcing by poorer households is highlighted in a household food security survey conducted in eleven Southern African cities in 2011. This showed that around 66% of households in poorer areas normally source their food from informal outlets, with the majority purchasing at least once a week (Crush and Frayne 2011:799 cited in Skinner and Haysom, 2016). While supermarkets also provide access to food, their expansion in low-income areas of Cape Town is “often incompatible with the consumption strategies of the poorest households, revealing the significance of the informal economy” (Peyton et al. 2015:36 cited in Skinner and Haysom, 2016).
Skinner and Haysom (2016) argue that urban food security is enabled through the use of multiple and varied food access strategies, with street trading being but one. In addition, they argue that access can be enabled or hindered by spatial planning and food system inequalities among others, which are facilitated through policy, governance and the market across various scales (Skinner and Haysom, 2016). Therefore street trading management and spatial planning must incorporate food security considerations into decision-making processes.

One convenient aspect of informal food businesses is that when located near transport hubs, they provide access to food for those who have to leave home too early to eat breakfast (Krige, 2017). They offer meals or snacks that can easily be eaten on the go. Additionally, they often trade at peak consumer demand times, and thus are available when needed, in contrast to more formal businesses with strict operating hours. Petersen et al. (2017 cited in Krige, 2017) propose that an interconnected approach is necessary to provide support for informal food traders. They suggest one form of support could be the installation of bulk refrigeration to help keep stock fresh for longer.

2.2.2. The importance of street trading in Cape Town

Street trading plays an important role in Cape Town’s local economy and urban landscape. A CCID pedestrian survey in the city centre in 2014 showed that 73% of respondents shopped at informal traders (CCID, 2015). A 2015 CTP survey of people interviewed while they were shopping at informal traders, showed that the majority worked in the CBD, shopped regularly at informal traders, and that food, cigarettes and clothing were the most common purchases (Nteta, 2015). Most people surveyed also viewed informal trade as a necessary economic activity in the city centre. As noted in Chapter 1, informal trade is the city’s second largest employment sector, providing more than 160 000 jobs, with significant growth in jobs occurring in recent years (Sokanyile, 2016; cf. Chapter 1). Lastly, informal trading is vital not only for job creation and poverty reduction, but also aids in improving self-worth for marginalised Capetonians (ibid.; cf. Chapter 1).

2.3. Informal Sector Policy environment

2.3.1. National Government

Chapter 1 highlighted the repressive colonial and Apartheid-era policies that sought to eliminate informal trading from city centres, thus strictly limiting livelihood opportunities for marginalised South Africans. While the Businesses Act of 1991 removed many barriers to informal trading, it gave local governments the power to limit street trading and determine the locations and manner in which street trading could occur. A trader was rendered illegal by trading without a license, outside of designated areas, or in contravention of permit conditions. Thus, the Act was similar in spirit to preceding colonial and apartheid regulations (van der Heijden, 2012). In addition, the standard by-laws passed as a result of this Act, deal with street trading under criminal rather than administrative law, and therefore violations are sanctioned more harshly than if this was an administrative matter (ibid.).

Post 1994, the White Paper on the Development and Promotion of Small Businesses of 1995 was the first policy that acknowledged survivalist and entrepreneurial informal businesses as part of small business in South Africa (RSA, 1995). Rogerson’s (2004: 765) 10 year review of the impact of the government’s small, medium and micro enterprise (SMME) programmes concluded that they “to a large extent have bypassed micro-enterprises and the informal economy”. From 2003 onwards, President Mbeki argued that the informal sector was a ‘second economy’ that was ‘structurally disconnected’ from the first and the global economy, and not capable of generating its own growth and development (Devey et al., 2006). This is a false dichotomy, as research shows that the formal and informal economies are closely interconnected (Devey et al, 2006). The Accelerated Shared Growth Initiative of South Africa (ASGISA) even went so far as to call for the “elimination of the second economy” (RSA 2006:11).

Only with the National Development Plan, launched in 2012, did the focus shift to the importance of small business. The NDP targeted the creation of 11 million jobs by 2030 and argued that 90% of these new jobs will be created by SMMEs (NPC, 2012). However the
plan did not address how existing informal businesses will be supported, or how existing barriers to entry will be removed to generate these new jobs (Fourie, 2015). The Department of Small Business Development (DSBD) was created in 2014 to respond to the small business focus in the NDP. However, the Draft Business Licensing Bill (DTI, 2013) released in 2013, highlighted government intentions to regulate the informal sector. The Bill specified that a license would be required by anyone involved in business activities, irrespective of size. Commentators view the Bill as mostly punitive, arguing that it would result in large-scale criminalisation of current livelihood activities, as well as discriminate against foreign migrants by trying to exclude them (Crush et al., 2015; Rogerson, 2016; Turok et al., 2017). It is currently under review (Skinner and Haysom, 2016).

In 2014, the government launched the National Informal Business Upliftment Strategy (NIBUS) (DTI, 2014). This is the first post-apartheid national government policy statement on the informal sector (Skinner and Haysom, 2016). NIBUS proposed a strategy to enable the formalisation and integration of informal businesses into the formal economy (Turok et al., 2017). It suggested interventions to address infrastructure and skills deficits in informal businesses, such as financing, skills development and infrastructure measures (ibid.). Turok et al. (2017) observe that the strategy has not resulted in much improvement in the operating environment for most informal traders. They argue that NIBUS is in need of refinement and more systematic implementation, and that it has also not helped municipalities in dealing with the reality of tensions between support for the informal economy and other competing interests (ibid.).

2.3.2. Provincial government policies

Provinces have been slow in supporting and regulating the informal sector, despite their mandate to do so (Skinner and Haysom, 2016). The KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) Informal Economy Policy of 2011 (KZNPG, 2011) has not been developed into a White Paper, but the Western Cape Informal Sector Framework (2014) at least refers to the informal sector’s role in food security (WCPG, 2014). However, government informal economy initiatives often show neglect of spatial divisions (Turok et al., 2017). They ignore differences between areas and do not acknowledge and enable connections between the formal and informal sectors. Turok et al. (2017) argue that government strategies hardly revise or streamline existing legislation that hinders informal businesses.

2.4. South Africa: The disjuncture in approaches to street trading management

In South Africa, it is a constitutional requirement that public participation be undertaken by local authorities in order to build “a capable, accountable and responsive state that works effectively for its citizens” (NPC, 2012). This participatory approach is seen by municipal governments as reconciling their business-friendly agenda with residents’ ‘right to the city’, a principle understood as meeting socio-economic and other needs (Steck et al., 2013). Suggestions of the ‘right to the city’ in South Africa’s contemporary public policies include principles embodied in the Bill of Rights of the national Constitution of 1996, such as the rights to equality; freedom of movement and residence; freedom of trade, occupation and profession; and access to adequate housing, basic services and education (RSA, 1996). But what exactly is this ‘right to the city’, and how would the principles embodied in the Bill of Rights be achieved in urban policies and practices affecting street trading management?

2.4.1. Right to the city

The phrase ‘the right to the city’ was first used by Henri Lefebvre as the title of a 1968 work (“Le Droit à la ville”) that criticised the commodification and privatisation of urban space (Lefebvre, 1968). In Purcell’s (2013) interpretation, Lefebvre argues that in the prevailing liberal-democratic framework in which capitalism operates, the property rights of owners dominate over the use rights of inhabitants, and the exchange value of property, rather than its social use value, determines how it is used. The right to the city is thus commonly understood as a struggle to enhance citizens’ rights against the property rights of owners (ibid.).

Purcell (2013) argues that Lefebvre’s conception of the right to the city is about the right to participation and the right to appropriate urban space. Firstly, the right to participation entails the right of inhabitants to play
a key role in decision-making processes involving the production of urban space at all scales. “Unlike the indirect nature of liberal-democratic enfranchisement in which the voice of citizens is filtered through the institutions of the state, the right to the city would see inhabitants contribute directly to all decisions that produce urban space in their city” (Purcell, 2013: 102). Secondly, the right to appropriate urban space means that it should be produced in a way that enables the “full and complete use” of urban space by inhabitants in their daily lives. It thus encompasses the “right to live in, play in, work in, represent, characterize and occupy urban space.” (Purcell, 2013: 103). Purcell (2013:149) gives a useful rationale to this appropriation:

In claiming a right to the city, inhabitants take urban space as their own, they appropriate what is properly theirs. Property rights, for Lefebvre, are an expropriation of urban space. They take what properly belongs to inhabitants of a community and arrogate it to property owners, to those who bought land in the marketplace. Appropriation is thus a ‘right’ in the sense that users have a normative right to the space of the city. It is rightfully theirs.

Inhabitants’ rights to appropriate and to participate are achieved through active participation in the making and re-making of the city (ibid.). Thus, the right to the city has to be realised through collective action, and needs solidarity and new forms of alliances between inhabitants (Horlitz and Vogelpohl, 2009).

In the global South, it was in Brazil that the first initiatives for the right to the city appeared. According to Saule Júnior (2008 cited in Görgens and van Donk, 2012: 4):

The Right to the City arises as a response to the panorama of social inequality, considering the duality experienced in the same city: the city of the rich and the city of the poor; the legal city and the illegal city, as well as the exclusion of the majority of the city's inhabitants determined by the logic of spatial segregation; by the commodity city; by the mercantilization of urban soil and real-estate appraisal; by the private appropriation of public investments in housing, in public transportation, in urban equipment, and in public services in general.

The stark inequalities in resource distribution and the spatial exclusion of South African cities parallel this argument, and call for greater justice in urban decision making. But how can this be achieved?

2.4.2. The just city

A ‘just city’ is a:

\[ \text{City in which public investment and regulation would produce equitable outcomes rather than support those already well off.} \]

(Fainstein, 2010: 3)

Fainstein (2010:3) argues that the idea of what is unjust is almost instinctive, and “consists of actions that disadvantage those who already have less or who are excluded from entitlements enjoyed by others who are no more deserving”. She observes that despite much planning and public policy literature detailing appropriate decision-making processes, there is little focus on which policies would result in more urban justice. In addition, she argues, most policy analysis deals with best practices concerning specific planning goals, but does not interrogate the wider objectives of these policies (ibid.).

In response, Fainstein (2010) proposes an urban theory of justice. She argues that this would encompass equity, democracy, and diversity, and that this idea of justice should influence all public decision-making. Fainstein notes that Lefebvre’s arguments concerning the right to the city do extend beyond justice. She acknowledges that her proposals are “limited to what appears feasible within the present context of capitalist urbanisation” (Fainstein, 2010:5), and that they might not be able to “deal with the injustices inherent in capitalism”. However, she notes that she does not expect conflict to be avoided. Fainstein argues that the current system will change incrementally as a result of sustained pressure for justice. If decision makers are forced to make justice a main consideration in urban policies, then this will represent a significant change (ibid.). As an element of wider national and international movements, it would increase pressure for “restructuring capitalism into a more humane system” (Fainstein, 2010:6).

To guide public decision makers, Fainstein (2010) proposes a number of principles that can ensure greater
To promote greater equity, she states that “businesses should not be involuntarily relocated for the purpose of obtaining economic development or community balance except in exceptional circumstances.” (Fainstein, 2010:172). She argues that if relocation is necessary for the construction of public facilities, adequate compensation should be made in the form of an equivalent business site, irrespective of whether those dislocated are renters or owners, and independent of the market value of their original location. In addition, construction should occur incrementally to allow for those that are displaced to remain in the area on an interim basis. Secondly, Fainstein (2010) argues that economic development programmes should prioritize small businesses that have more local roots than large corporations. She further argues that all new commercial development should provide space for public use, and when possible “should facilitate the livelihood of independent and cooperatively owned businesses” (Fainstein, 2010:172). Lastly, planners should take an active role in decision-making processes to push for equitable solutions and to block those that disproportionately benefit the already well off.

To promote greater diversity, Fainstein (2010) proposes that zoning should not be discriminatory but should foster inclusion, and that boundaries between districts should be porous. Secondly, public space should be easily accessible and varied; and that political speech should not be prohibited in privatised public spaces. She also argues “groups with clashing lifestyles should not have to occupy the same location” (Fainstein, 2010:174). Fainstein explains this to mean that people should have the right to protect themselves “from those who do not respect their way of life” (ibid.). “What is important is that people are not differentiated and excluded according to ascriptive characteristics such as gender, ethnicity, or homelessness” (ibid.). Thirdly, Fainstein (2010:174) argues that land uses should be mixed when practical and “desired by affected populations”. Lastly, she argues “public authorities should assist groups who have historically suffered from discrimination in achieving access to opportunity in housing, education, and employment” (Fainstein, 2010:174). Fainstein notes that Appiah’s concept of “cosmopolitanism” (2006, xv) echoes her concept of diversity, as “we have obligations to others stretching beyond those to whom we are related by blood or nationality”, and “we take seriously the value of the lives of others...and give recognition” (Appiah, 2006:xv cited in Fainstein, 2010).

To promote greater democracy, Fainstein (2010) proposes that when a group is not able to participate directly in a decision-making process, it should be represented by an advocate. Secondly, if an area is already developed, plans should be developed in consultation with the target population, but that the existing population should not have the only say in the future of an area. Broad citywide considerations must also apply (ibid.). She notes that the purpose of inclusion in decision-making should be to ensure the fair representation of interests, and not to value participation in and of itself. Fainstein (2010) argues that democracy is mainly an instrument in the achievement of justice, and thus equity should take priority over democracy.

Fainstein (2010) also provides strategies for how to promote justice in decision-making. She notes that planners and policy analysts work within the public sector, private consulting firms, and nonprofit organizations. They lack individual power to implement policy and are restricted by politicians and clients in the regard to what objectives they can aim for. She cites Weber’s (1958) argument that “bureaucrats can use their control over information to bend their political superiors to their will” (Fainstein, 2010:180). Fainstein argues that they can supplement cost/benefit analyses to include who bears the costs and who gets the benefits, and thus shift debate towards equity. Citizen activism can support this as “citizens have an interest in knowing who is getting what” (Fainstein, 2010:180). Regardless of this support, justice should be the goal of all decisions, as “it is way too easy to follow the lead of developers and politicians who make economic competitiveness the highest priority and give little or no consideration to questions of justice.” (Fainstein, 2010:180).

In the interests of a just city, these principles should surely inform all planning processes and outcomes involving street traders in the Cape Town city centre. In Chapter 1, it was argued that street traders were negatively affected by renovation of public spaces linked to the 2010 Soccer World Cup. To understand why these decisions appear to have gone against principles embodied in the Bill...
of Rights and those proposed by Fainstein (2010), one must analyse the nature of participatory processes and explore the context of urban governance and street trading management in South African cities. It is to these discussions that I now turn.

### 2.4.3. Spaces of participation

Fainstein (2005) argues that it is only through more inclusive forms of governance that more just outcomes can be achieved. While participatory governance is promoted by the South African Constitution and mandated in public policies (e.g. SPLUMA; cf. Chapter 1), spaces of participation have been criticised by a number of commentators (Cornwall, 2002; Harvey, 2005), particularly in South African urban governance contexts (Winkler, 2011; Steck et al., 2013; Morange, 2015). It is important to understand the nature of these spaces. Cornwall (2002) proposes that spaces for participation exist along a continuum. At one end are ‘closed’ spaces, where decisions are made without any participation at all. When efforts are made at including some form of participation, ‘invited’ spaces are created where state actors control the space and narrative, inviting citizens to take part at different stages of the policy- and decision-making processes. Lastly, ‘claimed’ spaces are those that civil society claims from those in power in reaction to the dominance of closed or invited spaces (Winkler, 2011). These spaces “come into being as a result of popular mobilization around identity or issue-based concerns” (Cornwall, 2002:24).

Steck et al. (2013) and Morange (2015) view the state-led participatory processes involving street traders that took place in the run-up to the 2010 FIFA World Cup as invited spaces that ‘constructed consent’ (Harvey, 2005) and a ‘fiction of community’ (Morange, 2015) in order to further the aims of a ‘world-class city’ amid increasing neo-liberal governance of urban space. These processes ended in fact to the traders’ disadvantage as many were relocated to make way for renovations of public spaces (Morange, 2015) and the construction of the Cape Town Stadium (Hirsch, 2016). But how can street traders claim their right to the city in these participatory processes?

Winkler (2011) argues that state-led public participation in South Africa is ineffective and lacks transformative potential due to the deepening centralisation of decision making, a focus on performance management (as part of a New Public Management approach), and the powerful role of politics in planning. Certain scholars argue that participation is not transformative when “the language of empowerment is used to mask facilitators’ real concerns for ‘efficiency’ through NPM (Cooke and Kothari 2001; Harcourt and Escobar 2002 cited in Winkler, 2011: 260).

In order for citizens to play a meaningful part in state-led participation processes, and for this to lead to transformation in planning policies, practices, and outcomes, Winkler (2011) proposes a move towards Heller’s “optimist conflict model” of participatory democracy and responsive government (2001 cited in Winkler, 2011). Active citizenry is one aspect of this model (ibid.). Another aspect is a more responsive state “so that the boundaries between claimed and invited spaces for participation may become more permeable” (Winker, 2011: 267). The model helps citizens to claim space in challenging public policy, but also means that the state must remake these spaces to become more inclusive, responsive, and effective, even if trade-offs in outcomes are necessary (ibid.). However, these changes require the necessary political will to be implemented, and a “step-by-step process of radical reform and social learning in all domains of public action” (Friedmann 1987: 407 cited in Winker, 2011).

### 2.4.4. The disjuncture between developmental policies and restrictive practices

Despite municipal policies acknowledging the importance of street trading, management practices contradict policy. The City of Johannesburg (CoJ) is a prime example of this contradiction, as it has steadily drafted progressive municipal street trading policies (Matjomane, 2013), and adopted apparently progressive institutions, such as the Informal Traders Forum, which involves traders in policy discussions.
and implementation discussions. In practice, however, the CoJ follows inefficient and restrictive approaches (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015). The legitimacy given to traders was challenged by the highly contested Operation Clean Sweep in November 2013, which involved the City displacing around 7,000 licensed and unlicensed street traders from the Johannesburg city centre, many of them migrants.

In contrast, the approach of the eThekwini Municipality (Durban) in the early 2000s is held up as an example of a progressive approach to street trading (Skinner, 2008b; Dobson and Skinner, 2009). A progressive informal economy policy was adopted by the city administration in 2001 and this policy still stands (Skinner and Haysom, 2016). The policy was manifested in the inclusive upgrading of the Warwick Junction inner-city transport hub, which will be detailed later in this chapter.

However, the municipality has subsequently taken a more ambivalent approach (Skinner and Haysom, 2016). In 2009, the city council approved a mall development at Warwick which threatened the livelihoods of 6,000 traders, which was only stopped through approaching the courts (Skinner, 2010). Poignantly, street traders won a case in 2015 that challenged the constitutionality of confiscating street traders’ goods, forcing the city to revise street trading by-laws (Skinner and Haysom, 2016).

As can be seen from these examples, at the municipal level in South Africa a disjuncture exists between progressive policy and restrictive implementation. This is eloquently expressed by Bromley (2000:17 cited in Skinner, 2008a: 22):

**The key point is that there is a wide gulf between the broad aims and directives of senior administrators and politicians, and the ways policies can actually be worked out on the street. Regulating street vendors... requires interactions between dozens of local officials and literally thousands of vendors, with enormous potential for misunderstandings, avoidance and deception. The inspectors, police and extension workers who perform such functions are usually at the bottom of the administrative hierarchy, and regulating and promoting street vending is one of the lowest status and most difficult tasks that they have to perform.**

Watson (2003) argues for the importance of understanding the ‘conflicting rationalities’ that affect planning and management decisions. The reality that individuals can have fundamentally different worldviews and different value-systems is often not acknowledged by officials and planners. These ‘conflicting rationalities’ can and often do clash when plans or development projects intersect with the “lives and livelihoods of households and communities” (Watson, 2003: 396). The ethical responses by officials and planners in such situations need to be interrogated. What should be done, for whom and by whom, and with what benefits and costs? (Watson, 2003:404). Whose ethics should prevail?

The disjuncture between developmental national policies and restrictive municipal approaches to street trading management in South Africa is such a case of
‘conflicting rationalities’. It can be seen as an issue of policy implementation, and an understanding of street trading issues in predominantly economic terms (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015). As an issue of policy implementation, national policy (e.g. NIBUS) is supportive of street trading but it fails to acknowledge contextual municipal issues, such as the tension created by a dual (and often contradictory) mandate to alleviate poverty and promote economic development, while still managing intense use of urban space (ibid.).

An understanding of street trading issues in predominantly economic terms is problematic as street trading is in fact primarily a planning and land use management issue (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015). But in order to plan, municipal authorities also need to understand the economic aspects of residents’ livelihood strategies. It is up to city officials to decide how to address these conflicts, as determined by local by-laws and spatial plans. While this is partially addressed in local economic development planning, the effective separation of planning and management leads to a disconnect. A municipality must also adhere to national directives. I thus derive assessment criteria and ask the subsidiary question:

To what extent does the City of Cape Town’s street trading management practice on the Grand Parade align with national developmental policies?

However, there are local and global South case examples that demonstrate innovative and progressive street trading management, despite being short-lived. Before turning to a summary of these cases, an understanding of the dimensions of street trading management models must first be developed. It is to this discussion that I now turn.

2.5. Street trading management models

2.5.1 The meaning of ‘management’

It is important to unpack the meaning of street trading management in order to understand the political aspects and social impacts of the choices made by authorities around how street trading occurs. Bénit-Gbaffou (2015) contends that the term ‘management’ is used as a way of depoliticising ‘governance’, reducing it to technical details and ignoring political aspects and social impacts. In turn, she defines governance in the case of informal street trading as the manner in which decision-making impacts an area or group. This involves the interaction of a number of stakeholders, the state being just one, through cooperation, alliances or conflict, with the power balance between these stakeholders shifting constantly. Bénit-Gbaffou (2015) argues that one must question the political situation of the adoption and application of ‘management’ models, as well as analyse the political context, power levels, interpersonal relationships, and structural conditions between stakeholders involved. The stakeholders relevant to my study are street traders, the state, law enforcers (e.g. police), private businesses, and public-private partnerships such as business (or city) improvement districts.

‘Regulation’ is also a problematic term for traders in regards to street trading. This is because the term is commonly associated with the exclusionary outcomes that result from formalising a limited number of traders, and it is often equated in the literature with the repression of informal street traders by municipal authorities (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015). But, this also does not acknowledge the difficult job of balancing competing land uses and urban needs in city centres. However, Bénit-Gbaffou (2015) argues that term ‘regulation’ is more useful than ‘governance’ as it helps to analyse the everyday management arrangements between traders, municipal officials, and law enforcers, such as the police. It highlights the strategic importance of the different technical decisions made in a regulatory process, including numbers of traders to be accommodated in a specific area and how this is decided; and the number of representatives from each stakeholder constituency that are represented in a trading stakeholder committee among other considerations.

2.5.2 Progressive and sustainable management models

One also needs to understand what a ‘progressive management model’ and a ‘sustainable management model’ mean for street trading for both legalised and illegalised informal street traders. Bénit-Gbaffou (2015) argues that a progressive management model is developmental and inclusive. Firstly, she argues that
it is developmental if it endeavours to support traders’ livelihood strategies, along a spectrum from creating a less restrictive environment to a supportive one. She proposes the following questions to ascertain if a management model is developmental (from a trader perspective):

- To what extent does the management model allow for new entrants with limited financial capital?
- What forms of support and services are provided to traders to aid in sustaining their livelihoods?
- Do the support structures differ between survivalist and entrepreneurial street traders?

I in turn derive criteria from these questions and ask the subsidiary research question:

To what extent is the City of Cape Town’s street trading management approach on the Grand Parade developmental?

A progressive management model is inclusive if it endeavours to legalise all (or a majority of) existing street traders (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015). Here, I question if all traders want to be legalised, as this surely is the state’s ultimate aim? UN-Habitat (2006) argues that regulation of the informal economy can lead to improved recognition of property rights, greater access to credit, access to basic urban services, productivity gains, as well as higher savings arising from a reduction in corrupt practices. Tax revenues can also be generated for the state. As such, I adopt the position that formalising street trading via the issuing of permits/licenses is beneficial to the livelihood security of traders. Inclusivity also means involving street traders in policy making and management decisions affecting them through the relevant decision-making institutions, rather than just consultation.

For a management model to be sustainable, it must not be so contested that it results in a failure of management. Bénit-Gbaffou (2015) notes that sustainability implies notions of equity and managerial efficiency based on the perhaps debatable assumption that equitable models have a longer life span than those that are inequitable. This is because they generate less resistance from those being governed or managed i.e. the traders. However, as Bénit-Gbaffou (2015) points out, though this concept is useful, it also fails to make clear the complex relationship between equity and efficiency. She argues that regarding restrictive street trading management approaches, it is plausible that their lack of equity (or progressiveness) produces their lack of efficiency and possible management failure.

2.5.3. Restrictive street trading management approaches

There appears to be limited literature on examples of progressive or sustainable street trading management. However, much literature details the elements of restrictive municipal approaches to street trading management. Firstly, restrictive approaches try to significantly limit street trader numbers in city centres (Mitullah, 2005; UN-Habitat 2006; Roever, 2006; David et al. 2013). Placing an unreasonable restriction on the number of trading licenses results in increased numbers of un-licensed (or ‘illegalised’) street traders (ibid.) This creates more disorder, from the standpoint of city officials, and hinders opportunities for individuals to access livelihood opportunities. In effect this criminalises the poor and hinders livelihood strategies (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015).

Secondly, restrictive approaches engender municipal corruption, violence and mismanagement, and foster informal arrangements, patronage, and aggression between traders (Mitullah, 2005; UN-Habitat 2006; Roever, 2006; David et al. 2013). Corruption by municipal officials is fostered when they are tasked with applying by-laws removed from urban needs and realities. This is illustrated by the case of São Paulo, Brazil where vendors have precarious working conditions due to violent police repression, relations of patronage with officials controlling access to licenses, and the solicitation of bribes from traders operating in unlicensed spaces (Itikawa 2004 cited in Roever, 2006). Roever cites Itikawa’s argument that this patronage and corruption is due to the lack of clear legal definitions in by-laws, and the tendency by authorities to alternate between tolerance and repression of street trading. Aggression between traders is induced by restrictive approaches as traders are in competition for license allocation and trading space access (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015). Crush et al. (2015) note that competition over informal trading spaces also produces gender struggles with men.
sometimes displacing women.

Thirdly, relocating traders to off-street sites or other locations in a city may lead to reduced pavement congestion, with improved infrastructure, safety and hygiene for traders (Donovan, 2002; Roever, 2006), but also leads to income loss (Mitullah, 2003; Roever, 2006). Locating trading spaces along key pedestrian routes is vital for trader livelihoods (Bénit-Gbffou, 2015). City-led relocations can produce tensions with relocated traders, and necessitate the deployment of law enforcement officers to prevent re-occupation of former trading sites, as was the case in Nairobi, Kenya (Mitullah, 2003).

Lastly, restrictive policies and practices often produce both collective and individual resistance and adaptation on the part of traders (Roever, 2006; UN-Habitat, 2006). For example, lack of trader involvement in drafting a street trading by-law in Caracas, Venezuela, as well the by-law’s lack of legal clarity, encouraged street traders to “privately appropriate space through strategies of negotiation and confrontation with city governments” (Roever, 2006:21).

From these dimensions of restrictive street trading management approaches, I derive criteria for assessment and ask the subsidiary research question:

To what extent is the City of Cape Town’s street trading management approach on the Grand Parade restrictive?

Before turning to a summary of the local and global South case examples that demonstrate innovative and progressive street trading management approaches, I explore the relationship between street trading and public space.

Repression or restriction of street trading has been motivated by contemporary visions of the supposed appearance of ‘world-class cities’ (Skinner, 2008a). The relocations of street traders prior to the 2010 FIFA World Cup, to make way for renovations of emblematic public spaces in the Cape Town city centre, are viewed by commentators as driven by the dual pressure of managing competing land uses and creating a shop window of ‘well-managed’ spaces to attract foreign investment (Lindell, 2010; Steck et al.2013; Morange, 2015). But what does the relocation of traders from public spaces such as Green Market Square mean for the ‘sense of place’ of these spaces?

2.6. Genius loci

Norberg-Schulz (1979:5) suggests that:

The spaces where life occurs are places...A place is a space which has a distinct character. Since ancient times the genius loci, or spirit of place, has been recognized as the concrete reality man has to face and come to terms with in his daily life. Architecture means to visualize the genius loci and the task of the architect is to create meaningful places, whereby he helps man to dwell.

While referring to the role of architecture and architects in creating a sense of place, planners and the users and occupiers of a space also enact physical placemaking. Norberg-Schulz (1979:18) observes that “the structure of a place is not a fixed, eternal state”.

Landman (2010) goes further and puts forward a framework for understanding spatial transformation as a socio-spatial process. This process involves space, need, idea, order, form and meaning. Space is often informed by specific time- and context-based needs. Need produces a response in how to address it, and this starts to produce an ordered spatial manifestation of the need and idea. This form reflects the character of a space and contributes towards the creation of a sense of place, which can be modified over time. People attach meaning to spaces and places, by ‘reading’ or ‘experiencing’ them (ibid.). Spaces and places can appeal to people’s emotions, such as feeling safe or unsafe in a place (ibid.). As such, physical space influences the use of space, as well as people’s behavioural patterns and reactions to it (ibid.). These responses can contribute to the transformation of a space if considered necessary by a sufficient number of people. This once again represents a need that can give rise to further transformation of a space. A range of actors involved in the production and management of space influence this process (Landman, 2010).

Thus, these producers and managers of space, both planners, city administrators, users and occupiers of
a space, have a vital role in planning and trading in public spaces. A strong sense of place will help define the meaning and use of a public space in the mind of the public. A positive sense of place can create and be created by concentrated use of public space (often colloquially referred to as ‘vibrancy’) as well as a feeling of safety in the space, and these can be seen as mutually reinforcing. Street trading, and its management, thus has the potential to contribute to, or detract from, this vibrancy and feeling of safety. I consequently establish assessment criteria and ask the subsidiary research question:

To what extent does the City of Cape Town’s street trading management approach affect the ‘genius loci’ or ‘sense of place’ of the Grand Parade, and does this support or hinder trader livelihood strategies?

2.7. Innovative and progressive implementation of street trading management

The first case example of a progressive approach to street trading management is the recent (2014) reform of street trading management policies in India. The reforms are based on a history of innovation and street trader mobilisation (Sinha and Roever, 2011). The Street Vendors (Protection of livelihood and regulation of street vending) Act of 2014 takes an inclusive approach by making the granting of trading permits (known as vending certificates) non-restrictive. It states that (i) all existing vendors should be granted trading permits, as long as they do not trade at more than one stall or have alternative sources of income; and (ii) that they should be granted a trading space at their current location, or at a nearby location (Sinha and Roever, 2011). Secondly, the legislation recognises ‘natural markets’ which are areas where traders naturally concentrate in reaction to customer flows, without trying to relocate or minimise these. Thirdly, participatory institutions known as Town Vending Committees have been set up, and their recognition by authorities and their constitutions enable them to have significant decision-making and advisory powers (ibid.)

The second case is the innovative street trading policy and implementation approach followed in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania from 1992 to 2000. The approach enabled traders to cooperatively manage their activities at street level (Nnkya, 2006). In the approach, known as the Sustainable Dar es Salaam Project (SDP):

The underlying assumption of SDP was that what people did should be the basis of planning decisions, rather than a master plan with legal force but little basis in economic and social realities. Its goal was strategic planning without master plans, but with a pragmatic solution to urban spatial management problems, which would be continually under review and development.

(Lyons et al., 2012: 1018, my emphasis)

Nnkya (2006) notes that the advantages of this approach included, firstly, street trader involvement in policy and implementation decisions. This promoted the consolidation of traders’ organisations, and they had an influence on decision-making. Secondly, the approach encouraged self-management of trading areas, which has led to numerous area-based traders associations (ibid.) Some area-based traders associations have registered as cooperatives in busy and lucrative inner city areas (ibid.).

This approach was short-lived. Removal of the UNDP Sustainable City Programme’s support for the SDP in 2007 was soon followed by a national and municipal policy backlash against street trading, resulting in evictions and destruction of trader stalls and stock (Lyons et al., 2012). Lyons et al. (2012) view these actions as a dislike by municipal officials of participatory approaches that were followed, as well as the power of the local business and political elite to lobby against street trading in the name of achieving the appearance of a ‘world-class city’. A third case is the street trading management system used in Bangkok, Thailand. Policy has fluctuated over time, from tolerance to stricter regulation, depending on national economic growth (street trading is more tolerated during economic crises and increasing unemployment), and also depending on the metropolitan region governor’s personality (Kusakabe, 2006). Purchasing from street traders, and eating in the street (‘public eating’) is accepted as a cultural phenomenon, even for middle income Thais (Yasmeen and Nirathron 2014). Overall, the trend has been
towards greater legitimisation of traders and broader trading areas, with an acceptance by authorities that street trading is part of Thai culture and important for poverty alleviation and economic growth (Kusakabe, 2006; Yasmeen and Nirathron, 2014). In Bangkok, the less restrictive and participatory approach followed led to increased municipal revenue, reduced corruption and improved by-law and regulation adherence by street traders (Kusakabe, 2006; Yasmeen and Nirathron, 2014). There are three important lessons from the Thai example. Firstly, changing the respective prejudices of street traders, officials and the general public through education is important in building a consensus around the value of street traders in cities (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015). Secondly, the idea of ‘street congestion’ is relative and context-specific, and technical norms of ‘carrying capacity’ or ‘degree of congestion’ of a street should be contextually negotiated (ibid.). The minimum pavement width for street trading is set at two metres in Bangkok, versus for example, three metres in Johannesburg (Kusakabe, 2006; Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015). From a practical perspective, a general threshold should be defined under municipal by-laws, with an allowance for locally negotiated guidelines (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015). Lastly, trading license certificates in Bangkok provide an asset for street traders, as they allow access to social welfare payments, and can be used as collateral for loans (Kusakabe, 2006; Yasmeen and Nirathron, 2014). This incentivises trader registration and fee payment (ibid.).

The final international case involves a comparative study of nine markets in Dar es Salaam by Lindell and Appelblad (2009), specifically looking at the impacts of contracting out market management to the private sector. There were five main findings around this form of management. First, it increased fee collection, which was then shared between the private companies and municipal authorities. Second, there was no increase in market maintenance or market infrastructure investment. The limited interest and expertise in street trading of private companies meant that markets were seen as revenue sources, not urban investment assets. Third, there was repression and violence towards traders, with few avenues to raise concerns over treatment. Fourth, politicians and their networks were awarded contracts, leading to increased corruption. Finally, in regard to trader cooperatives managing markets, it was found that these were not necessarily more democratic than private sector-managed markets, as the membership costs of these cooperatives excluded most traders. Cooperatives were found to be less inclusive than trader associations, due to income level disparities and a heightened focus on profit over trader development (Lindell and Appelblad, 2009).

A celebrated South African case of progressive street trader management is the so called ‘eThekwini model’ of
the late 1990s and early 2000s. The model was a result of the inclusive upgrading of the Warwick Junction market based on concerted pressure from a well-organised street traders organisation, the Self-Employed Women’s Union (SEWU) (Horn, 2014). This led to a temporary progressive street trading model approach between 1999 and 2001 and “selective policy implementation and regression” (Skinner, 2008b) between 2001 and 2005 (Horn, 2005). The model involved four key principles (Skinner, 2008b; Dobson and Skinner, 2009). Firstly, it recognised that busy, congested city areas are not only where street traders seek to trade, but also those that need the most urban management. Secondly, it acknowledged the uneven success of markets, and elected to only develop markets in areas where there is significant footfall, and which complement, not replace, street trading. Thirdly, there was recognition of the need to explicitly subsidise the informal economy, rather than focus on pure profit making or cost-recovery. Lastly, the model relied on participatory and area-based approaches (ibid.).

A number of key institutions were involved. Specifically, area-based management in Warwick Junction involved a dedicated project manager; solid links with Planning, Business Development, Health, and Police departments in particular; a site office to foster participation, and a ‘users and residents’ committee with links to project management. There was an empowered street trading organisation (SEWU). SEWU put pressure on municipal authorities, leading to the creation of a federation of street trader organisations in 1995, the Informal Traders Management Board (ITMB)(ibid.). The ITMB was involved in making strategic policy inputs. Parallel to the IMTB board, a multi-stakeholder forum was established to address street trading regulation issues, consisting of a dedicated Department of Informal Trade & Small Business Opportunities (DITSBO), the IMTB, private businesses, and relevant departments with concerns in the eThekwini city centre (Horn, 2014).

A new street trading policy was developed by a task team that included relevant departmental officials, academics, and NGOs (such as WIEGO - Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing). The eThekwini council adopted a developmental management policy in 2002 (Skinner, 2008b; Dobson and Skinner, 2009). In order to implement the policy, an Implementation Working Group (IWG) was formed which included relevant city officials, ITMB, and advisory NGOs with street trading expertise: WIEGO, StreetNet, and the Legal Resources Center (LRC)(Horn, 2014). The institutions allowed for localised, negotiated, and flexible solutions to practical day-to-day issues (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015). However, most of these participatory

Figure 2.3: Warwick Junction stalls (Source: Smithsonian Cooper-Hewitt National Design Museum, 2011)
and decentralised institutions were disbanded or restructured with the change in the City manager in 2004 (Horn, 2014). Bénit-Gbaffou (2015) observes that the number and institutionalisation of spaces for engagement, and the focus on building street trader organisational capacity to be involved in strategic policy and implementation decisions, were key to the eThekwini model.

I now turn briefly to two recent pilot street trading management projects in the Johannesburg city centre that, as Bénit-Gbaffou (2015) argues, show an alternative approach driven from outside municipal structures. The first involved a joint venture agreement between the Metropolitan Trading Company (MTC) and the Central Johannesburg Partnership (CJP). The MTC is a semi-autonomous ‘Municipally Owned Entity’ (MOE) that took over street trading management in the early 2000s, reporting to an independent board as well as the City’s Department of Economic Development. The CJP consists of private property and business owners in the central city. This agreement effectively shared responsibility for street trading management and fee collection. One manifestation of the agreement has been the Retail Improvement District (RID), a city improvement district (CID) (ibid.).

This CID aimed to integrate street traders into the district’s streets unlike other CIDs in the city, and the successful street trading management model piloted there, backed by significant public investment via the JDA (Johannesburg Development Agency) which involved pavement refurbishment, linear market construction (cf. Figure 2.4) and BRT (bus rapid transit) routes and stations, resulted in the accommodation of 700 to 900 street traders in the area (ibid.).

The positive aspects of the RID model are fourfold (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015). First, it allows for cross subsidisation where the property owner levy pays for street security and cleaning. Second, it makes use of diverse trading stalls types that do not impede pedestrian flows. Third, it establishes localised mechanisms for conflict resolution, maintenance, and control. Lastly, it promotes strong working relationships between management (CJP) and the City via regular meetings, funding and networks. On the other hand, there are limitations to the model. It is not trader-centric as they have limited input or control over management decisions. Financial sustainability is heavily reliant on the CID levy. Lastly, management efficiency is dependent on the strong lobbying power of the CJP and network links with municipal officials and politicians.

Many of the traders involved in the RID are members of the traders association, South African National Traders and Retailers Alliance (SANTRA), and the successful experience contributed to a level of trust between SANTRA and the CJP (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015). In the context of this working arrangement, and following Operation Clean Sweep in 2013, the two organisations proposed a pilot street management programme in the area around Park Station, Johannesburg’s main train station and public transport terminus, in an effort to show the possibility of sustainable street trading management (ibid.).

There were five main aspects of the pilot. First, the financial sustainability relied partly on a rental fee paid by traders, which, based on negotiations between CJP and SANTRA, was a square metrage fee (minimum of R10/day/square metre), which allowed entrepreneurial traders to pay more for extra trading spaces while not serving to be exclusionary to survivalist traders.
Second, as with the RID model, cleaning and security management and coordination would be paid for by trading stall rentals. Third, regarding ‘street carrying capacity’, it was agreed that all existing traders would, as far as possible accommodated through professionally designed sustainable spatial solutions. Fourth, the model intended to include shop and property owners, as they have a stake in improved management of the area, and to encourage their financial participation in the management model (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015).

Lastly, an unresolved issue was that of representation on the street trading management committee. Only SANTRA was represented on the committee, and they had developed a close relationship with the CJP in the RID pilot. However, the other trader organisations in the area were not represented and this had the potential to cause tensions (ibid.)

The aspects of these tensions between trader organisations need to be understood when analysing street trading management practices. Before turning to a discussion of these organisations and their politics, common elements can be identified from the progressive approaches above, which pragmatically address the complexities of street trading management. These elements are fivefold. One, they are grounded in participatory processes. Two, they involve street trading forums where multiple stakeholders can debate issues, and make agreements and compromises. Three, these street trading forums are resourced to allow for consolidation and capacitation of street trader organisations. Four, they often involve the setting up of a dedicated street trading management institution with a clear mandate. Last, they involve area-based street trading management processes and institutions.

From these elements, I derive assessment criteria and ask:

To what extent is the City of Cape Town’s street trading management approach on the Grand Parade pragmatic?

2.8. Trader organisations

As noted earlier, restrictive approaches to street trading management are the norm. This has caused street trader politics to consist of fluctuating but predominantly antagonistic relationships with local authorities, and resistance to these restrictive management approaches (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2016). The state, as well as NGOs, insist on engaging with a unified body of legitimate trader representatives, and view trader organisations as “lacking continuity, legitimacy, representativeness and strategic vision” (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2016:1105). However, this is hypocritical, as these divisions are predominantly produced by the state via its management and engagement techniques (ibid.). Trader organisations exist in different forms over time, but are often dominated by personalities. These leaders are often active in “fighting for positions, status and money, like most political entrepreneurs” (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2016:1107). They are also involved in mediation, problem solving, among others, often at the expense of their own business. There is limited evidence of trading organisation influence over local government policies or practices towards informal trading (Matjomane, 2013).

Trader organisations have defined political niches that are fluid, involve different strategies and tactics, and shift with political opportunity (Lindell, 2010). There are four distinct, but related, aspects to these differences (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2016). Firstly, organisations have varied constituencies. Secondly, they have different spatial focuses, from local areas up to national level. Thirdly, their main objective can be around either policy and legislation, or economic development. A policy and legislation objective would include opposing abusive police practices, resisting eviction and trying to guarantee security of tenure for trading spaces. It could also involve increasing the number of legal trading spaces, negotiating municipal services and infrastructure, and setting up forms of trader self-management or management partnerships. An economic development objective would include negotiating trader business training and support, forming cooperatives, developing access to credit or bulk buying, or applying for government tenders. Lastly, street trader organisations engage with municipalities in antagonistic or cooperative ways, but this depends on opportunity (Lindell, 2010). Their degree of antagonism or cooperation sits on a continuum, and also varies depending on the sections and levels of the state that are engaged (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2016). This may also involve playing one off against the other (Lindell, 2010). However, trader organisations...
have built historical identities around either antagonism or cooperation (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2016).

Intra-organisational unity is challenged by the scarcity of general meetings (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2016). This is due to the fact that meetings during the day affect trader incomes, and that most traders do not live near to their workplace and therefore have to catch transport home after work (ibid.). Inter-organisational unity is affected by the nature of municipal trading management. Organisations try to consolidate their power in a context of legal trading space scarcity, struggling to secure trading spaces for their members. This forces competition between organisations, or attempts at delegitimising other organisations or traders, particularly foreign traders (ibid.).

Xenophobia is prevalent in trader discourses (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2016). This can occur when foreign traders, barred from legal trading space access, set up illegally in better locations or with more mobility, sometimes even in front of the legal trading stalls of South African citizens (ibid.). Nationality and legal trading space scarcity are conflated into xenophobia, with South African traders calling for stricter clampdowns on illegal trading and the involvement of Home Affairs in these processes (ibid.). This can even escalate to violence against foreign traders (Crush et al., 2015; Kihato, 2009) – dubbed ‘violent entrepreneurship’ by Charman and Piper (2012).

While self-management of trading spaces has the potential for more inclusivity and democracy in city spaces, Bénit-Gbaffou (2016) raises two questions. These questions are similar to those she argues should be asked about City Improvement Districts in the privatised management of public space. Firstly, she questions how public space governance can be delegated to (large or small) entrepreneurs. Secondly, she questions how rights to freedom of association can be respected, and raises the possibility that delegating rent collection and trading space allocation can become undemocratic (ibid.). Bénit-Gbaffou (2016) concludes, that while street trading organisational politics are fragmented in their agency, and often involve clientelism and ad hoc arrangements, they highlight issues of representation, democracy, and political efficiency.

2.9 Conclusion

This chapter began with a discussion of the importance of the informal economy in South Africa, and demonstrated its key role in food security and the lives of marginalised Capetonians. This was followed by an overview of the informal sector policy environment at national and provincial levels, which highlighted national and provincial strategies that aim to support informal businesses, but that many of these strategies have had mixed results. The Draft Business Licensing Bill of 2013 is mostly punitive and discriminates against foreign migrants, while the National Informal Business Upliftment Strategy (NIBUS) of 2014 has not resulted in much improvement in the operating environment for most informal traders. Provinces have been slow in supporting and regulating the informal sector, and their informal economy initiatives often show neglect of spatial divisions, and do not do much to revise or streamline existing legislation that hinders informal businesses.

In turn, a disjuncture was identified between developmental state policies and restrictive municipal street trading management practices. This discussion covered concepts such as the right to the city, the just city and the nature of participatory spaces in urban decision-making in South Africa. The meanings surrounding management and regulation were interrogated, and the elements of both progressive and restrictive street trading management approaches were identified. The value and importance of ‘genius loci’, or ‘a sense of place’, for planning and trading in public spaces was highlighted, and local and global South case examples demonstrating innovative and progressive street trading management approaches were discussed. These approaches contained common elements that were identified and turned into criteria for assessing the case under study. Finally, street trader organisations and politics were discussed. This discussion identified the aspects of the various strategies and tactics that trader organisations employ. Intra- and inter-organisational unity were shown to be challenged by the nature of municipal trading management, as legal trading space scarcity produces tensions between organisations, which can spill over into xenophobia.

The overarching aim of this dissertation is to critically assess the impact of the City of Cape Town’s street
Let us now turn to discussions on research methods and techniques.
<table>
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| Restrictive Street Trading Management Approach | Criminalising the poor and hindering livelihood strategies  
Engendering municipal corruption, violence and mismanagement  
Fostering informal arrangements, patronage and aggression between traders  
Producing resistance and adaptation on the part of traders, both individually and collectively | To what extent is the City of Cape Town’s street trading management approach on the Grand Parade restrictive? |
| Genius loci | Concentrated use  
Feelings of safety | To what extent does the City of Cape Town’s street trading management approach affect the ‘genius loci’ or ‘sense of place’ of the Grand Parade, and does this support or hinder trader livelihood strategies? |

**OVERARCHING CRITERIA FOR PROGRESSIVE STREET TRADING MANAGEMENT**

| Developmental | Ease of access for new entrants with limited financial capital  
Support and services to sustain livelihoods  
Differentiated support structures for survivalist and entrepreneurial street traders. | To what extent is the City of Cape Town’s street trading management approach on the Grand Parade developmental? |
| Pragmatic | Street trading management based on participatory processes  
Multiple stakeholder street trading forums  
Consolidated and capacitated street trader organisations  
Existence of a dedicated street trading management institution  
Area-based street trading management processes and institutions | To what extent does the City of Cape Town’s street trading management practice on the Grand Parade align with national developmental policies? |
CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODS
3.1 Introduction

The main and subsidiary research questions are presented in chapters 1 and 2 respectively. This chapter concerns the research methods and techniques that are used to answer these questions. The choice of research methods and techniques are informed by the research question. The choice is also informed by my desire to describe and understand the impacts of the City of Cape Town’s street trading management approach on the livelihood strategies of traders on the Grand Parade from the traders’ point of view.

The first section of this chapter deals with the research methods employed, namely the case study and discourse analysis methods. The case for this research is the Grand Parade, which is located in Cape Town’s city centre, and is introduced at this point. This is followed by a discussion of the research techniques used. These are non-participant observations, and semi-structured interviews. The limitations of each technique are also discussed. A short note on positioning follows this discussion. The third part of this chapter details how the research participants were selected to participate in this study. This part of the chapter also includes a discussion of the ethical considerations that are of concern in this study. This section also includes a discussion of how these concerns have been addressed. This chapter concludes with a discussion of the data analysis and interpretation techniques used in this study. But first I turn to a discussion of the research methods employed.

3.2 Research Methods

This section details the processes followed to gather data. The case study and discourse analysis methods are used to gain an understanding of how the policies and discourse around street trading interact with the City’s management approach, and the impacts this has on trader livelihood strategies. It is to a discussion of the case study method that I now turn.

3.2.1. Case Study Method

Duminy et al. (2014: xiii) note that planners in African cities “are being trained to view and interact with the world in a way that is sharply at odds with the manner in which the multitude of urban residents perceive and negotiate urban life”. One could surely say the same of municipal management officials and local government policy makers. A more nuanced understanding is needed “to proactively engage with the realities of African urbanisation - the modes of land access, settlement, movement, collaboration and livelihood often grouped (negatively) under the bracket of ‘illegal’ and (sometimes interchangeably) ‘informal’” (Duminy et al., 2014: xiv).

In Africa, planning theory is not only challenged by the trends and forces driving urbanisation in this context, but also by the political and policy crisis affecting cities where “planning systems...are marked by the ‘colonial wound’”(Mignolo 2009 cited in Duminy et al., 2014: 1). The case study method, adapted to local contexts, can be viewed as a mode “better suited to describe and interpret the contradictory processes of rapid change and uncertainty that characterise African urbanisms” (Duminy et al., 2014: xiv).

Abu-Lughod (1994) argues that urban complexities at a city or neighbourhood scale can only be understood through case studies. The case study method allows one to produce context-dependent, value-driven knowledge (Flyvbjerg, 2011). However, there is a paradox in the case study’s widespread use and low regard by academics (Gerring, 2004). Flyvbjerg (2011) argues that five misunderstandings are at the root of this paradox. These misunderstandings concern theory, reliability, and validity. I deal with the concern of theory in this section. Reliability and validity are addressed in section 3.4.

The first misunderstanding is that concrete case knowledge is less valuable than general theoretical knowledge. Flyvbjerg (2011) argues there is no context-independent knowledge in the social sciences. Case knowledge must, therefore, be valued as highly since it firstly, allows for a nuanced view of reality. Behaviour cannot be understood merely as “rule-governed acts” (Flyvbjerg, 2011:303). Secondly, cases are important for developing good research skills. Concrete research experience is attained through proximity to the study issue as well as feedback from research participants (ibid.) The case study method enables me to reveal the way in which the multitude of factors that interact to produce the City of Cape Town’s street trading management approach impact upon the livelihood strategies of the traders on the Grand Parade.
Babbie and Mouton (2001) state that one cannot generalise from a case study. Flyvberg (2011) argues to the contrary - the second misunderstanding. The case study can form the basis for generalisation if it is supplemented by other methods. The “force of example” and transferability of the case to other contexts are often underestimated (Flyvbjerg, 2011:305). The aim of my study is to draw out general lessons from the effects of the City of Cape Town’s street trading management on the livelihood strategies of traders on the Grand Parade. These lessons can then possibly be applied to other similar urban contexts.

The third misunderstanding is that the case study is useful for generating hypotheses, but not suited for hypothesis testing and building theory. This is countered by Flyvberg’s (2011:306) argument that the “generalisability” of case studies, and hence their suitability to hypothesis testing, can be increased via strategic case selection. Specifically, Flyvberg (2011) argues that the need to understand the deeper causal relationships around a problem and its consequences, rather than just describing the symptoms, requires choosing a valid case. This is better than random sampling methods that emphasise representativity (ibid.; cf. section 3.5). George and Bennett (2005) confirm this by arguing that the case study method is better suited than others to theory development as it allows for better ‘process tracing’. Through process tracing, the researcher examines varied data sources to find whether or not the:

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\text{Causal process a theory hypothesises or implies is in fact evident in the sequence and values of the intervening variables in that case.}
\]

(George and Bennett, 2005: 6)

Process tracing allows for the inductive generation of new variables and hypotheses based on these sequence observations. In turn, the generation of new theories and models will be more specific and concrete than those created simply through correlation between a limited array of variables (George and Bennett, 2005).

The fourth misunderstanding noted by Flyvberg (2011) is that the case study method contains a verification bias. Specifically, there is the possibility of confirming the researcher’s preconceived ideas (ibid.). Ragin and Becker (1992) and Flyvberg (2011) argue that their preconceived assumptions and hypotheses have often been proved wrong when conducting intensive and in-depth case studies. The authors further argue that in these instances study results have necessitated revision of their initial hypotheses. Therefore, as Flyvberg’s (2011) experience shows, the case study does not result in a greater tendency towards verification.

The final misunderstanding is that of the difficulty in summarising and developing general propositions from specific case studies (ibid.). Flyvberg (2011) counters this by arguing that the difficulties associated with summarising case studies often arise from the (e.g. complex) nature of the reality studied, rather than the case study method.

It is to a discussion of the case under study that the chapter now turns.
3.2.1.1 The Case: The Grand Parade

The Grand Parade is a large public space in the heart of central Cape Town. It is situated between the Cape Town City Hall and Cape Town Central Library on the south, the Castle on the east, Cape Town Station and Golden Acre shopping centre on the north, and the Central Post Office building on the west (cf. Figure 3.1). The streets framing the space, colloquially known as ‘the Parade’, are Darling Street to the south, Castle Street to the east, Strand Street to the north and Lower Plein Street to the west. The main Cape Town Bus Terminus is located between the Grand Parade and Strand Street to the north. Curiously, the service road accessing the bus terminus from Lower Plein and Castle Streets is also known as Castle Street, but is in fact a continuation of the Castle Street running between Strand and Hout Street to the west.

The Grand Parade was once the site of the first fort established by the Dutch East India Company at the Cape in 1652 (Abrahams, 1996). When the fort was abandoned the garrison was moved to the adjacent Castle that had subsequently been erected (Figure 3.2) (ibid.). The space was then used as a parade ground for the soldiers. According to Abrahams (1996:55), the Parade has subsequently been used an important public square for “civic functions, military parades, promenading the latest Victorian fashions, bi-weekly market stalls and more recently, political rallies, including the speech by Nelson Mandela in 1992 after his release from 27 years of political imprisonment.” This speech was made from the main balcony of the City Hall (Thompson, 2017). Current City plans include celebrating this event with a statue of Mandela and an interpretive display (ibid.).
The case study area is the Grand Parade. The boundaries for the study are defined as the streets officially recognised as the boundaries of the Parade, as detailed above and indicated in Figure 3.1. However, it must be noted that the physical and municipal boundaries of this space may or may not be recognised by traders and their customers on the Parade. Boundaries can be permeable and may have different meanings for different people. These meanings may be attached to real or perceived jurisdictional boundaries, or to spheres of influence. Mbembé and Nuttall (2004) note that individuals, goods and information move freely across boundaries into various spaces and interstices.

False assumptions can also sometimes be made as to the existence of a community within a specific geographic extent (Ragin and Becker, 1992). In response to this, Keller (1968) argues that the existence of a geographically demarcated area is not proof of the existence of community, cohesive or otherwise. Therefore this study does not make the assumption that all traders operating on the Grand Parade are homogenous or make up a cohesive community. It is also for this reason that this study aims to include as many trader voices on the Parade as possible, bearing in mind the significant time constraint to this research. Sampling procedures employed in this study are discussed in detail in section 3.5. This chapter now turns to a discussion on the Discourse Analysis method.

3.2.2. Discourse Analysis Method

‘Discourse’ can be thought of as the structuring of language in different patterns according to the differing domains of social life that people participate in (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002). Specifically, a discourse is a “particular way of talking about and understanding the world (or an aspect of the world)” (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002:1). Discourse contributes to the construction of social identities, social relations, and systems of knowledge and meaning (ibid.). Thus, ‘discourse analysis’ is the analysis of these patterns. Morgan (2010) notes that discourse analysis is in fact an umbrella term for a number of approaches to analysing discourse, including critical discourse analysis (first developed by Norman Fairclough) and Foucauldian analysis (based on the theories of Michel Foucault).

A key advantage of the different methods of discourse analysis is that they can surface or aid in the construction of alternative social positions by research participants. Discourse analysis can also disrupt long held ideas of self, gender, autonomy, identity, and choice (Morgan, 2010). This can play a part in empowering vulnerable individuals. Discourse analysis can also provide a positive social critique of the process under study (ibid.). As Morgan notes, the method is relevant and applicable in various times and places to different subjects. She also argues that discourse analysis, through understanding the function of language and discourse in a situated context, allows for both positive individual and social change. It thus challenges traditional theory, policy and practice in a number of contexts. In this approach researchers cannot be neutral observers, as the method forces them to take a reflective stance (ibid.).

In this study, I analyse discourses contained within written texts (municipal policies and legislation) as well as verbal texts of key actors including traders, municipal officials, and a representative from a formal business on the Parade. I use the critical discourse analysis approach, in order to reveal the ‘language’, ‘institutional culture’, and ‘ideology’ of the public institutions and accompanying policies impacting street trading on the Grand Parade. In short, I use critical discourse analysis to uncover the meaning behind what is said. Morgan (2010) notes that as meaning is never fixed, everything is always open to interpretation and negotiation. Every analysis can give rise to further critique. Therefore, explanations of concepts such as street trading management and justification for their use in each analysis must be made (ibid.; cf. section 1.2).

Critical discourse analysis has been used in recent years to understand urban policy implementation processes (Jacobs, 2006). The methodological assumption is that urban policy is a field where varied interest groups aim to control a narrative for political ends (ibid.). Laclau and Mouffe (1985) argue that political conflict is an important factor shaping public discourses. Also, Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999) warn that personal discourses are often constrained by structural relationships of dependency. However, the line between public and personal discourses is not clear-cut. I attempt to
distinguish between the two in my research by analysing whether elements of personal discourses are derived from public discourses, or from lived experiences.

Critical discourse analysis has a number of benefits. Firstly, it can help illustrate how ideology influences policy change (Marston, 2002). Organisational actors often use ideological discourses to promote a policy agenda that is in their best interests (ibid.). In the case of the Grand Parade, critical discourse analysis allows me to surface these ideological discourses with regard to street trading management. Secondly, critical discourse analysis aids in changing urban policy practices. Marston (2004) contends that critical discourse analysis is particularly useful in focusing on ‘sites of resistance’, where individuals challenge “colonising discourses, inequalities and hierarchical power relations in organisational settings” (Marston, 2004:18). Lastly, a critical discourse analysis approach based on the work of Fairclough (1995), allows a more nuanced and relational analysis of the competing discourses around street trading management on the Grand Parade.

The chief limitation of critical discourse analysis is its subjectivity to a researcher’s biases and interpretations (Morgan, 2010). I address this limitation in section 3.4.

In conclusion, while critical discourse analysis allows for a theoretically informed and nuanced study of urban policy, the usefulness of the analysis relies on careful selection of evidence, while also attempting not to over-generalise from limited evidence (Jacobs, 2006). Thus, I am vigilant of the process I follow in selecting and interpreting evidence.

3.2.3. Positioning

In an attempt to situate myself within my research, I acknowledge the limitations of the case study and discourse analysis research methods employed. In doing so I take inspiration from Tuhiswai Smith (1999:39), who urges researchers in the global South to carefully and critically engage with the “significant acts” that these research methods entail. Specifically, these significant acts are:

The methodologies and methods of research, the theories that inform them, the questions which they generate and the writing styles they employ.

(Tuhiswai Smith, 1999:39)

Tuhiswai Smith (1999) notes this does not mean a total rejection of Western research or knowledge, but a centering of the concerns and worldviews of indigenous peoples. It also means “coming to know and understand theory and research from [their] own perspectives and for [their] own purposes” (Tuhiswai Smith, 1999:39). Most importantly, as Gbadegesin (1991) argues:

Africans cannot be in a strategic position to solve current problems and plan for a better future unless they are fully informed about their cultural pasts.

Gbadegesin (1991:216)

Throughout this research process, I attempt to maintain awareness of my own and the research participants’ cultural pasts, in an effort to generate more useful research outcomes. In so doing, however, I am also aware of the pitfalls of romanticising any particular culture. It is to a discussion on the research techniques I use in this study that the chapter now turns.

3.3. Research Techniques

This section discusses the research techniques utilised in this research. The techniques are: non-participant observation and semi-structured individual interviews. The data collected using these techniques collectively yields answers to the research question.

3.3.1. Non-Participant Observation

This technique is the first step in the research process. During non-participant observation, the researcher is an “outside observer” (Babbie and Mouton, 2001:293), and does not involve themself in any of the activities taking place. I observe the activities being undertaken at the Grand Parade. I record my observations in a fieldwork notebook, as well as through photographs and sketches. While these notes are initially abridged in the field, they are elaborated upon soon after each interview while the experience is still fresh in my mind. These field notes also serve to document any unanticipated events encountered during the course of my research. Lastly, the fieldwork journal also records interpretation and analysis of findings on an on-going basis, as well as my thoughts on what research participants say, or have left
Non-Participant observation, as an initial phase in the research process, enables an understanding of the use of the Grand Parade. In particular, this technique helps me identify, among others:

- The current forms of trading, their location, and the physical structures that are used for trading purposes.
- Elements that appear to be missing, for example particular forms of infrastructure or services, and what this signifies and suggests. This is corroborated during the interviews.
- Additional information that would help to answer the research questions, such as whether or not physical infrastructure appears to have an enabling or hindering effect on trading.

The observations are likely to provide a wealth of information while also raising a number of questions. The observations help shape the questions that are asked during the individual interviews. For example, the layout and physical infrastructure, such as the fencing around the food stalls on the Plein Street end of the Grand Parade, may appear to hinder customer access. This observation gives rise to questions on the layout and types of physical infrastructure on the Grand Parade. These questions have been posed to both traders and city officials.

The main advantage of non-participant observations is that they provide information from spontaneous, unplanned and/or unexpected events. This technique is also useful in difficult contexts such as noisy, crowded settings like a public square. The limitation is that taking notes (or recording via photographs and/or film) while observing events might be distracting to the research participants. To counter this, I attempt to reduce the influence of my presence by building a limited rapport with the research participants, given the time available for this study. This will allow them to feel more at ease with my presence, and less reactive. I discuss reactivity in section 3.4. The section now turns to a discussion of individual interviews.

### 3.3.2. Individual interviews

The validity of a great deal of what we believe to be true about human beings hinges on the viability of the interview [as a research technique].

(Briggs, 1986: 1)

Individual interviews give research participants an opportunity for their voice to be heard. They provide important insights for the research while also surfacing the participant’s own subject-positioning (Hill Collins, 1999). The interviews are semi-structured to ensure that information relating to impacts of street trading management on traders’ livelihood strategies on the Grand Parade may be uncovered. Semi-structured interviews are not according to a rigorous set of questions, but are open, allowing new ideas to be brought up during the interview as a result of what the interviewee says (Edwards and Holland, 2013). The interviewer in a semi-structured interview generally has a framework of themes to be explored (ibid.). As I am a less experienced researcher, I therefore make use of semi-structured interviews.

Holstein and Gubrium (2004) argue that all interviews are reality-constructing, meaning-making occasions and that the interview itself should become a site in which interviewers and interviewees co-construct data. Interviews enable the gathering of deeper insights through probing questions. Probing also gives rise to rich descriptions of the issue under study. As Babbie and Mouton (2001) note, probing, if done carefully, will not result in response bias in subsequent questions in an interview. I record and transcribe interviews for the purpose of inserting, verbatim, participants’ ‘accurate’ (or unedited) ‘voice’ (Hill Collins, 1986) in my research as evidence of a finding. It is important, as Roulston et al. (2003) warn, that a researcher avoids asking leading questions. Therefore, I carefully frame questions to avoid this pitfall.

The majority of the data is collected through interviews with street traders on the Grand Parade. All interviews are conducted in person, while allowing for follow-up interviews to happen via phone, and with the tone of each interview being conversational. As interviews can be time consuming, particularly for the research participants, I limit the number of semi-structured interviews with traders on the Parade to 12, with a trader
from Adderley Street, two blocks away from the Parade (cf. Figure 3.1) also interviewed. Additional interviews are conducted with city officials, law enforcement, and a representative of a formal business on the edge of the Parade. I discuss this in greater detail in section 3.5, which outlines the sampling procedures. There are 19 semi-structured interviews in total. The option of additional in-person or telephonic follow-up interviews is available and is used when clarification is needed.

The interviews are conducted in English, but participants are encouraged to use expressions in their mother tongue if these more accurately capture the sentiment they are trying to express. During follow-up interviews, I check the accuracy of translations to ensure that I have captured the intended meaning and understanding of what was said. Ison (2005) argues that it is through language, metaphors and dialogue that understanding can arise. Conversely, it is also through language, metaphors and dialogue that misunderstandings may arise (Ngwenya, 2013). As Ngwenya (2013) argues, this is particularly the case when researcher and research participant have different cultural backgrounds. Therefore, these follow-up interviews are vital for understanding the voice of the research participant.

3.4. Reactivity and verification bias

Interview questions are carefully considered in their construction and delivery in order to avoid, firstly, any leading questions which would influence a response that is biased towards the researcher’s perspective. Secondly, interview questions are carefully worded to reduce misunderstandings between participant and researcher. Roulston et al. (2003: 644) note that there is always a degree of uncertainty in the interview process and “one can never be sure what will occur”. Part of this uncertainty is a result of the fact that the researcher has an influence on the research itself. Consequently, a researcher must be aware of the impact they have on a research participant. Visser (2000 cited in Mandiyanike, 2009: 64) argues that “positionality and the manner in which one is perceived inevitably influences the knowledge one produces”. Roulston et al. (2003) further note that a researcher positively and negatively influences the type of data produced by research participants. This is known as reactivity. Reactivity can influence participants in one of two ways (Bailey, 2008). First, the researchers’ expectations can influence participants’ responses and/or behaviour positively. The researchers’ expectations can also influence participants’ responses and/or behaviour negatively. Thus, reactivity presents a threat to the internal validity of the research. Babbie and Mouton (2001: 122) argue that reactivity can increase the difficulty of conclusively establishing the true meaning of interview content.

I now turn to the issue of verification bias. As I have argued in section 3.2.1 above, citing Flybjerg (2011), the case study method is sometimes subject to verification bias. This is the possibility of confirming the researcher’s preconceived notions. In order to counter this bias, I will check the findings with the research participants to ascertain whether or not my understanding is accurate. Prolonged engagement with the research participants also serves to create a rapport. The validity and reliability of this research is enhanced by making use of two different research techniques, namely non-participant observations and semi-structured interviews. This will allow for verification of the qualitative research findings. This verification will ensure that the findings presented in chapter 4 are indeed valid and reliable. The chapter now turns to a discussion of the sampling procedures utilised to select the interview respondents. While this research is qualitative in nature, it is nevertheless important to understand how the research participants were chosen.

3.5. Sampling Procedures

The sample comprises 7 women and 12 men. The majority of the research participants are traders operating on the Grand Parade. One trader interviewed operates from Adderley Street, near the Parade. I also interview municipal officials directly responsible for street trading management on the Grand Parade as well as officials in senior positions in the City department managing street
trading on a metro scale. Other interviewees include a law enforcement officer, as well as the manager of Texie’s Fishmarket and Takeaways, the sole formal business located in a building on the Grand Parade. Purposive sampling is utilised to select the research sample. This non-probability sampling method enables the researcher to make use of their knowledge of the population and research aims in order to select a sample.

Snowball sampling, another non-probability sampling method, is also used in this research. Snowball sampling involves asking interview participants to identify other individuals who can be a part of the research.

Non-probability sampling methods, like snowball and purposive sampling, yield a sample whose:

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\text{Aggregate characteristics will not closely approximate those same aggregate characteristics in the population.}
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Babbie and Mouton (2001: 172)

Specifically, the sample is not representative of the population and can lead to bias. In order to address this I attempt to ensure that the excluded population of traders in my study does not differ significantly from the overall population on the Parade. In addition to the issue of representativity, there is a need to corroborate the information provided by research participants. This is accomplished by, firstly, including as wide a range of ‘voices’ of possible in the research process (Field, 2012). Secondly, information is cross-checked with other research participants (such as municipal officials and a law enforcement officer, to mention two), media, academic reports, as well as documents in the public and private domains. This is done in order to ‘hear all sides of the story’.

3.6. Ethical Considerations

One must be aware of the asymmetrical power relations between the research participants as well as between the researcher and the ‘researched’ (Field, 2012). An asymmetrical power relation can present ethical problems, and these must be addressed. Firstly, informed consent must be considered. The research participants must be made aware of the study’s aim and their choice on whether or not to take part in the research. A consent form issued to prospective research participants outlines the nature of the research, and highlights the possibility that they can withdraw from the study at any time. I read through the form and explain the form to each respondent in the event that they are not fully comfortable reading English. Second, in terms of confidentiality, consent is requested for the use of participants’ name/designation/words in the research. In order to protect the anonymity of all research participants, I choose not to make use of any names. This aims to protect participants from any potential future recriminations that may result from utterances made during the research.

Prior to the start of this research, while working with an NGO, I met the leaders of the Grand Parade Merchants Association (GPMA), one of the traders’ associations represented on the Grand Parade. My prior relationship with GPMA leaders may possibly lead to perceptions of bias or favouritism. This may also become an issue during the research process. I address this issue by spending time with research participants who are members of different traders’ associations on the Parade in order to build up a similar level of rapport.

3.7. Data Analysis

I use Fairclough’s (1995) approach to critical discourse analysis to analyse all the data collected. Firstly, the interviews are transcribed, and as Roulston et al. (2003) note, this is a tedious process. Through multiple readings of the transcribed data, inconsistencies are noted and then clarified through follow-up consultations. Secondly, recurring categories are highlighted and assigned labels (coded). To order and structure the data, I use themes that correspond with the subsidiary research questions derived from the literature reviewed in Chapter 2. This is done because, as Jørgensen and Phillips (2002) argue, texts cannot be understood or analysed in isolation. They argue that texts can only be understood in relation to networks of other texts - such as the literature reviewed - and in relation to the social context (ibid.).

Fairclough (1995) provides two dimensions on which to focus during data analysis. Firstly, one must focus on the ‘communicative event’, which can be the language contained in a media article or an interview. The communicative event is further broken down into three parts – texts, discursive practice and social practice.
The term texts refers to speech, writing, visual images or a combination of these. Discursive practice is the “production and consumption of texts” (Jørgensen and Phillips (2002: 68). The term social practice refers to how the discourse relates to wider power structures and ideology (ibid.). Secondly, one must focus on the ‘order of discourse’, which is the configuration of the different types of discourse used within a social institution (Fairclough, 1995: 66). Using Fairclough’s (1995) approach, I focus on texts, discursive practice and social practice in my analysis. The structured data is presented and analysed in Chapter 4.

3.8. Conclusion

This chapter began with a discussion of the research methods and techniques employed in this research, as well as an introduction of the case study area. The strengths and limitations of each were highlighted, and the chapter discussed how each limitation was addressed. The third part of this chapter detailed how the research participants were selected to participate in this study. This section also contained a discussion on the ethical considerations that are of concern to this study and how they were addressed. The chapter concluded with a discussion of the data analysis and interpretation techniques employed.

It is to a discussion of context of the history of street trading on the Grand Parade, as well as current management arrangements that this dissertation now turns.
CHAPTER 4: CONTEXT
4.1. Introduction

The case under study was introduced in Chapter 3. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a context of the history of street trading on the Grand Parade, as well as current management arrangements. To this end, the chapter is structured as follows. This chapter begins by contextualising trading on the Grand Parade from a historical perspective. As there currently exist only a few published accounts of the history of street trading on the Grand Parade, this discussion is primarily based on an article by Zinn (2014) and the interviews I conducted with traders as part of this research. This section is followed by a discussion of the current trading and management arrangements on the Parade. The chapter then turns to discussions on trader associations and operational management arrangements. Lastly, safety and security on the Parade are discussed. The chapter now turns to a discussion of the history of trading on the Grand Parade.

4.2. History of trading on the Parade: a snapshot

Trading, whether formal or informal, has occurred on or near the Grand Parade since colonial times (Abrahams, 1993). Zinn (2014:Online) notes that until the early 1980s, the Grand Parade was viewed as “the pulsating heart of Cape Town” where one had the opportunity to “buy anything from flowers and fruit to cold drinks and even property in Belville, all at one flea market.” Third-generation sellers ran many stalls at the time (Ibid.).
Today, two rows of food stalls, also known as kiosks, form an outdoor corridor along the Plein Street end of the Parade. These stretch from the corner of Darling Street where Texies Fishmarket stands (formerly known as the ‘movie snaps’ corner) towards the bus terminus along Strand Street (cf. Figure 4.4). These stalls are housed in free standing plastered brick buildings clad in wood clapboard and corrugated iron roofs that reference a Victorian architectural style (cf. Figure 4.5).

These buildings were erected in 1983 to replace the previous “ramshackle” wooden stalls that possibly dated back to pre-World War II (Zinn, 2014). The City Council stated at the time that these new structures would “attract tourists, improve business and bring people back to the city centre.” (Ibid.).

Figure 4.4: Location and arrangement of food kiosks on the Grand Parade (Source: Google Maps, 2017)

Figure 4.5: Appearance of food kiosks on the Grand Parade (Source: Author, 2017)

Figure 4.6: “The colourful stalls have stood on the Parade for half a century but are now rotting and in need of replacement” (THE ARGUS, Saturday September 10, 1983). (Source: Environmental and Geographical Sciences Library, University of Cape Town. Original caption.)
The City envisioned that the two rows of wooden stalls (at the time, 10 selling fruit and vegetables and 12 selling cold drinks and light snacks), would be “transformed into a pedestrian takeaway precinct where tables, chairs, umbrellas and pedestrian-scale lighting would contribute to creating a leisurely atmosphere” (Ibid). Parking on the Grand Parade would also be converted from ‘all-day’ to short-term parking. The plans also involved planting a row of trees down the centre of the outdoor mall created by the two rows of stalls as depicted in Figure 4.7 (Ibid.).

Zinn (2014: Online) in agreement, argued “it is the people behind the counters [of the stalls] that hold the character of what would otherwise be disregarded as a lifeless inner-city space”. Another trader (cited in Zinn, 2014: Online) stated that “it will be nice to rebuild, as long as they do not put the rent up”. However, the rent did go up. Zinn (2014) notes that there were serious misgivings over lease agreements between traders and the municipality. By May 1984, rent increases had forced 25 per cent of the original 23 stallholders to reject further refurbishment of the Grand Parade stalls. This has poignant parallels with a current dispute between the kiosk vendors and the City over greatly increased monthly rentals, with one vendor’s rent rising from R3,400 to R260,000 in one month (Payne, 2017). In addition, this “bureaucratic error” (as termed by one Mayoral Committee Member) follows a dispute between vendors and the City over how to carry out an upgrade of the Grand Parade, which remains unresolved (ibid.).

Zinn (2014: Online) notes that stallholders welcomed the upgrades, despite concerns that the character of the market would be affected. A stallholder (cited in Zinn, 2014, Online) states:

“We are the character. The council is leaving the interior of the stalls up to us, the character of the Grande Parade will remain.”

Zinn (2014: Online) states that thirty years later, in the 2010s, the Grand Parade is “strikingly unglamorous”. For her, there is a public nostalgia for the market as it once was, since the market is now “characterized by neglect” and a loss of its former ‘sense of place’ or ‘genius loci’ (Norberg-Schulz, 1979; cf. Chapter 2). Zinn (2014: Online) further argues that:

Disillusioned visitors can be found sitting on a park bench or leaning against a column reminiscent of 19th century vernacular, looking, waiting, commiserating, perhaps about a place’s soul that no longer smiles. The branches that spread from “majestic” rows of trees have been neglected too long to ever be a source of nurtured pride.

This loss of a ‘sense of place’ (‘genius loci’—i.e. the ‘soul’ referred to in the above quote) can be seen as a loss of the perceived concentrated use (‘vibrancy’ – cf. Chapter 2) of the Grand Parade and a public view that the space is now unsafe and suffering from neglect. Thus the current negative ‘sense of place’ could be impacting the number of visitors to the Parade and hence the sustainability of trader livelihoods.
Zinn’s (2014) is just one contemporary perspective on the Grand Parade. It is to a discussion of the current trading and management arrangements that the discussion now turns.

4.3.1. Current trading and management arrangements on the Parade

Of the 25 current food traders on the site, 9 have been on the Grand Parade for over 30 years (DAG, 2017). Many of them are the second or third generation occupants of the stores which were first occupied by their parents and grandparents (Ibid.). A survey of food kiosk holders carried out by the Grand Parade Merchants Association (GPMA)\(^4\) shows that these trader families have an accumulated total of at least 785 years of presence as kiosk holders on the Parade. The survey also reveals that currently approximately 25 stall leaseholders—their 100 dependents, 261 employees and their dependents—rely on income from these kiosks. The kiosks are open from 4am to midnight, 7 days a week, with only 3 stalls closing at 6pm and Sundays (interview with trader, 29 August, 2017).

On Wednesdays and Saturdays, a ‘flea market’ is held on the Parade to the east of the food kiosks and up to a line drawn from the King Edward VII statue on the Darling Street side to the Strand Street Bus terminus (cf. Figure 4.9). Concrete bollards currently indicate this line. According to traders, this flea market, known as the Wednesday and Saturday Market, is the longest running informal market on the Grand Parade (interviews with traders, 29 August—5 September, 2017). The Wednesday and Saturday Market operates from 6am to 1pm on both days. All stalls have to be erected and taken down by these times. These stalls mostly consist of a steel canopy frame covered by a variety of different canopies and tarpaulins (cf. Figure 4.10).

\(^4\) The GPMA represents the majority of traders in the food kiosks towards the Plein Street edge of the site. Refer to section 4.3.2 for details on other trader associations present on the Grand Parade.

Figure 4.9: Location of markets on the Grand Parade including trader association representation (Source: Author, adapted from Google Maps, 2017)

Figure 4.10: Wednesday and Saturday market stalls (Saturday 2 September, 2017) (Source: Author, 2017)
The stall components and stock are brought to the Parade in one of two ways. Firstly, they are stored in rented spaces in the nearby Buitenkant, Harrington, and Roeland Streets or in District Six. The rental agreements are informal (interviews with traders, 29 August—5 September, 2017). The components and stock are transported to and from the Parade in steel trolleys by hired assistants, who are predominantly African migrants. These assistants are known as trolley-pushers, and these arrangements are also informal. Secondly, a minority of traders have their own vehicles and use these to transport stall components and stock from other sites in the city. A few traders store their stock in space rented from the Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (PRASA). Storage costs up to R2,000 per month (ibid.).

The City regulates what goods can be sold via the conditions attached to trading permits. These conditions are detailed in Chapter 5. A City official (interview, City official A, 4 September, 2017) states that these conditions avoid duplication of goods, and stop food being sold outside the food kiosk area. However, this quashes endogenous approaches to trading, and as Turok et al. (2017) note, mobile street trading is significantly more common globally than in South Africa. Traders have differing views on these conditions (cf. Chapter 5). One of the Wednesday and Saturday traders believes that trading conditions and the profitability of this market were “better in the 1980s” (interview, 2 September, 2017). For him, the opening of a number of malls around the city—such as the V&A Waterfront, Century City and N1 City—has had a negative impact on business. He believes that customers that used to spend their Saturdays shopping on the Parade are now shopping in malls (ibid.).

Parked cars occupy most of the area taken up by the Wednesday and Saturday Market on the other days of the week. The City’s Facilities Management department currently operates this public parking (interview, City official B, 5 September, 2017). However, there appears to be little control of who parks here, as confirmed by the research participants.

On all other days, stalls operate in three areas. Firstly, in the area immediately east and north of the food kiosks, with those to the north arranged along the walkway between the steel entrance to the food kiosk area and...
the public toilets towards the bus terminus (indicated by the broader red band in Figure 4.9). Secondly, stalls are arranged along the Castle Street edge of the Parade adjacent to the Bus Terminus (the narrower red area and brown area in Figure 4.9). Thirdly, stalls are arranged on the pavement along the Darling Street edge of the Grand Parade, facing the City Hall (the longer yellow area in Figure 4.9). All these stalls are erected and taken down daily. They are normally put up and taken down around 6am and 6pm respectively, but this is often dependent on the weather and the time of year. These stall components are of similar materials and stored and transported in the same manner as the stalls used for the Wednesday and Saturday Market. The City also regulates what goods can be sold at these stalls via the conditions attached to trading permits.

4.3.2. Trader associations, leases and permits

There are seven trader associations in total representing all trader types on the Grand Parade, namely food kiosk traders, day traders and Wednesday and Saturday traders. All traders present on the Parade are members of an association. The advantages and disadvantages of being a member of an association, as well as the relations between associations will be revealed in the course of this chapter and Chapter 5 (interviews, 29 August – 5 September, 2017). These associations are: Grand Parade Merchants Association (GPMA), Grand Parade United Traders Association (GPUTA), Black Pirates, Wednesday and Saturday Traders, Hanover Street Traders, Bus Terminus Traders and the Historical Traders (cf. Figure 4.10).

While the food kiosk traders have direct month-to-month lease agreements with the City, the Wednesday and Saturday Market traders and the daily traders on the Parade pay fees for trading permits to their associations. Traders and trader leaders interviewed request that the fee amounts not be disclosed due to tensions between the associations resulting from differences in fees paid. The traders associations then pool the funds and pay the City (ibid.). Until the early 90s, the Wednesday and Saturday traders had individual leases with the City (interview, 2 September, 2017). Interviews reveal that this revenue collection arrangement was negotiated and agreed to by trader associations representing the Wednesday and Saturday traders and the daily traders, on the one hand, and the City on the other. However, a trader leader confirms that these arrangements are not contained in association constitutions (interview, 12 October, 2017). These arrangements can therefore be viewed as informal.

The monthly rental fees paid by the kiosk holders are significantly higher than the monthly fees paid by the Wednesday and Saturday traders. The latter’s rental fees are in turn higher than those paid the daily traders (interviews, 29 August – 5 September, 2017). Facilities, overhead costs and sizes of trading areas account for most of these differences. However, interview responses reveal a degree of animosity between the three trader groupings regarding fees, particularly when similar goods are being sold. This is most clear between the food kiosk traders and day traders who sell fruit, and between the Wednesday and Saturday traders and the day traders over non-foodstuffs. Incidentally, the manager of Texie’s Fishmarket and Takeaways, the sole formal business located in a building on the Grand Parade, views the kiosk traders and day traders that sell cool drinks as competition, and notes that these items can be “sold cheaper than us, because they don’t pay rent” (interview, Texie’s Manager, 29 August, 2017).

The day traders along the Darling street pavement have demarcated trading bays, which are indicated by painted lines and allocated by the City. All the other day traders do not have designated trading bays and set up according to informal arrangements between themselves, their associations and City officials (interview, 5 September, 2017). The associations, in line with the revenue collection arrangement, allocate trading areas on the Parade to their members. The food kiosk holders, who are not subject to the allocation arrangements, view the system as disorganised (interview, 29 August, 2017). The City states that it “monitors the demarcated sites to ensure that traders comply with the City’s by-law and within their permit conditions” (interview, 4 September, 2017). This by-law, namely the City of Cape Town Informal Trading By-Law of 2009 (amended in 2013) will be discussed in Chapter 5 in relation to the research findings. A City official interviewed states that “over-
trading”—defined by this official as extending over the permitted stall size and bay area — and the selling of foodstuffs in contravention of permit conditions is a regular issue (interview, City official A, 4 September, 2017). As such, the official conducts daily inspections of the Parade to look for these contraventions. Those found in contravention are “dealt with” (ibid.) as per City guidelines laid out in the Informal Trading Policy (2013: 21):

Where a trader violates the permit conditions, he/she will be informed in writing of the violation and course of action. A ‘three-strike system’ will be employed whereby two (2) written warnings will be issued before punitive action is taken. Permit fees will not be refundable if the permit is revoked or suspended.

Lease and permit administration is handled by the Property Management department (for the food kiosks) and the Economic Development Department (for the street side bays), with both based in the Civic Centre, less than a kilometre from the Parade (cf. Figure 4.12). In addition, the location of the local District Area Coordinator’s office is on the 13th floor of an office block adjacent to the Civic Centre, and is thus not easily accessible to traders.

This means traders must walk all the way to the Civic Centre if they need to renew or query their trading licence conditions. This impacts their trading activities, as they are forced to close their stalls when going to the Civic Centre (Interview, 29 August, 2017). The Property Management department deals with fee revenue collection from the trader associations that allocate bays on the Parade, as well as the lease agreements and fees of the kiosk holders. This is different to the procedure followed for trading in the rest of the City centre, where trading permit administration, bay allocation and revenue collection are all handled directly by the City’s Informal Trading function in the Economic Development Department.

4.3.3. Operational management

The daily operational management of the Parade is carried out by a City employee with the designation of Senior Foreman. He oversees the daily cleaning of the Parade by a dedicated team, deals with any ad-hoc issues that may arise, and functions as the liaison between the traders and the City manager responsible for the Parade. This Senior Foreman has a small office in the upper storey of the row of kiosks on the Plein Street edge (cf. Figure 4.4). He reports to a manager with the title of Facility Manager within the Strategic Assets Department, which forms part of the City of Cape Town’s Tourism, Events and Economic Development cluster. This manager is based in an office in the City Hall bordering the Parade. The City views the Grand Parade as one of its four strategic assets, the others being Athlone Stadium, the Good Hope Centre and Cape Town Stadium (CoCT, 2017: Online). It views these public facilities as “key in promot[ing] Cape Town as a premier events destination” (ibid.).

4.3.4. Safety and security

Interviews reveal that traders, city officials and law enforcement officers all view crime as a significant issue on the Parade. Traders believe that the crime in the area consists predominantly of pickpocketing, drug dealing and use, and theft (interviews, 29 August – 5 September, 2017). The City (Thompson, 2017: Online) views “pickpocketing, robbery, illegal and roaming traders, and loitering” as the main crimes on the Parade.
Traders view many individuals who congregate on the Parade, that they identify as foreign nationals, and well as some of those migrants who work as trolley pushers, as the source of most of this crime. A Law Enforcement official echoes this view (interview, 31 August, 2017). The South African Police Services (SAPS) (cited in Thompson, 2017) also claim that prison parolees are seeking refuge on the Parade, as “there is currently gang warfare on the Cape Flats”. The homeless that live on and around the Parade, particularly near the Castle, are viewed by most research participants as engaging in some of the forms of crime mentioned above.

A City of Cape Town Law Enforcement caravan is present on the Parade and staffed by a rotating contingent of 18 officers (Thompson, 2017). These Law Enforcement officers are responsible for enforcing the City’s Streets and Public Places by-laws (Seapoint CPF, 2017). Both traders and municipal officials overseeing the Parade state that the officers leave and the caravan is locked between 6pm and 6am. It is important to note that there is no South African Police Services (SAPS) presence. Four Central City Improvement District (CCID) officers are present on the Parade, despite it not falling within the CCID boundary (Thompson, 2017). These Law Enforcement officers are responsible for enforcing the City’s Streets and Public Places by-laws (Seapoint CPF, 2017).

A Law Enforcement official, the Senior Foreman and the Facility Manager are in agreement that since the permanent stationing of the Law Enforcement caravan on the Parade at the start of 2017, crime has been significantly reduced. SAPS (cited in Thompson, 2017: Online) claim that in August 2017, “75 people were arrested on the Grand Parade for various crimes, while Law Enforcement made 19 arrests”. Published crime statistics for the Parade for 2017 are not currently available from SAPS, and thus these claims are difficult to verify. Most traders interviewed state that they have seen little improvement in crime levels in 2017. SAPS claim that they conduct daily operations on the Parade in conjunction with the City and CCID, including undercover officers (Thompson, 2017). Interviews with traders and field observations do not seem to confirm this. In addition, one trader (interview, 31 August, 2017) argues that SAPS’ claim of using undercover officers “could be a way of pretending that they have officers patrolling when they don’t”.

CCID guards are sometimes assaulted by alleged drug dealers and criminals (interview, 5 September, 2017; Thompson, 2017). Traders complain that these guards have limited efficacy, as they do not have the power to arrest suspected criminals (interview, 29 August, 2017). This view is confirmed by the manager of Texie’s (interview, 29 August, 2017). CCTV cameras have been mounted on a number of the tall lampposts on the Parade. Traders claim that City officials have said the cameras are not working (Thompson, 2017). They may perceive this as the City neglecting the safety and
security of traders and their customers on the Parade. Traders state that crime has a definite negative impact on their trading operations and reduces the potential number of customers coming to the Parade (interviews, 29 August – 5 September, 2017).

4.4. Conclusion

This chapter began with a discussion of the history of trading on the Grand Parade. This was followed by a discussion of the current trading and management arrangements on the Parade. The chapter then turned to discussions on trader associations and operational management arrangements. The chapter concluded with a discussion of safety and security on the Parade.

It is to a discussion of the research findings that this dissertation now turns.
CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
5.1. Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to present and analyse the research findings. The findings are assessed on the basis of the criteria established in Chapter 2. Findings reveal the complexities of the City of Cape Town’s street trading management approach on the Grand Parade, the underlying dominant discourse around street trading that informs this approach, and the impact that this management approach has on the livelihood strategies of traders on the Grand Parade.

This chapter is structured in accordance with assessment criteria established in Chapter 2. Chapter 5 begins with an assessment of the City’s street trading management approach against criteria for restrictive management. This is followed by an assessment against criteria for positive ‘genius loci’ or ‘sense of place’, and the impact this has on trader livelihoods. In turn, criteria for developmental, pragmatic, and hence progressive street trading management are used to assess the City’s management approach. Based on these previous analyses, the chapter concludes with an assessment of the degree of alignment between the City of Cape Town’s street trading management practice on the Grand Parade and national developmental policies. But first I turn to an assessment of the City’s street trading management approach against criteria for restrictive management.

5.2. Assessing street trading management on the Grand Parade based on criteria for restrictive management

The overarching criteria for restrictive management set out in Chapter 2 include:

- Criminalising the poor and hindering livelihood strategies;
- Engendering municipal corruption, violence and mismanagement;
- Fostering informal arrangements, patronage and aggression between traders, and;
- Producing resistance and adaptation on the part of traders, both individually and collectively.

Each criterion is analysed with respect to the Grand Parade.

5.2.1. Criminalising the poor and hindering livelihood strategies

Formalisation of traders, referred to as “entrepreneurs” in the City of Cape Town’s Informal Trading Policy of 2013 (CoCT, 2013:10), is to be encouraged incrementally “as per their needs” and “as the business and entrepreneurs develop over time”. The policy makes no mention, however, if formalisation is also aimed at accommodating as many traders as possible within the city centre. The City and associations, through informal allocation arrangements, in practice limit the number of permits that can be provided for traders on the Parade. Law Enforcement removes those trading on the Parade without permits as per the Informal Trading Policy guidelines highlighted in Chapter 4 (interview, City official A, 4 August, 2017). Therefore those who do not have permits to trade on the Parade are forced to seek alternate possible trading locations, either through legal City permit allocation processes, or by illegal means, for example, sub-letting. Thus, both the Informal Trading Policy and the practices of permit allocation on the Parade, serve to illegitimise and criminalise poor individuals who seek to create a livelihood opportunity in the city centre. These limitations align with the criteria for restrictive street trading management.

As noted in Chapter 4, City officials view “over-trading” — defined by them as extending over the permitted stall size and bay area — and the selling of foodstuffs in contravention of permit conditions as a regular issue. This indicates a form of resistance to permit conditions by traders. This could be a reaction to the size of the stalls or bays not being conducive to sustainable trader livelihoods, or denying endogenous approaches to trading, such as mobile food trading. The Cape Town Informal Trading By-law, derived from the Businesses Act of 1991, is, through limiting street trading and
determine the locations and manner in which street trading can occur, effectively criminalising traders (cf. Chapter 2; van der Heijden, 2012).

Enforcement of permit conditions, apart from over-trading, often occurs under the guise of a police raid (in the case of suspected counterfeit goods) or a health and safety inspection (in the case of foodstuffs, particularly at the food kiosks). In relation to counterfeit goods, a trader couple (interview, 31 August, 2017) states that traders cater to a low-income market who cannot afford original goods. The couple also highlight that traders cannot afford to buy original goods for resale. While they understand the legal issues around counterfeit goods, they feel that the City hinders trader livelihoods and that it should “go after the China Malls, and the people that import this stuff into the country...they never get caught” (interview, 31 August, 2017). They say that it appears easier for the police to raid informal traders who are more vulnerable and have less legal resources than “the big guys” (interview, 31 August, 2017).

Incidentally, the trader couple believe the closure of many textile manufacturers in Woodstock and Salt River, as a result of cheap Chinese imports, has pushed many of these former workers into informal trading as a livelihood strategy (interview, 31 August, 2017). The City acknowledges trader livelihoods are impacted by the “influx of competitively priced goods” (CoCT, 2013:6) in its Informal Trading Policy, but does not propose how to address this. As such, traders have no effective support from the City in this regard. Relevant street trading literature has little to say on ways of protecting traders from these types of influxes, but one can argue that in South Africa, the involvement of national and provincial levels of government is needed to address such systemic economic issues facing traders and other small businesses.

Traders believe the City hinders their livelihoods by making decisions without their input, including planning for events on the Parade, when they are often given little notice, and when their livelihoods are often affected (interviews, 29 August – 5 September, 2017). Another example, related by traders is how they, or other traders they know personally, were previously trading but then removed from Green Market Square, Greenpoint or the Station Deck above the Cape Town Train Station, also known as the ‘Top Deck’. Each of these locations underwent revitalisation for the 2010 World Cup (cf. Chapter 2).

Traders say that in each case the City side-lined them, and as Morange (2015) argues, in the case of Greenmarket Square, this was done through a superficially participatory process. One trader leader argues that many of the existing traders did not regain their trading spaces in these locations (interview, Trader association leader, 29 August, 2017). The traders feel that this is a pattern of harsh treatment from the City, while the literature reviewed in Chapter 2 also identifies a pattern of restrictive approaches characteristic of these revitalisation efforts. Traders feel that the Grand Parade is a “dumping ground” for not only traders from other markets in the city centre, but also for the homeless and criminals (interviews, 29 August – 5 September, 2017). A trader believes that this displacement of traders from other locations is one of the causes of tension among traders and trader associations on the Parade (interview, 29 August, 2017).

These tensions are produced by the inequitable and therefore unjust decision making process (cf. Fainstein, 2010) that the City followed in these revitalisation efforts. The process did not follow two of Fainstein’s (2010) principles for equity in just public decision making. Firstly, that if relocation is necessary for the construction of public facilities, adequate compensation should be made in the form of an equivalent business site. And secondly, that construction should occur incrementally to allow for those that are displaced to remain in the area on an interim basis (Fainstein, 2010; cf. Chapter 2). The assessment in this section has shown that by criminalising the poor and hindering livelihood strategies, the City’s street trading management approach aligns with the criterion for restrictive management.
5.2.2. Engendering municipal corruption, violence and mismanagement

Interviews with traders reveal allegations of municipal corruption (interviews, 29 August – 5 September, 2017). With reference to the allegedly common, but illegal practice of sub-letting of stall spaces, a trader (interview, 29 August 2017) states:

If you know somebody there [the City] you might become successful. It’s mostly foreigners...and not necessarily because they have legally obtained it...but because they know somebody up there or they paid somebody up there...so it’s definitely not the ideal situation. As far as these blocks are concerned...it’s not working...they will tell you, you will go on to the waiting list for 2020 or something...there is no engagement whatsoever to even encourage you to make an application...it won’t be possible

In response, a City official notes that the current electronic permitting system is more transparent, as the ‘human element’ has been removed in permit allocation. The official admits that there were previously allegations of corruption against certain City officials involved in permit allocation (interview, City official C, 18 September 2017). This quote also indicates that the legal trading space scarcity in the city centre (410 bays) is forcing potential traders, including vulnerable foreign migrants, into sub-letting, and hence criminalising them.

While the research findings do not uncover any evidence of violence between City officials working on the Parade and traders, allegations are made concerning a raid on the food kiosks that occurred in early August 2017. Traders state that this raid was to check trading licenses. The traders allege that police and municipal officials threatened them verbally when asking for licences, which some traders were not able to produce on the spot as they stored them in other locations for safekeeping. The traders also state that they felt intimidated as the police were carrying guns. An elderly female owner of a kiosk felt anxious due to the manner in which the raid was conducted (interview, 29 August 2017). The research findings do not indicate the levels of police aggression that occurred in Johannesburg during Operation Clean Sweep in 2013 (cf. Chapter 2), but they do indicate some level of violence, which is noted in the literature as a result of a restrictive street trading management approach.

Mismanagement of trading permits has been revealed by the research findings. Some traders as well as municipal officials argue that certain trader association leaders use the permit allocation and revenue role they play in ways that create personal profit. For example, some argue that they charge permit holders a fee higher than the official City permit fee, and pocket the difference (interviews, 29 August – 5 September, 2017). City officials and some traders also accuse certain trader association leaders of allowing sub-letting, when this is in fact prohibited. Food kiosk holders view the informal revenue collection and permit allocation arrangements as disorganised. These arrangements can also be seen as confirming the criterion for mismanagement (cf. Chapter 2).

Ultimately the City is responsible for managing trading on the Parade and thus the onus rests on them to ensure that the system of permit allocation and revenue collection is effective and has minimal scope for mismanagement. When questioned on this matter, a city official (interview, City official B, 5 September, 2017) argues that this system was inherited from previous administrations, and they would prefer to deal directly with individual traders. While this may be an opportunity for more effective permit management, it can also be seen as an attempt to reduce the collective voice and bargaining power held by trader associations.

Most traders view the City’s record keeping as being in disarray, as “they regularly ask us who is legal and who is not” (interview, 29 August, 2017) and that they are “not aware of who is sub-letting” (interview, 29 August, 2017). They also state that a new lease agreement has yet to be drawn up by the City since the previous leases expired in 1996. City officials confirm this as the reason for the month-to-month nature of all current leases. This hampers the traders’ activities, as they are uncertain of their tenure security and rental payments, and cannot plan ahead or invest in the refurbishment of their stalls (interviews, 29 August – 5 September, 2017). Tenure insecurity is a common issue facing traders and hinders individual trader business growth (cf. Chapter 2).
The research findings reveal an inconsistency between the systems of permit administration the Grand Parade, and that followed in the rest of the city centre. The convoluted nature of the departmental responsibilities for street trading management on the Grand Parade (cf. Chapter 4) and the inconsistencies in permit administration, can be viewed as mismanagement. This meets a criterion for restrictive street trading management.

5.2.3. Fostering informal arrangements, patronage and aggression between traders

The research findings indicate that the City’s street trading management approach on the Grand Parade fosters some informal arrangements, such as those around revenue collection and permit allocation, sub-letting, and storage. Patronage, and aggression between traders, is also fostered. Informal arrangements involve City entities, traders and security guards, and the management inconsistencies mentioned in the previous section contribute to these informal arrangements. As highlighted in Chapter 4, four CCID officers patrol the Parade on the basis of an informal arrangement between the City and the CCID. Traders have informal arrangements with trolley pushers, who a City official alleges are also engaged in criminal activities on the Parade:

...We call these young men ooiers. I don’t know if they are Nigerians or whoever. In the morning there’s this place up in District Six where these traders park their trolleys. Most of them [the trolley pushers] sleep in Culemborg. They will be here early morning, go up, fetch the trolley of the trader and push it down...and then the trader will pay him X amount of money...and then tonight he or somebody else will push it back. These are also people who are part of the crime on the Parade during the day. When we address this, I say to the traders, please, you cannot have your bread buttered on both sides...you come and cry about the crime rate, you complain about the illegal activities. But these people who are part and parcel of the criminal activities taking place on the Parade, you still pay these people money...and now these people are claiming they are working on the Parade.

(interview, City official A, 4 September, 2017)

Traders also have informal rental arrangements with private individuals for storage of their stall components and stock in spaces in nearby Buitenkant, Harrington, and Roeland Streets or District Six. Traders who were interviewed state that no contracts are signed for the use of these storage spaces, rather the agreements are purely verbal (interviews, 29 August – 5 September, 2017). This is the same with arrangements between traders and trolleypushers. The trading permit allocation and revenue function of most traders associations on the Parade can also be viewed as an informal arrangement. It is not governed by any formal agreement with the City or contained in association constitutions (cf. Chapter 4).

The parking of cars on the Parade, both by traders as well as day parkers is also characterised by informal arrangements. Traders, mostly Wednesday and Saturday traders who have their own vehicles, have an arrangement with security guards that monitor the vehicular entrance to the Parade. Officially, it is illegal for traders to park on the Parade (interview, City official A, 4 September, 2017). Fieldwork observations and interviews with traders and City officials, confirm that a number of traders do park their vehicles on the Parade in resistance to this regulation.

Wednesday and Saturday traders use their vehicles as one non-permeable edge of their trading space in order to enclose the space and provide for easy loading and off-loading of stalls and goods (interview, City official A, 4 September, 2017). This appears to be a response by traders to the lack of permanent stall infrastructure on the Parade, as well as a form of resistance to the City’s street trading management. City officials in charge of the Parade do not have any firm plans on how to resolve this issue (interviews, City officials A and B, 4 and 5 September, 2017).

Certain traders also allege patronage. They argue that leaders of certain trader associations have a “cosy” relationship with City officials and politicians (interviews, 29 August – 5 September, 2017). This is evidenced by repeated favouritism shown by the City to the trader associations in matters that affect all trader associations (ibid.). These matters include permit irregularities, involvement in City-led workshops and discussions.
around plans for traders when events are held on the Parade. A report on a workshop held in 2015, convened by the CTP to discuss the involvement of Grand Parade traders in the proposed City Walk, is revealing.

According to the report, the meeting had two focal points: firstly, to discuss the “challenges felt by the traders operating in the central city”, and; secondly to “capture opportunities on how traders could meaningfully participate in the City Walk” (CTP, 2015 – original emphasis). However, the meeting’s participants only included representatives from two of the seven trader associations present on the Parade (GPUTA and Black Pirates). Individuals from these two associations are accused by certain traders of being subject to the patronage of City officials and politicians (interviews, 29 August – 5 September, 2017). Roever (2006; cf. Chapter 2) argues informal arrangements, and the tendency by authorities to alternate between tolerance and repression of street trading produces relations of patronage. Therefore, it can be argued that the nature of the City’s street trading management approach has produced these elements of patronage.

While no research findings suggest violence between traders, fieldwork observations and interviews with Law Enforcement and City officials, indicate that there is aggression between some traders and trolley pushers (interviews, 29 August – 5 September, 2017). I witnessed an argument and subsequent fight at a trader stall, between a trader and a trolley pusher. These disagreements are said to occur regularly and concern payment for trolley pushing services. Traders and City officials state that when daily takings are low, some traders are not able or refuse to pay a trolley pusher. It is alleged that these arguments and incidents of aggression most often occur with traders trading on the Darling Street pavement facing the City Hall (interviews, 29 August – 5 September, 2017). These traders are alleged to be foreign migrants sub-letting stalls (ibid.). According to some traders, this sub-letting takes place because of the alleged illegal residency status of some of the migrants (ibid.). This claim is difficult to verify as none of the traders in this area consented to interviews, possibly due to their multiple vulnerable statuses. The trolley pushers are also predominantly foreign migrants and this could appear to be a case of tensions and aggression between two marginalised and vulnerable groups.

These tensions can be analysed against the literature reviewed. When assessed against the criteria of engendering violence and fostering aggression between traders, that are produced by a restrictive street trading management approach (cf. Chapter 2), one can argue that the context of legal trading space scarcity forces traders into competition, which may lead to attempts at delegitimising other traders, particularly foreign traders (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2016; cf. Chapter 2). Nationality and legal trading space scarcity are conflated into xenophobia. There are also tensions between traders and homeless people on the Parade, with a number of the homeless alleged to be foreign migrants (cf. Chapter 4). It can be argued that the precarious nature of street trading, due to trading space scarcity and lack of tenure security, hinders access by foreign migrants to the livelihood opportunity that street trading provides, and puts further pressure on already vulnerable and marginalised groups. Hence they are further marginalised and can perhaps be pushed into homelessness and crime. Further research could be conducted to explore if this is indeed the case in the Cape Town city centre. These tensions once again impact on the ability of the City to manage street trading effectively (from their perspective), and serve as a further hindrance to trader livelihoods.

Tension between associations results from differences in fees paid, and the lack of transparency around revenue collection and permit allocation arrangements. The animosity felt between traders selling similar items (cf. Chapter 4), once again echoes the tensions identified with a restrictive street trading management approach.

The fact that the Grand Parade is managed by the Strategic Assets Department, and not Economic Development as in the rest of the city centre, means that bays on the Parade are not governed by the trading plan for the city centre. This convoluted management has produced the informal arrangements around revenue collection and permit allocation on the Parade. Traders do not have recourse to legally binding agreements, and are subject to possible prejudice in the allocation of bays. Allegations of corruption in the informal revenue collection and permit allocation process also show that traders do not view this process as transparent. For city officials managing or planning for street trading,
these informal arrangements and the tensions they produce, between traders, associations and the City, make the management approach unsustainable and the formulation of plans difficult (cf. Chapter 2). It is plausible that the lack of equity in the City’s restrictive management approach produces a lack of efficiency (from a City perspective) and possible management failure (Bénit-Gbaffou 2015; cf. Chapter 2).

5.2.4. Producing resistance and adaptation on the part of traders, both collectively and individually

Research findings reveal a level of resistance and adaptation (cf. Chapter 2) to the City’s street trading management approach on the Grand Parade. A trader association leader (interview, 4 September, 2017) states:

*You have had to kick down doors at the City. Threaten the City with certain things…marches and all of this…to make people aware and listen - this is a voice that is coming…this is a voice you are going to deal with….it is not going away. That is where we are at the moment. Currently the City’s door is not really open, it’s slightly open, but at least we have our foot in the door.*

This quote and the language used, indicate a discourse of collective resistance being produced and maintained by trader association leaders. A perception of disempowerment created by the City’s street trading management approach has produced a discourse of claiming power for traders. However, research findings reveal that this is rarely acted upon, for example through marches, protests, or rent boycotts. Only one march took place, in 2016, calling for a return of the old Green Point market that was closed in 2009 due to the construction of Cape Town Stadium for the 2010 FIFA World Cup (Hirsch, 2016).

An official (interview, City official B, 5 September, 2017) explains that there has also been resistance by traders to a proposed City-led upgrade of the food kiosks:

*We wanted them to stop trading for 3 months so we can fix their places up. They said no, we don’t want to give up this place. But the place is in a mess. There are rats all over. But they don’t want us to clean it up. They want to continue trading in those conditions, but they want us to fix it while they are trading there. We can’t do that, we need them to vacate the place… It’s not our responsibility to provide them an alternative, if they want to continue trading some other place. But they actually expected us to put up temporary structures. But we don’t have that kind of budget. We either do the one or the other…or we just demolish the kiosks and then what are they going to do?*

This particular quote highlights the irritation felt by this City official towards seemingly irrational resistance from traders, from the official’s perspective. This attitude and proposed process does not align with Fainstein’s (2010) principles for equity in just public decision making that were discussed earlier in relation to relocations linked to the 2010 FIFA World Cup. It also shows an insensitivity on the part of the City and that in fact, contrary to the developmental intentions of the Informal Trading Policy, management practice does not support informal trading. This can be seen a case of ‘conflicting rationalities’ (Watson, 2003, cf. Chapter 2). The conflicting rationalities of traders and officials, on the one hand, and between the actions of officials and the City’s Informal Trading Policy directives. This is addressed in more detail later in this chapter.

As noted in Chapter 4, there is also individual resistance to complying with certain regulations, including permit conditions, stall sizes and parking. City officials (interviews, 4 and 5 September, 2017) note that traders have tried to sell food in the ‘informal’ area of the Parade, while the sale of food is only allowed in the food kiosks, as per lease agreements. Officials inspect for these “contraventions” (interview, 4 September, 2017) and notify the trader associations to “deal with” these members.

Evidence of adaptation (cf. Chapter 2) to the City’s street trading management approach on the Grand Parade can be seen in the responses of trader association leaders. Many of those interviewed express a need for closer cooperation between associations. They acknowledge that if they can get over their disagreements and form an umbrella body, then they will be able to “talk with one voice” (interviews, 29 August – 5 September, 2017).

The research findings align closely with the criteria for
restrictive management set out in Chapter 2. The City’s management approach, by placing restrictions on the number of legal trading spaces, and where and what to sell, produces resistance, adaptation and informality on the part of traders in order to sustain their livelihoods.

5.3. Assessing street trading management on the Grand Parade based on criteria for a positive ‘genius loci’ and impact on trader livelihood strategies

The criteria for positive ‘genius loci’ or ‘sense of place’ in relation to street trading in public spaces as set out in Chapter 2 are:

- Concentrated use;
- Feelings of safety.

Zinn (2014: Online; cf. Chapter 4) argues that that the Grand Parade is “strikingly unglamorous” and “characterized by neglect” and a loss of its former ‘sense of place’. Traders confirm there are fewer visitors to the Parade, and hence their incomes have suffered (interviews, 29 August – 5 September, 2017). This cannot be independently verified as no pedestrian counts are currently available for the Grand Parade. A reduction in visitors and potential customers to the Parade speaks to a drop in the concentrated use and ‘vibrancy’ of the space, as also alluded to by Zinn (2014: Online; cf. Chapter 4).

While part of the drop in numbers can be attributed to the opening of malls near the city centre, as claimed by a trader (cf. Chapter 4), crime and neglect appear to have played the largest part. Traders allege that crime is a major problem on the Parade and is affecting their trade (cf. Chapter 4). Media articles (Thompson, 2017; Serra, 2016) confirm the existence of high crime levels. Despite claims by a Law Enforcement officer, the Senior Foreman and the Facility Manager on the Parade, that crime has been significantly reduced, most traders interviewed state that they have seen little improvement in crime levels in 2017 (cf. Chapter 4).

Traders complain that CCID guards have limited efficacy, as they do not have the power to arrest suspected criminals (cf. Chapter 4). Traders, also claim that City officials have told them that the CCTV cameras are not working. This may be perceived as the City not taking seriously the perceptions of safety and security of traders and their customers on the Parade (cf. Chapter 4).

Therefore, it appears that there are a number of safety and security concerns in the public view (Thompson, 2017; Serra, 2016) and among traders. This has reduced feelings of safety on the Parade and contributed to a drop in visitors and potential customers. In turn, this has affected trader livelihoods. These findings do not align with the criteria for a positive ‘genius loci’ or ‘sense of place’, but rather a negative one. This confirms the argument that the former ‘genius loci’ or ‘sense of place’ (Norberg-Schulz, 1979; cf. Chapter 2) of the Parade has been lost (Zinn:2014; cf. Chapter 4). While broader socioeconomic factors affect the Grand Parade and contribute to crime, it can be concluded that the inability of the City’s street trading management approach on the Parade to successfully address issues of crime and neglect thus hinders trader livelihood strategies (cf. Chapter 2).

City managers and planners will have to acknowledge these impacts in order to craft management strategies and plans that attempt to move the Parade towards a more positive sense of place, and in so doing support trader livelihoods.

5.4. Assessing street trading management on the Grand Parade based on criteria for progressive street trading management

The criteria for a progressive street trading management approach are: developmental and pragmatic. Each criterion is used to assess the Grand Parade case in the sections that follow.

5.4.1. Developmental

The assessment criteria for developmental street trading management approaches are:

- Ease of access for new entrants with limited financial capital;
- Support and services to sustain livelihoods; and
Differentiated support structures for survivalist and entrepreneurial street traders.

5.4.1.1. Ease of access to new entrants with limited financial capital

Before dealing with the cost of trading permit applications and other costs associated with becoming a legally recognised trader on the Grand Parade, one must consider the trading permit application process itself. The City’s website and the District Area Coordinator’s Office at the Civic Centre, which deals with informal trading applications, are the only publicly available sources of information on applying for a trading permit (interview, 29 August, 2017). This precludes easy access to information for potential traders, as multiple forms of information access are not available, for example at other civic centres or Department of Labour offices. Older individuals who are not information technology (IT) literate or those with mobility challenges are disadvantaged.

In addition, the information on the website is only available in English, which disadvantages individuals whose home language is not English. Only 28% of Cape Town’s population speak English as their home language (StatsSA, 2011). Afrikaans and isiXhosa, are the home languages of 35% and 29% of the city’s population respectively (ibid.). These disadvantages can be seen as infringing on potential traders’ right to freedom of trade, occupation and profession, as contained in the Bill of Rights, as well as not meeting Fainstein’s (2010) principle for diversity in just governance, that authorities “should assist groups who have historically suffered from discrimination in achieving access to opportunity in... employment” (Fainstein, 2010:174; cf. Chapter 2). This also runs counter to the criteria for a developmental street trading management approach (cf. Chapter 2).

All applications for an informal trading permit must be made online. The City has made provision for traders to be assisted to complete the online application at the District Area Coordinator’s office. In order to apply for an informal trading permit, the applicant must first register for an e-Services account. An e-Services account requires an identity document (ID) and a “business partner number”, which is the reference number the City uses to identify residents on their system. This number is “found on the third line in the header of [the] municipal account statement” (CoCT, 2017a). This requirement further serves to exclude individuals who reside in rented or informal accommodation, and foreign nationals who may not be in possession of valid residence permits. It may be for this reason, that some foreign nationals are sub-letting their stalls.

On receipt of an application, the electronic permitting system preselects an applicant “based on the highest score” (CoCT, 2017a). This score, or how it is determined, is not explained on the website. The score is assumed to refer to the criteria and considerations for bay allocation listed in Section 9.5.4. of the City’s Informal Trading Policy (CoCT, 2013:19):

a) Applicants must be:
   i. existing informal traders, or
   ii. desire to become informal traders (provided they comply with the requirements below, and may be for example, informal employees, seeking to establish their own business)

b) The nature of the goods and services should not conflict with or unduly compete with:
   i. the type of goods/services sold by formal businesses in the trading area/ or close to the bay
   ii. the type of goods/services, sold informally, in the same trading area;

c) Unemployed people will get preference

d) Where bays are available, traders operating more frequently will get preference over occasional/casual
traders within the trading area

e) The applicants ability to meet the trading hours set for the trading area

f) Preference will be given to Historically Disadvantaged Individuals

g) Consideration shall be given to new traders to the City database

h) Only one bay will be allocated per trader

i) Preference will be given to traders who do not trade in any other trading area

j) Preference will be given to those who do not share the same household with an existing permit holder, provided that

i. There are more trading bays than applicants

ii. The applicant is not economically dependent on the existing permit holder

k) Preference will be given to applicants who reside in, or close to, the trading area for which the permit is applied

l) The trader must be in possession of a valid South African identity document or relevant documents allowing the individual to working permit.

m) In the case of foodstuffs being processed and traded, the trader must be in possession of the required Business License (and Certificate of Acceptability)

On selection, a screening interview is conducted. Questions cover similar criteria to those in Section 9.5.4 of the Informal Trading Policy, such as whether the applicant is a historically disadvantaged individual and if they are a “new entrant to Informal Trading with the City” (CoCT, 2017a:19). One of the questions asks:

“Does the trading good/service which the applicant intends selling/rendering, positively contributes (sic) to the nature of business within the trading area or its immediate vicinity?” (CoCT, 2017a). One wonders how a trader could answer that question.

A successful applicant is then allocated a trading bay according to the approved informal trading plan for the area in which the bay is located. Once an informal trading permit fee is paid, an informal trading permit is issued (CoCT, 2017a). Selling food as an informal trader requires an additional “hawking in meals” licence, and a certificate of acceptability from an environmental health office that governs food safety and hygiene regulations.

An existing trader does not feel the permit application process is accessible. The trader (interview, 29 August, 2017) notes that:

Any City department...Water, Electricity or any department...try phoning them. I don't think the City attempts to enhance the communication with the informal sector. Try going to the Civic Centre to apply for a permit, for instance.

As can be seen from the above description of the trading permit application process, it is far from simple and disadvantages potential traders in a number of ways. The mission statement contained in the City’s Informal Trading Policy (CoCT, 2013) reads:

Through a developmental approach, the City seeks to facilitate the (sic) access to job and entrepreneurial opportunities within the informal trading sector.

As argued above, one may legitimately question whether the trading permit application process in fact promotes accessibility. This process will need to be addressed to further the aims of access and freedom of trade.

The cost of a permit depends on the type of trading undertaken as well as trading needs (CoCT, 2017). Monthly tariffs range from R20 for a 1,5m x 1,5m bay to R1 440 for a lockable container (Ibid.). A “hawking in meals” licence costs R10 (Ibid.). To understand the affordability of these costs one must look at the city’s income statistics. The proportion of households in Cape Town that fall within the low income category, which ranges from no income to just over R50 000 annually (R4 166 per month), varies between locations in the metropolitan area (WCPG, 2017). For example, approximately 63 per cent of households in the Khayelitsha/Mitchells Plain district fall within the low income bracket, of which 16.5 per cent have no income (Ibid.). Most traders do not reside close to the Grand Parade (interviews, 29 August – 5 September, 2017). The average household expenditure on food, housing and transport in South Africa in 2015 was 62 percent (StatsSA, 2015). This means that the maximum monthly disposable household income for low income households (not including health, education and other costs) in Cape Town is around R1580. This is not much more than the monthly tariff for a lockable container.
income, even the R20 monthly tariff for a 1.5m x 1.5m bay is significant.

In addition to permit costs, there are storage costs of up to R2,000/month, stock purchases, trolley pusher and employee costs. The standardised steel canopy frame used by traders for shelter is not provided by municipal authorities. The structure costs approximately R1,500 and is made by arrangement with metal workshops around the city (interview, 29 August, 2017). No formal loan facilities are available to traders (interview, Trader association leader, 2 September, 2017). Lastly, as indicated in Chapter 4, traders must walk all the way to the Civic Centre if they need to renew or query their trading permits. This affects their trading activities, as they are forced to close their stalls when doing so. The lack of an accessible area-based project office, as in the eThekwini model (cf. Chapter), means direct engagement is not enabled. Assessing against the criterion of ease of access to new entrants, this highlights the difficult nature of engaging the City as a trader. Taking both the direct financial costs (application and permit fees, and trading costs) and the indirect costs associated with the application process, it can be concluded that access to new entrants with limited financial capital can be improved.

5.4.1.2. Support and services to sustain livelihoods

The City’s self-stated developmental Informal Trading Policy details organisational and individual support measures for traders (CoCT, 2013). The organisational measures include the establishment of Multi-stakeholder Engagement Forums, Representative Organisations, and Industry Development Organisations (Ibid.). First, the multi-stakeholder engagement forums are to be established by the City at Metro and District level and “serve to identify problems, solutions and set the direction for the development of the sector in the respective areas” (CoCT, 2013: 11). These forums are also intended to “spread information to the sector via the representative organisations” (Ibid.). Second, support to and assistance with the establishment of Representative Organisations or trader associations is to be offered. Third, “industry-specific intermediaries (private sector firms or purpose-built development organisations)” (Ibid.) offer development and business support. Specifically, this support would entail “perform[ing] functions on behalf of informal traders such as product design, mentorship, contract negotiation, and a business interface role with respect to informal enterprises.” (Ibid).

The individual support measures are both direct and indirect (CoCT, 2013). The direct support includes firstly, business or technical training and mentorship. Secondly, “new traders will be encouraged to join a trader association in the trading area” (CoCT, 2013:19). Thirdly, the policy states that traders will be encouraged to register at “industry-development organisations related to the trader’s goods/service (should those be available)” (Ibid.). Ongoing indirect support is viewed by the City as the provision of: a) roads, water, sanitation; b) spatial and land use planning; c) site identification, preparation and development; d) contract development and legal services, and; e) management and regulatory services (Ibid.).

Interviews reveal that a number of these support measures are not in effect. While a monthly meeting is held by the City’s Facility Manager for the Parade, this meeting involves only two stakeholders: namely trader association representatives, and the Facility Manager. The Facility Manager represents the Tourism, Events and Economic Development department of the City, but no other relevant City departments are present. In addition, Law Enforcement, the CCID and surrounding business owners/managers are not represented.

No area-based multi-stakeholder engagement forum exists (interview, City official B, 5 September, 2017). This impacts the possibilities for more effective engagement and trader support. On a broader city level, no permanent multi-stakeholder engagement forum currently exists (interview, City official B, 5 September, 2017). While such a structure is mandated in the City’s Informal Trading Policy, the annual Informal Economy Summit7 and quarterly ‘Round Tables’ (that rotate to different areas of the city centre) do not include sufficient relevant stakeholders and offer limited opportunities for trader engagement, a view shared by both trader leaders and City officials (interviews, 29 August – 12 October, 2017).

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7 In the City’s own words, “the Informal Economy Summit is an Area Economic Development Department [event] that is held annually to get a better understanding of the problems and issues that faces (sic) the sector” (CoCT: 2017:1)
In fact, no ‘Round Table’ has been held for the Grand Parade due to the convoluted City management arrangements and tensions between trader associations on the Parade (interview, City official E, 2 October, 2017). This also bears a negative consequence for developmental street trading management and trader engagement possibilities.

Research findings reveal some evidence of capacity building and engagement. According to a trader association leader:

_We also work with the City on a leadership training program for members to send their leaders to. People are not skilled enough to run an organisation. We have these programs now...it is supported by the city._

(interview, Trader association leader, 4 September, 2017)

_We now have these by-law workshops. We felt that the by-laws were more protecting the City than us. But it is open to amendment for the next 2 years, so we can still revisit it._

(interview, Trader association leader, 4 September, 2017)

A City official states that the City is investigating the possibility of part or full self-management of street trading markets in appropriate contexts (interview, City official D, 3 October, 2017). They suggest that the Grand Parade could be a candidate for such a model. While there are benefits to self-management, I argue that this is premature. The current tensions between trader associations on the Parade, and the lack of existing trader capacity, serve to hamper any successful self-management of trading. The City has also recently signed an agreement outsourcing street trading management of Greenmarket Square and St Georges Mall to the CCID (interview, City official E, 13 October, 2017). However, research has shown (Lindell and Appelblad, 2009; Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015; cf. Chapter 2) that contracting street trading management to private companies or CIDs is not generally beneficial to trader livelihoods. These models are not trader-centric, the managing agents have little experience or understanding of the needs of traders, and the models are not financially secure due to reliance on internal or CID levy funding (ibid.).

Most of the trader association leaders interviewed express their frustrations with the level of engagement from the City, the lack of trader association involvement in strategic decision-making impacting their livelihoods, and the lack of a broader number of stakeholders in the forums that do exist. A trader association leader (interview, 29 August, 2017) expresses that:

_[If they are really serious with the Parade...currently we are meeting with...I don’t know what’s his portfolio...the guy we are meeting with? If we can sit with someone higher on the decision making side. From the association’s side we are sitting with people who can’t make decisions. If the forum is not going to bear fruit then we will lose interest, and then it will take longer on the next round. It’s about how serious the City is with getting the Parade on track. If the City is more transparent with their future plans it will help, because currently we don’t know whether to revamp our shops or what to do. We know there is something in the pipeline, but the City is not forthcoming with those things._

One trader body has responded to this lack of engagement and support by attempting to build a broader coalition of trader associations in the Cape Metro and Western Cape. The Western Cape Informal Traders Coalition (WCITC) has held annual trader association summits for the past three years (interview, Trader association leader, 4 September, 2017). A trader association leader, who is involved in WCITC, states:

_As a coalition we try to educate people about their rights, access to legal advice, skills programs. The city has for the last three years come to the party...after we put a memorandum to the Mayor indicating that we will have a summit. After last year’s summit and this year there is more participation. It’s about us...we can also give input....As the WCITC we try to mobilise all traders, and we become the mouthpiece for you at the city level._

(interview, Trader association leader, 4 September, 2017)

It can be concluded from the research findings that while the stated developmental approach to street trading contained in the City’s Informal Trading Policy encourages organisational and individual support...
measures for traders, the street trading management practice does not reflect this. Therefore a significant degree of support and services to sustain livelihoods is not being provided. Assessing against the developmental street trading management criterion of support and services to sustain livelihoods, it can be concluded that the developmental aspects of the City’s street trading management approach are limited in this respect.

5.4.1.3. Differentiated support structures for survivalist and entrepreneurial street traders

On the Grand Parade, interviews reveal that three trader groupings can be considered as entrepreneurial. These are the food kiosk owners, the more established Wednesday and Saturday traders, and the more established day traders. Each of these groupings can be characterised by two criteria. Firstly, each has employees. Secondly, each is strongly represented in trader association leadership. This indicates a level of financial stability to take up this unpaid role (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015; cf. Chapter 2). Less established daily traders, mainly those on the Darling Street edge, and the less established Wednesday and Saturday traders can be viewed as survivalist. These groupings can be characterised by the inverse of the criteria for entrepreneurial traders: no employees, and no representation in trader association leadership.

Interviews reveal no differentiated support structures between survivalist and entrepreneurial street traders on the Parade (interviews, 29 August – 5 September, 2017). Both types of traders are thus not supported in a context specific fashion considering they have different needs. The implications for planning are two-fold. Firstly, entrepreneurial traders are not allowed the opportunity to expand by paying more for extra trading bays (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015; cf. Chapter 2). Therefore the opportunity to lower costs and improve access to survivalist traders through cross-subsidisation is foregone. Business development training that could allow for these traders to grow their businesses and perhaps transition into formal businesses is also lost. Secondly, targeted support for survivalist traders, understanding their specific needs and the constraints on their business, could enable them to attain greater livelihood and food security.

The developmental aims of the City’s Informal Trading Policy are not borne out in differentiated support, when assessed against this criterion. It can be concluded that this limits the developmental nature of the City’s street trading management approach on the Grand Parade.

5.4.2. Pragmatic

The assessment criteria for analysing whether the street trading management approach of the City of Cape Town is pragmatic are:

- Street trading management based on participatory processes;
- Multiple stakeholder street trading forums;
- Consolidated and capacitated street trader organisations;
- Existence of a dedicated street trading management institution; and
- Area-based street trading management processes and institutions.

5.4.2.1. Street trading management based on participatory processes

The City’s Informal Trading Policy states that trading plans must be adopted where required. This is vital in areas where there is an overlap between stakeholders, business, public or City uses (CoCT, 2013). A trading plan sets the geographical boundary for the trading area and allocates trading bays. It can also include specific trading conditions or criteria, set out development priorities for the local economy or industry specific development plans, and trader and employee development. Environmental and heritage protection are allowed for. It can also cater for markets and high demand zones, and set out third party arrangements and responsibilities for managing trade in the area. Lastly, it can include guidelines for the frequency of stakeholder meetings, or the need for engagement forums (CoCT, 2013).

Informal trading on the pavement edges of the Grand Parade and central city is managed according to the Informal Trading Plan for Subcouncil 16 (Ward 77) (cf. Appendix A). However, due to the convoluted management of the Parade by both the Facilities and Property Management Departments, and the informal arrangements around permit allocation and revenue collection, only the day traders along the Darling street pavement that have demarcated trading bays
are indicated in this plan. All the other day traders and Wednesday and Saturday traders are not a part of the plan. This means that the majority of trading occurring on the Grand Parade is de facto not governed by the trading plan for the city centre. The majority of traders on the Parade therefore currently have no participatory space to influence decision making that legally binds trading in their area. This further highlights the conflicted priorities of the City in regards to the Parade, and how this results in a lack of support for trader livelihoods.

The City of Cape Town’s Informal Trading By-Law of 2009 (amended in 2013) details in Section 6 the public participation process to be followed when adopting a trading plan. The By-Law obliges the City to consult with all interested and affected parties “including the informal and formal sectors” (CoCT, 2013:6) before adopting a trading plan. Similarly to other public participation processes, it lays out details of how notifications should be handled, inviting comments and objections, and regulations for public meetings. The need for the consideration of all options prior to adoption of a trading plan is also outlined (CoCT, 2013). As such, the formulation and adoption of trading plans is envisaged as a participatory process.

However, the nature of participation in this and other participatory processes led by the City in regards to street trading must be analysed. One must be cognisant of the level of stakeholder participation, the relative influence of each, and the power dynamics between and within stakeholder groupings. The process is City-led and thus an ‘invited space’ of participation (Cornwall, 2004; cf. Chapter 2). The City has the dominant power in this process, and can shape the discourse to its own ends.

Trader associations on the Grand Parade are suspicious of one another, and not united under a Parade-specific umbrella body. While the number of trader associations represented on the Grand Parade is due to historical processes and differing trading types, tensions between these associations have been heightened and reproduced by City actions. These actions include, but are not limited to, the relocation of traders from other markets in the city centre and alleged patronage of certain associations and their leaders.

Therefore, the bargaining power and influence of traders on the Grand Parade, if they are to be included in the trading plan and other participation processes, is curtailed. They have limited power to shape the discourse and are hindered by the negative connotations that the term “informal” carries (cf. Chapter 2). As one trader leader (interview, Trader association leader, 4 September, 2017) so poignantly argues:

"The word “informal” gives people a sense of belonging... it’s a way to recognise us, for the authorities to recognise us. Informal traders. It’s almost like a brand, when you say: oh the traders? Oh...uh... the hawkers? Oh, the street traders? Oh no, those are a bunch of skollies! Whenever you have street trading you will have crime. Almost as if the crime is breeding there...You rather have to go to Canal Walk or the Waterfront or go to a mall, you know, you will be more safer there. It’s not being advertised as a business that if you support that business you are actually supporting their families...It is being given the...um...the brand of negativity.

It can be safely assumed that formal businesses, property owners and the CCID have superior financial resources to traders associations. These stakeholders also have access to greater social capital, and can rely on the positive power that the term “formal” carries in public discourse (cf. Chapter 2).

In terms of trader participation in ongoing operational management discussions on the Grand Parade, it is useful to analyse the nature of the monthly meetings that the Facility Manager chairs with representatives of all seven trader associations. These meetings have been convened since late 2016 (interview, 29 August, 2017). The Senior Foreman, on behalf of the Facility Manager, verbally announces the dates of these meetings. According to traders, this is often with little warning (interviews, 29 August – 5 September, 2017). The meetings are held during trading hours. Thus, the trader association leaders have to close their stalls to attend, thereby incurring a negative impact on their business (interview, 29 August, 2017). This echoes the issue raised by Bénit-Gbaffou, (2016) around holding trader organisation meetings, where meeting scheduling has an impact on trader business (cf. Chapter 2). The Facility Manager states that he began convening these meetings to “deal with the problems on the Parade” (interview, 5 September, 2017). The agenda of the meetings is set
by the Facility manager, without consultation with the trader association leaders (interview, Trader association leader, 29 August, 2017).

This raises questions around the nature of City engagement, and the level of participation and legitimacy of these meetings. Generally, issues discussed are around trading impacts due to upcoming events planned for the Parade, as well as ongoing operational issues such as crime (interview, City official B, 5 September, 2017). Some trader leaders interviewed claim that these meetings are of little use to them (interviews, 29 August – 5 September, 2017). The Facility Manager has observed that some trader association leaders do not attend meetings (Interview, City official B, 5 September, 2017). These perceptions indicate that due to the lack of inclusion in the setting of agendas, and the one-sided nature of these engagements, traders feel disempowered and see the meetings as of little use, particularly if they are to sacrifice business to attend. The City is therefore, through the nature of its direct engagement with traders on the Parade, producing further tensions and hindering effective management and trader support.

The research findings also do not reveal any level of trader participation in the drafting of the City’s Informal Trading Policy, Informal Trading Policy Implementation Plan or Informal Trading By-Law. The by-law workshops alluded to by a trader association leader earlier are for by-law ‘education’, with limited possibility for input (interview, Trader association leader, 4 September, 2017) The current forums for engagement by traders in street trading management on the Grand Parade are limited. These are namely the monthly meetings with the Facility Manager, and annual Informal Economy summits. These both share similar weaknesses, namely, lack of sufficient relevant stakeholders, limited opportunities for traders to voice their concerns, and strict control by the City over the narrative of discussions. It can therefore be concluded that the City of Cape Town’s street trading management approach on the Parade is based on limited and inequitable participatory processes. This is echoed by a trader association leader’s words:

_The emphasis must remain on an equal partnership in which our participation is viewed and accepted as serious enough to warrant our participation in all discussions/plans and programs which are relevant to us. Hence we subscribe to the slogan: nothing about us, without us!_ (Muller, 2017a: 2)(original emphasis)

Research findings confirm the lack of transformative potential in City-led ‘invited spaces’ of engagement and policy making regarding street trading (Winkler, 2011; cf. Chapter 2). In addition, as argued earlier in relation to City decision making that hinders trader livelihoods through their lack of participation, Lefebvre’s right to the city and Fainstein’s arguments for inclusive forms of governance that promote more just outcomes are being ignored by the lack of equitable participatory spaces for engagement by traders. Assessed against the criterion of street trading management based on participatory processes, the City’s approach is limited in its transformative potential and pragmatism.

5.4.2.2. Multiple stakeholder street trading forums

The City’s Informal Trading Policy (CoCT, 2013) makes provision for multi-stakeholder engagement forums to be established by the City at Metro and District level. These would serve to identify problems, solutions, and set the direction for street trading development in different areas of the city. The policy stipulates that these forums would also serve to spread information to traders via trader organisations. It was noted earlier that research has revealed no area-based multi-stakeholder engagement forum exists for the Grand Parade (interview, City official B, 5 September, 2017).

On a broader city level, only the quarterly ‘Round Tables’ and the annual Informal Economy Summit exist as forums for engagement. As noted the nature of these spaces limit any possibilities for multiple stakeholders to debate issues and make agreements and compromises (Skinner, 2008b; Dobson and Skinner, 2009; cf. Chapter 2). No ‘Round Table’ has been held for the Grand Parade due to the convoluted City management arrangements and tensions between trader associations on the Parade. It can therefore be argued that limited multi-stakeholder street trading forums exist. Assessing the City’s street trading management approach against this criterion, it can be concluded that it lacks pragmatism and hence progressiveness.
5.4.2.3. Consolidated and capacitated street trader organisations

Historic efforts at consolidation driven by trader associations, such as the WCITC initiatives, have remained largely unsuccessful. Only at the 2017 Informal Economy Summit was it announced that WCITC and UKITA (United Khayelitsha Informal Traders Association) are in the process of amalgamating (Muller, 2017b), and this presents an opportunity for greater bargaining power in negotiations with the City at a metro level.

The City of Cape Town’s Informal Trading Policy (CoCT, 2013) mandates support to and assistance with the establishment of trader associations (CoCT, 2013). The Policy states that the purpose of these organisations is to represent their members in engagement forums (Ibid.). However the research findings reveal little support to trader associations, bar several leadership training programs and by-law workshops. The Informal Trading Policy also encourages business or technical training and mentorship programmes. However, there is also little evidence of these types of capacity building programs (Interviews, 29 August – 5 September, 2017). No street trader forum exists to facilitate the participation of trader associations in a multi-stakeholder engagement forum. The City appears not to realise that a more organised street trading sector is of benefit to the city as a whole, both in management and governance terms, and thus a sound investment (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015; cf. Chapter 2).

As argued earlier, the restrictive nature of the City’s street trading management approach on the Grand Parade produces tensions between trader associations, through limiting legal trading spaces, informal revenue collection and permit allocation arrangements, and selective and limited engagement with associations. It also produces resistance to these restrictive management practices (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2016; cf. Chapter 2). City officials note that they would prefer to engage with a unified trader body, and view the associations as lacking representivity (interview, City official A, 5 September, 2017 and City official C, 2 October, 2017). However, this is hypocritical, as these divisions are mostly produced by the City’s street trading management approach. This echoes Bénit-Gbaffou’s (2016) argument in Chapter 2. Assessing the City’s street trading management approach on the Parade against the criterion for consolidated and capacitated street trader organisations, the findings reveal the City to fall short of a pragmatic approach.

5.4.2.4. Existence of a dedicated street trading management institution

Findings reveal the convoluted and opaque nature of the street trading management structure on the Grand Parade. Chapter 4 detailed how the trading management on the Grand Parade is the responsibility of the Strategic Assets department of the City of Cape Town, while trading management in other areas of the city, as well as permit and license administration is the responsibility of the Economic Development department. With the Organisational Development and Transformation Plan (ODTP), an organisational restructuring process currently under way within the City, the Economic Development department has fallen away, and the street trading management function is now housed under Area Economic Development within the Area-based Management Directorate, along with Local Tourism Development, Public Participation and Customer Relations (interview, City official E, 2 October, 2017)(cf. Figure 5.1). In this new area-based structure, the city centre falls under Area North which also includes Mamre, Atlantis, Durbanville, Melkbosstrand, Milnerton, Brooklyn, Maitland, Langa, Kraaifontein, Observatory, Cape Town, Sea Point, Camps Bay and Hout Bay (Evans, 2017)(cf. Figure 5.2, highlighted in light blue). There is thus no dedicated street trading management institution in the City.

The City of Cape Town’s Informal Trading Policy (CoCT, 2013) notes 16 different City departments that have roles and responsibilities in the effective facilitation, support and management of street trading. The key departments are: Economic Development, Spatial Planning and Urban Design, Building and Development Management and the Transport Department. These are the former names of these departments, prior to the ODTP which also involves the re-naming and re-aligning of functions. The research findings reveal limited dedicated interdepartmental cooperation.

The lack of a dedicated street trading management institution means that any form of interdepartmental
Figure 5.1: Organisational Development and Transformation Plan (ODTP) Organogram (Source: CoCT, 2017)
cooperation, as in the eThekwini model, is limited (Skinner, 2008b; Dobson and Skinner, 2009; cf. Chapter 2). The current convoluted street trading management structure on the Parade is not only opaque to street traders themselves (interviews, 29 August – 5 September, 2017), but also to the author. This structure is possibly a part cause of the ineffective, haphazard and restrictive street trading management practice that the research findings in this chapter have revealed. This street trading management practice has been shown to have significant negative impacts on the livelihood strategies of traders on the Grand Parade. Therefore, the lack of a dedicated street trading management institution indicates a lack of pragmatism in the City’s street trading management approach on the Parade.

5.4.2.5. Area-based street trading management processes and institutions

It has been demonstrated in this chapter that area-level multi-stakeholder engagement forums do not currently exist in the Cape Town city centre. While the monthly meeting between trader associations can be viewed as a form of area-based street trading management, the lack of other stakeholder representatives in these meetings limits their effectiveness. The frustration felt by trader association leaders towards these meetings can be seen as symptomatic of their limited nature. Issues affecting trading on the Grand Parade such as crime and inappropriate infrastructure cannot be addressed...
effectively without interdepartmental cooperation arising out of area-based multi-stakeholder engagement forums (Skinner, 2008b; Dobson and Skinner, 2009; cf. Chapter 2).

Building an umbrella body to represent all traders associations on the Grand Parade has not been possible due to the fragmentary and tense nature of trader association relationships. Perceptions of patronage towards some trader leaders and organisations, and relocations of traders from other markets to the Parade, has produced and reproduced distrust between trader associations. In addition, the lack of a multi-stakeholder engagement forum means that sustainable and locally adapted solutions to trading issues affecting the livelihood strategies of the traders on the Grand Parade cannot be found (Skinner, 2008b; Dobson and Skinner, 2009; cf. Chapter 2). The lack of sufficient area-based street trading management processes and institutions once again indicates a lack of pragmatism in the City’s street trading management approach on the Parade.

Taking all the assessments above into consideration, it can be concluded that the limited developmental and pragmatic nature of the City’s street trading management approach on the Grand Parade result in its lack of progressiveness. The findings and analysis reveal that this lack of progressiveness serves to limit the positive impacts of the City’s street trading management approach on the livelihoods of traders on the Parade.

5.5. Alignment of management practice with the City’s Informal Trading Policy

Research findings reveal the disjuncture identified in the literature between developmental policy at national and local government levels, and the performance of municipal officials directly tasked with urban management (cf. Chapter 2). This disjuncture is between the developmental approach of the City’s Informal Trading Policy and the restrictive nature of the City’s practice. These ‘conflicting rationalities’ (cf. Chapter 2) appear to impact on trader livelihoods. I will now go into more detail regarding this disjuncture.

The City of Cape Town’s Informal Trading Policy of 2013 is informed by the Constitution, the NDP and national developmental legislation (CoCT, 2013). The Policy takes a developmental approach. It even heads one section of the Policy as such. As part of this approach it aims to “improve conditions for informal trading, assisting it to thrive by focusing on 1) planning and development, 2) policy issues, and 3) institutional arrangements” (CoCT, 2013:9). Under Planning and Development, the City firstly acknowledges the legitimacy and role of the informal economy, in terms of its employment and economic growth prospects. Secondly, it notes that development interventions should be area-based and focus on improving sustainability, growth and profitability for the trader. Thirdly, partnerships between “private sector developers and land owners, or other development organisations and other government departments” are essential to “benefit the informal sector and private sector, consumers and the City alike” (CoT, 2013:10). Variation and flexibility in the developmental approach is also highlighted, and this depends on “the trader, the industry, and the local level social and economic environment” (CoT, 2013:10).

Research findings reveal that this developmental approach found in the City of Cape Town’s Informal Trading Policy (CoCT, 2013) is at odds with the City’s practice. This section compares the Policy directives with management practice as revealed by the research, in order to elucidate the extent of the misalignment.

The Informal Trading Policy details three groups of principles that should be used to “operationalize the [developmental] approach, especially the development planning process” (CoCT, 2013:11). These are Economic Principles, Spatial Principles, and Engagement Principles. Economic Principles are intended to facilitate economic growth in the informal trading sector by, firstly, reinforcing “business zones” by “link[ing] new and existing trading areas to business areas to create viable hubs of business activity”(CoCT, 2013:12). While the focus of this study is the Grand Parade, my research suggests that there is no evidence that any new trading areas have been created in the city centre since the adoption of the Informal Trading Policy (interview, City official C, 18 September, 2017), or that any trading areas have been linked to business areas. While the street trading areas in Greenmarket Square, St George’s Mall and Adderley
Street may be located in areas with concentrations of (formal) business activity, there appear to be no City-led efforts to link these.

Secondly, traders are to be linked “to a range of capacity building and business support services that caters (sic) for the different types and levels of traders” (CoCT, 2013:12). As discussed earlier, there appears to be limited evidence of this. Thirdly, the policy states that “the buildings and property owned by the City are leveraged for maximum economic return” (Ibid.). The language used here reveals the City’s competing priorities.

Regarding the ongoing upgrade of the City Hall, the City’s Mayoral Committee Member for Assets and Facilities Management, Councillor Stuart Diamond, states that “we also need to optimise our key strategic assets as outlined in the City’s ODTP” (Chetty, 2017:Online). One of the ODTP pillars is “ensuring long-term operational sustainability” for the City which entails “manag[ing] its portfolio of assets so as to secure its financial viability and stability, which will in turn enable sustainable service delivery” (CoCT, 2017b: 40). The ODTP continues, that:

While the outcomes of the ODTP process will focus on value creation through effectiveness and efficiency, the underlying foundation will be a customer-centric operating model that will illustrate the City’s responsiveness to its citizens.

(CoCT, 2017b:40)

This language of ‘asset maximisation’, ‘portfolio management’, ‘value creation’ and ‘customer-centricity’ echoes Miraftab’s (2007) and Morange’s (2015) arguments highlighting the neo-liberalisation of urban governance in Cape Town (cf. Chapter 1 and 2). Trading management on the Grand Parade is the responsibility of the Strategic Assets department of the City, while trading management in other areas of the city, as well as permit and license administration is the responsibility of the Economic Development department. While this management structure is opaque to outsiders, it reveals that, on the Grand Parade at least, the asset maximisation imperative of Strategic Assets department - “to ensure the financial sustainability of the City’s key assets” (CoCT, 2017c) - takes precedence over sustainable livelihood development.

As part a focus on tourism, the City raised a discussion at its Informal Economy Summit in October 2017 on how “informal trading markets can be turned into tourism destinations that would attract tourist’s (sic), thus increasing trader’s livelihoods” (CoCT, 2017d:1). This appears to be an attempt, driven by the ODTP process, to ‘sweat the assets’ that public spaces like Greenmarket Square, the area around Cape Town Stadium, and the Grand Parade represent. While the City may argue that its reasoning is to support trader livelihoods through linking tourism more strongly to the informal economy, the question can be raised if this move is not rather motivated by a New Public Management approach, where the language of empowerment is used to mask real concerns for ‘efficiency’ (Winkler, 2011; cf. Chapter 2).

The financial imperative is exemplified in the fourth economic principle of the Informal Trading Policy. This principle pertains to “High Demand Areas” and involves “targeting highly accessible and visible locations for value added trading in order to derive benefit for informal traders, consumers and formal business alike” (CoCT, 2013:12). The use of the term “value added trading” is confusing as one wonders how beneficiation of traders’ goods and services can be accrued through their location in areas of high pedestrian traffic. This term further echoes the technocratic and financial tone alluded to above.

Spatial Principles contained in the Informal Trading Policy acknowledge that informal trading contributes to the value of public spaces and can potentially act as a catalyst for the generation of “positive public spaces”(CoCT, 2013:12). This is to be encouraged in three ways. Firstly, by developing those areas that could have the most significant impact on the largest number of people. That is, by developing areas with large flows of pedestrian traffic (Ibid.). Fieldwork observations and interviews confirm that the Grand Parade accommodates large flows of pedestrian traffic daily due to its location as thoroughfare between the city centre, District Six, Cape Town Station and the Bus Terminus. Many school children, and those who travel on public transport to or from the city centre pass through this public space (interview, Trader, 29 August, 2017).
However, interviews and media articles reveal that there has been minimal development of the Grand Parade to allow for street trading to harness the significant pedestrian flows that pass through the area. Research findings reveal that issues of crime and neglect on the Grand Parade have contributed to loss of positive ‘sense of place’, reduced visitor numbers, and consequent negative impacts on trader livelihoods. Thus the City’s street trading management practice has not created a ‘positive public space’ that supports trader livelihood strategies.

Secondly, the Informal Trading Policy states that space for informal trading areas should be allocated in line with the City’s Spatial Development Framework (SDF) and Local Area SDFs or District Plans (CoCT, 2013). This aligns with Policy 3.2 of the current City of Cape Town SDF, which states:

Local plans and urban upgrading initiatives in commercial areas should be encouraged to accommodate the needs of the informal sector i.e. through appropriate urban design.

(CoCT, 2012:40)

The draft 2017 City of Cape Town SDF echoes these sentiments by stating that the City will:

Ensure that sufficient, well-located and appropriately designed formal and informal trading facilities are provided in activity areas as well as other suitable public assembly points, such as transport interchanges, public spaces, parking areas and road reserves (where appropriate)

(CoCT, 2017e:197)

Findings reveal that no consultation has happened with traders regarding proposed renovations to the Parade, in order to ascertain and design for their needs (interviews, 29 August – 5 September, 2017).

Thirdly, the Informal Trading Policy states that “an appropriate level of infrastructure for informal trading should be provided” (CoCT, 2013:10). One should note, “appropriate” as this is determined by the City. This infrastructure varies depending on the type of trading undertaken in the area (CoCT, 2013). Infrastructure can include electricity, water, sanitation, drainage, shelter, and storage facilities (Ibid.). One of the strategic objectives in the policy, informed by this principle, is that infrastructure requirements in each trading area should be identified [by the City] (Ibid.). The delivery or provision of this infrastructure should be accompanied with a maintenance plan (Ibid.).

Supportive infrastructure is lacking. Piecemeal interventions have been the norm, with most being cosmetic or reactive to safety issues (interviews, 29 August – 5 September, 2017). The paving of the Parade prior to the 2010 Soccer World Cup can be viewed as a cosmetic intervention, which may have in fact negatively impacted trading. A trader (interview, 2 September, 2017) asserts that City officials have realised that the Parade should not have been paved as the paved surfaces are now uneven and the rainwater pools in areas. He states that it is impacting traders and customers. The trader further states that the homeless remove paving to use in building shelters around the Castle (interview, 2 September, 2017). The roofs of the food kiosks were refurbished by the City in preparation for the World Cup, however a trader leader states that most of the maintenance of the kiosk interiors is paid for by individual traders (DAG, 2017).

Reactive safety interventions include the erection of a steel fence enclosing the food kiosk area and the installation of CCTV cameras on lamp posts near the kiosks. The food kiosk area can only be accessed via three entrances. Kiosk traders assert that the fence has made little impact on crime levels. It has in fact reduced pedestrian flow to their kiosks, and consequently reduced their earnings (interviews, 29 August – 5 September, 2017). The manager of Texie’s confirms this view (interview, Texie’s Manager, 29 August, 2017). The position of the entrances is not immediately legible as day trading stalls and dustbins have been placed against the fence (cf. Figure 5.4). In addition, traders claim that homeless individuals sit and sleep against the fence. Interviews with traders also reveal that better canopy structures and on-site storage facilities are viewed as beneficial to their livelihood strategies (interviews, 29 August – 5 September, 2017).

Rosheda Muller of the Grand Parade United Traders’ Association sums up the feeling of a number of traders interviewed when she says:
The City has provided 12 law enforcement officers to address some of the many concerns we have, but there is no physical progress, like infrastructure, or fixing up of the place. When the wind blows too hard or it rains too much, we are still unable to trade. This has been something we have been asking the City for years.

Lastly, ‘Engagement Principles’ contained in the Informal Trading Policy focus on the manner in which stakeholder engagement must take place. Firstly, the City is mandated to “communicate widely, accessibly, in different forms (print, electronic media) to improve the targeting and reach of information to the sector stakeholders” (CoCT, 2013:12). In section 5.4.1.1. above, it is highlighted that there are only two sources of information on informal trading in the City of Cape Town: the City’s website and the District Area Coordinator’s Office at the Civic Centre. It is also argued that the digital nature of permit applications and the exclusive use of English on the City’s website create barriers to information access. Research indicates no records of print media, radio or other forms of communication being used to communicate with sector stakeholders, bar the distribution of pamphlets to notify of upcoming monthly meetings (interviews, 29 August – 5 September, 2017). Secondly, according to the Informal Trading Policy, equity and inclusion in engagement processes necessitate “includ[ing] all relevant stakeholders in the appropriate fora at the appropriate level” (Ibid.). As discussed in in sections 5.4.1.2 and 5.4.1.3., this policy principle is not manifested in the City’s street trading management practice.

The City’s Informal Trading Policy mandates annual monitoring of policy implementation, coordinated by the Economic Development Department, and bi-annual evaluation via a multi-stakeholder engagement platform (CoCT, 2013:24). A City official confirms that neither monitoring nor evaluation occur due to budgetary and capacity constraints within the Economic Development Department (interview, City official E, 2 October, 2017).

The Informal Trading Policy also states that street trading data is essential for analysing trends, spatialising trading and anticipating growth, in order to incorporate street trading into planning processes (CoCT, 2013:24). Monitoring is also essential in identifying and understanding the needs of traders (Ibid.). The research findings reveal that apart from the data in the electronic permitting system, little other data on street trading in Cape Town has been collected. The Policy suggests a monitoring (or feedback) system to allow for logging of issues and feedback. Street trading management officials currently use the SAP-based electronic permitting system to monitor issues logged regarding permit payments, however this is not used for logging issues facing traders and allowing for feedback (interview, City official C, 18 September, 2017). The lack of monitoring and evaluation of the City’s Informal Trading Policy and street trading management practice, and the lack of data collection, result in scant empirical evidence of policy and practice impacts on trader livelihoods. In addition, the case for increased budget allocations for the City’s Informal Trading function cannot be made. The continued lack of budget in the department is seen by a trader leader as hampering any further development of traders:

We remain hopeful that the City digs in its heels and emerges soon with a dedicated informal sector budget, one that will put beyond any doubt its commitment to uplift and empower our sector with the necessary infrastructural and logistical support.

(Muller, 2017a: 1)

Based on the evidence presented above, it can therefore be concluded that when comparing the directives contained in the City of Cape Town’s Informal Trading Policy (CoCT, 2013) with the City’s street trading management practice as revealed by the research, a disjuncture exists. This is a disjuncture between a...
developmental Informal Trading Policy (with restrictive aspects) and a street trading management practice that is limited in its developmental, pragmatic and hence progressive nature, and bears many of the hallmarks of a restrictive approach. This echoes the arguments made in Chapter 2 regarding the ‘conflicting rationalities’ of urban governance and street trading management (Watson, 2003, cf. Chapter 2), and experiences in eThekwini, Johannesburg and the other global South case examples detailed, where approaches to street trading management have fluctuated from restrictive to progressive (Skinner, 2008b; Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015; Skinner and Haysom, 2016.)

In closing, a trader association leader highlights his frustration with the perceived continued lack of developmental street trading management on the part of the City of Cape Town:

In the 90s, I don’t think the City was equipped to facilitate the informal sector...I mean informal trading is a means of employment...You would think that the local government would come on board and support it, but that’s not the case...Maybe their excuse back in 94...for instance...was that it was new territory, but what’s the excuse now?...I think it’s inexcusable for the City to not assist the informal sector...and yet they are creating all these barriers instead of building bridges... It’s unacceptable at this point.
(interview, Trader association leader, 29 August, 2017)

5.6. Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to analyse my research findings against the criteria established in chapter 2. The discussion in the first part of this chapter highlighted that the City of Cape Town’s street trading management approach on the Grand Parade bears a number of the hallmarks of being restrictive. Potential traders are criminalised and the livelihood strategies of current traders are hindered. Corruption, violence and mismanagement are engendered, and informal arrangements, patronage and aggression between traders are fostered. Both individual and collective resistance and adaptation on the part of traders is produced. The cumulative effect of these elements of restriction is a negative impact on street trader livelihoods on the Grand Parade.

Research findings reveal that the Grand Parade has lost a positive ‘genius loci’ or ‘sense of place’ due to crime and neglect. While this can partly be ascribed to broader socio-economic factors impacting on the Parade, it can be concluded that the inability of the City’s street trading management approach on the Grand Parade to successfully address issues of crime and neglect thus hinders trader livelihood strategies.

When assessed against criteria for developmental, pragmatic, and hence progressive street trading management, the City’s street trading management approach, while containing developmental aims in its Informal Trading Policy, is found to lack many of these progressive elements in the practice of management on the Grand Parade. Thus opportunities to enable and support the livelihood strategies of traders on the Parade are lost, and the restrictive effects of the City’s street trading management approach are left largely unmitigated.

Collectively, the assessments in this chapter highlight a disjuncture between the City’s developmental Informal Trading Policy (with restrictive aspects), that is derived from national developmental policies, and street trading management practice on the Grand Parade, that is limited in its developmental, pragmatic and hence progressive nature, and bears many of the hallmarks of a restrictive approach. This speaks to the ‘conflicting rationalities’ of urban governance and street trading management, and experiences in other local and global South cities, where approaches to street trading management have fluctuated from restrictive to progressive.

Table 5.1 provides a summary of my research findings. (Insert table)

Let us now turn to the final chapter of this dissertation in which management and policy recommendations - that are aimed at addressing some of the findings derived from this research - are put forward.
### OVERARCHING CRITERIA ASSESSMENT CRITERIA DERIVED FROM LITERATURE REVIEW (CF. CHAPTER 2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Restrictive Street Trading Management Approach</th>
<th>Criminalising the poor and hindering livelihood strategies</th>
<th>To what extent is the City of Cape Town’s street trading management approach on the Grand Parade restrictive?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Engendering municipal corruption, violence and mismanagement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fostering informal arrangements, patronage and aggression between traders</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Producing resistance and adaptation on the part of traders, both individually and collectively</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### SUBSIDIARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS DERIVED FROM ASSESSMENT CRITERIA

- What extent is the City of Cape Town’s street trading management approach on the Grand Parade restrictive?
- It produces informal arrangements, aggression and resistance on the part of traders.

### SUMMARY OF RESEARCH FINDINGS

- The City’s street trading management approach on the Grand Parade bears all the hallmarks of being restrictive.
- It produces informal arrangements, aggression and resistance on the part of traders.

### OVERARCHING CRITERIA FOR PROGRESSIVE STREET TRADING MANAGEMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Developmental</th>
<th>Ease of access for new entrants with limited financial capital</th>
<th>To what extent is the City of Cape Town’s street trading management approach on the Grand Parade developmental?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support and services to sustain livelihoods</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Differentiated support structures for survivalist and entrepreneurial street traders.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### SUMMARY OF RESEARCH FINDINGS

- The developmental aims of the City’s Informal Trading Policy are not borne out in practice.
- Access for new entrants is difficult, there is limited support to traders, and no area-based multi-stakeholder engagement forum exists.
- No differentiated support structures between survivalist and entrepreneurial street traders exist.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pragmatic</th>
<th>Street trading management based on participatory processes</th>
<th>To what extent is the City of Cape Town’s street trading management approach on the Grand Parade pragmatic?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Multiple stakeholder street trading forums</td>
<td></td>
<td>• The City’s street trading management approach is not pragmatic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consolidated and capacitated street trader organisations</td>
<td></td>
<td>• There are limited spaces for participation, and the forums that do exist lack sufficient relevant stakeholders, offer limited opportunities for traders to voice their concerns, and the City exerts strict control over the narrative of discussions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existence of a dedicated street trading management institution</td>
<td></td>
<td>• There has been limited City effort to capacitate street trader organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area-based street trading management processes and institutions</td>
<td></td>
<td>• No dedicated street trading management institution or area-based street trading management processes currently exist.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To what extent does the City of Cape Town’s street trading management practice on the Grand Parade align with national developmental policies?</td>
<td>• The City’s restructuring process, together with the convoluted street trading management structure on the Parade serve to limit any pragmatic management.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• A disjuncture exists between the stated developmental approach of the City’s Informal Trading Policy (informed by national developmental policies) and its practices.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• The combination of organisational restructuring processes, confused mandates as well as the low political and funding priority given to street trading management has meant that the complex of socio-economic factors and persistent management issues on the Parade, that require interdepartmental cooperation to address, continue to negatively impact trader livelihoods.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 5.4: Two gulls fighting on the King Edward VII statue in front of the Cape Town City Hall - a symbol of the tensions created between traders on the Grand Parade by the City’s street trading management approach? (Source: Sunday Times, 2017)

Figure 5.5: Image of the Grand Parade on the cover of the City of Cape Town Table Bay District Plan, 2012 - Note the absence of kiosks and stalls (Source: CoCT, 2012)
CHAPTER 6:
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
6.1. Introduction

The overarching aim of this dissertation was to critically assess the impact of the City of Cape Town’s street trading management approach on the livelihood strategies of traders. The Grand Parade served as the case under study. Accordingly, research findings revealed, for the most part, negative impacts on traders’ livelihood strategies, despite the municipality’s stated developmental goals (cf. Chapter 5)(cf. section 6.5 of this chapter for a note on a ‘good’ aspect). The aim of this study was also to establish a few recommendations in response to the research findings, so that municipalities may become more supportive of street traders’ needs and livelihood strategies. To this end, an in-depth review of the relevant literature concerning street trading management and livelihood strategies was presented in Chapter 2. This review, in turn, served as a means to establish subsidiary research questions and accompanying assessment criteria. The City’s management approach was then assessed against criteria for restrictive, progressive and pragmatic street trading management. The research methods and techniques used to collect data were discussed in Chapter 3. Finally, Chapter 4 provided a context of the history of street trading on the Grand Parade, as well as current management arrangements.

Research findings, guided by the main and subsidiary research questions, were presented in Chapter 5. These research findings are summarised in section 6.2 for the purpose of answering the main research question (cf. Chapter 1). I then provide broader recommendations pertaining to street trading policy and management in the Cape Town city centre, as well as specific recommendations focused on street trading management on the Grand Parade. Due to the aim of my research, recommendations focus predominantly on enhancing the municipality’s role and activities towards fulfilling its development goals by addressing traders’ concerns. However, it has become clear from the literature reviewed and my fieldwork findings that City officials cannot address traders’ concerns in isolation from broader political and socio-economic concerns, as well as in isolation from other stakeholders’ concerns. Recommendations presented in this chapter are thus geared, firstly, towards the types of actions and policies that are implemented by the municipality, and how these actions and policies impact traders’ livelihoods, and, secondly, towards trader associations’ and coalitions’ roles and activities. Avenues for future research are also identified. Before concluding the dissertation, the final section details the limitations of this research, followed by personal reflections on the study. Let us begin by revisiting the main research question.

6.2 Establishing Answers to the Main Research Question

The main research question of this dissertation asked: What is the impact of the City of Cape Town’s street trading management approach on the livelihood strategies of traders on the Grand Parade?

From the findings presented in Chapter 5, we may conclude that the City of Cape Town tends to adopt a more restrictive approach to managing traders on the Grand Parade. This approach corroborates many of the concerns discussed in Chapter 2, since it serves to produce informal arrangements, aggression and resistance on the part of traders. Thus, we find a disjuncture between the stated developmental approach of the City’s Informal Trading Policy (informed by national developmental policies) and its practices. In response to the main research question: The impact of the City’s current approach to managing street trading is, effectively, negative.

Regardless then of the City’s Policy that aims to support street trader livelihood strategies, case study findings reveal an impasse between the municipality’ desires and its implemented actions. Accessibility to new entrants is limited, and few support structures and services are provided to traders. Furthermore, only some traders have access to the ‘capacity development’ initiatives that exist, thereby exacerbating existing tensions between the different trader associations on the Parade. Opportunities for participatory planning processes also remain negligible. In sum, the current management approach adopted by the City serves only to highlight the ‘conflicting rationalities’ at play in the context under study (cf. Watson’s, 2003, argument in Chapter 2). Furthermore, there is no dedicated street trading management institution in the City of Cape Town. The combination of organisational restructuring processes, confused mandates as well as the low political and
funding priority given to street trading management has meant that the complex of socio-economic factors and persistent management issues on the Parade, that require interdepartmental cooperation to address, continue to negatively impact trader livelihoods.

In order to acknowledge street traders’ ‘rights to the city’ (Lefebvre, 1968; cf. Chapter 2), and to promote justice in decision-making according to principles of equity, democracy, and diversity (Fainstein, 2010; cf. Chapter 2), City officials and planners will need to reconsider the generally restrictive street trading management approach that currently impacts negatively on the livelihood strategies of traders on the Grand Parade. The policy and management recommendations presented below aim to provide guidance in this regard.

6.3. Recommendations

The recommendations presented in this chapter are split into two parts. The first being broader recommendations around street trading policy and management in the Cape Town city centre. The second part is focused specifically on policy and management recommendations to better enable livelihood strategies of street traders on the Grand Parade. Both sets of recommendations are aimed at City of Cape Town officials and planners involved in street trading management. But as highlighted in this research, street trading impacts, and is impacted by, many City departments, and thus the recommendations are also aimed more broadly at the City administration.

6.3.1. Recommendations for street trading policy and management in the Cape Town city centre

6.3.1.1. The ‘eThekwini model’ as a guide

I base my recommendations predominantly on what is known as the ‘eThekwini model’, which evolved out of the inclusive upgrading of the Warwick Junction market in Durban (cf. Chapter 2). It is regarded as an example of a progressive street trading management model that is based on participatory and area-based approaches. If a similar model is pursued in regard to the Cape Town city centre and the Grand Parade, this will assist in the gradual realisation of the developmental aims contained in the City’s Informal Trading Policy, which are not reflected in its management practice on the Parade. In light of the organisational restructuring process currently underway in the City of Cape Town (ODTP), it is an opportune time to recommend institutional changes to the street trading management model and structure within the City administration.

In line with the eThekwini model, for area-based management to be effective in the Cape Town city centre and on the Parade, it needs firstly to involve a dedicated project manager, and foster solid links with the Planning, Economic Development and Health functions in the City, as well as Law Enforcement and SAPS. Secondly, it needs an accessible locally based office and a city-centre multi-stakeholder street trading committee to foster participation in decision-making. Thirdly, a street trader forum, consisting of all trader associations in the city centre, is needed to facilitate consolidation and capacitation of trader associations and their participation in the multi-stakeholder street trading forum. Lastly, area-based market and street trading management committees must be set up to allow for negotiated solutions to contextual issues.

Currently, the local District Area Coordinator within the Area-based Economic Development function of the City fulfils the role of a project manager (as well as a personal interface with traders). However, the area this official is responsible for is vast, stretching from Atlantis to Hout Bay (cf. Chapter 5). Clearly, this office must be better resourced to provide more fine-grained and coordinated area-based management. In addition, the current location of the local District Area Coordinator’s office can be improved. This can be done by moving it from its inaccessible location on the 13th floor of an office block adjacent to the Civic Centre, to a ground floor location in either the Civic Centre or at City-owned property in the central city, close to transport links.

Secondly, while the shift to a new ‘area-based service delivery’ structure in City administration as part of the ODTP process may result in stronger coordination between the departments relevant to street trading management, this needs to be consolidated in the form of a multi-stakeholder street trading committee. While such a structure is mandated in the City’s Informal
Trading Policy, the current annual Informal Economy Summit and quarterly rotating ‘Round Tables’ do not include sufficient relevant stakeholders and offer limited opportunities for trader engagement. The establishment of a multi-stakeholder street trading committee for the city centre is a priority, and this should include trader association representatives, relevant senior municipal officials, private sector representatives (e.g. CCID), an NGO representative, and lastly the local ward councillor. This committee should be a permanent institution that allows for stakeholder debate and the possibility of pragmatic agreements and compromises regarding street trading in the city centre. A voting power balance must be established between these stakeholders to ensure that trader needs are not marginalised. The decision-making roles and functions of this committee should be clarified in a policy document (cf. Chapter 2).

In parallel to the multi-stakeholder street trading committee, a street trader forum, consisting of all trader associations in the city centre, should be formed to facilitate participation in this committee. This forum could be supported and capacitated by the City through organisational training via an independent party, such as an NGO specialising in street trading (e.g. StreetNet, WIEGO). As argued by Bénit-Gbaffou (2015; cf. Chapter 2), a more organised street trading sector is beneficial to a city in terms of both management and governance, and is therefore a good investment. Organisational and skills development training would also be in line with national informal business development directives contained in the National Informal Business Upliftment Strategy (NIBUS) (cf. Chapter 2).

Lastly, area-based market and street trading management committees (e.g. on the Grand Parade) must be set up. These should include trader association representatives and relevant municipal officials. These could allow for negotiated solutions to contextual issues to be found, through participation and flexibility, while promoting street trading management efficiency and a sense of ownership by traders. These committees should meet monthly, and be accountable to the city-centre multi-stakeholder street trading committee. This research has shown that current area-based monthly meetings are ineffectual due to their limited stakeholder representation, lack of feedback mechanisms and one-sided nature (cf. Chapter 5).

However, it must be noted that while these recommendations represent a significant change to the City of Cape Town’s current street trading management model, changes are always subject to political will, priorities, and budgets within the City administration. As noted by a City official, the current water crisis in Cape Town has further de-prioritised street trading (interview, 13 October, 2017). This, combined with the limited budget allocation to the City’s street trading management function, present serious obstacles to the implementation of these recommendations. However, monitoring and evaluation of the City’s street trading management can help make a case for increased budget allocations, amid a growing political will towards pro-poor policies, as evidenced by recent shifts in the City’s housing policy (de Greef, 2017).

The lack of regular monitoring and evaluation of the City’s Informal Trading Policy by the (former) Economic Development Department, due to budgetary and capacity constraints and lack of a multi-stakeholder forum (cf. Chapter 5), results in scant empirical evidence of policy impacts on street trader livelihoods. As noted in the Policy and in Chapter 5, street trading data is essential for analysing trends, spatialising trading and anticipating growth, in order to incorporate street trading into planning processes. Monitoring is also essential in identifying and understanding the needs of traders.

The Policy also suggests a monitoring and feedback system to allowing for logging of issues and feedback. The City’s current SAP-based C3 Electronic Reporting System allows for citizen complaints and service requests regarding, for example, water leaks or power outages to be sent to the correct line department (GPOKCID, 2017). These are recorded, tracked and reported, and the system enables the City to measure time taken to resolve complaints, as an indicator of service delivery success and improvement over time (ibid.). Street trading management officials used the SAP-based electronic permitting system separately to monitor issues logged regarding permit payments (cf. Chapter 5). I recommend linking these two systems to allow street traders to log infrastructural and other issues in their area. This will also allow these issues to be brought to the attention of street trading management officials,
and enable the City’s response to issues affecting trader working conditions and livelihoods to be evaluated. The SAP-based electronic permitting system could thus be expanded into a more consolidated street trading management tool, and aid District Area Coordinators in their direct engagements with traders. Greater levels of quantitative data, combined with qualitative data from regular trader surveys and multi-stakeholder and area-based street trading management committees, can provide the empirical evidence for larger budget allocations to street trading management in Cape Town. In Fainstein’s words, “bureaucrats can use their control over information to bend their political superiors to their will” (Fainstein, 2010: 180; cf. Chapter 2).

### 6.3.1.2. Trading permits

Current permit conditions mean that endogenous forms of trading, such as mobile food trading, are currently denied in the city centre and on the Grand Parade, and traders are not able to respond to monthly or seasonal fluctuations in customer demand (cf. Chapter 2 and 5). Based on the important role of street trading in food security as highlighted in Chapter 2 (Skinner and Haysom, 2016), and the scope for allowing greater flexibility in health regulations (Turok et al., 2017), I recommend that investigations into relaxing permit conditions around food trading be conducted. Food safety is important, and the City should follow the lead of eThekwini where a Food Handlers Program educates food traders on basic hygiene and food management health issues (David et al., 2012). Petersen et al. (2017, cited in Krige, 2017) also suggest the installation of bulk refrigeration to help keep stock fresh for street food traders. In the case of the Grand Parade, this could be housed in a structure adjacent to the current kiosks. Trading permit conditions should also be relaxed to allow traders to vary what they sell based on monthly or seasonal fluctuations in customer demand.

The accessibility of the permit application process to new entrants can be improved. Trading permit application information on the City’s website is currently only available in English, spoken by only 28% of Cape Town’s population as their home language (cf. Chapter 5). This information should also be made available in Afrikaans and isiXhosa, the home languages of 35% and 29% of the city’s population respectively (StatsSA, 2011). In addition to the City’s website and the District Area Coordinator’s Office at the Civic Centre, permit application information should be made available at other civic centres and Department of Labour offices. Jiyane and Mostert (2010), in a study of information and communications technologies used by female informal traders in rural areas of South Africa, note that mobile phones are their primary means of business communication, with radio and TV their sources of business-related information. Therefore, permit application information should also be publicised by the City via SMS, radio and TV (Jiyane and Mostert, 2010; Roever, 2010). The proposed increase in street trading management staffing capacity in the City would allow for the creation of a dedicated street trading walk-in centre where potential new entrants could source information and be guided through the application process, while existing traders could be assisted with permit-related queries or renewal, or directed to their nearest District Area Coordinator. The area-based project office in the eThekwini model serves as a precedent (cf. Chapter 2).

The onerous requirement of both an identity document (ID) and a municipal account number to register on the e-Services system, should be made flexible to allow for an ID (or passport number for foreign nationals) to be sufficient for those prospective traders who reside in rented or informal accommodation. In addition, a proof-of-residence affidavit from a local ward councillor (Kretzmann, 2015) should suffice for proof of address requirements for those in informal accommodation. For applicants who are not IT literate, the requirement for an email address should fall way, and assistance with online applications in the proposed walk-in centre should be given.

The research findings reveal that no differentiated support structures exist for survivalist and entrepreneurial street traders, resulting in their context specific needs not being met. Firstly, entrepreneurial traders should be allowed the opportunity to expand by paying more for extra trading bays (cf. Chapter 2; Bénit-Gbbafou, 2015). These would have to be outside the city centre due to the scarcity of bays in this area. The current permit management system (as informed by the Informal Trading By-law) does not allow for the allocation of more than one bay per individual, ostensibly to provide access to a greater number of potential
traders (cf. Chapter 5). While the system does allow for assistants to be registered along with the primary renter of the bay, regulations do not allow for the possibility that entrepreneurial traders renting multiple bays could potentially employ greater numbers of assistants, than would be possible at the micro scale of an individual bay. Increased permit revenue from the creation of additional bays across the metro, in line with directives in the current City SDF, would allow for the opportunity to lower costs and improve access to survivalist traders through cross-subsidisation.

Secondly, the current Informal Trading By-law only allows for the transfer of permits to a family member or assistant in the case of death, or temporary transfer in the case of illness, pregnancy, family responsibility, religious or cultural issues. However, the financial security of the trader is still limited, and the trading permit cannot be used as an asset to secure loans or be sold between traders. There is thus an opportunity to reform the Informal Trading By-law to allow for the tradeability of permits. This exchange could occur in a marketplace mechanism established and managed by the City. The City would provide a guarantee against trading bays, backed by a guarantee fund. Negotiations with financial institutions could enable the trading permit to be accepted as collateral against loans by traders. In the event of loan default, ownership of the bay would revert back to the City. Further research could be conducted into the viability of such a proposal. As an alternative, the Bangkok example could be followed, with trading permits allowing access to social welfare payments via the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA), as well as being accepted as loan collateral by South African banks. In so doing, trader registration and fee payment would be incentivised (cf. Chapter 2).

Lastly, as argued by Turok et al. (2017), the gradual phasing in of certain standards and regulations could allow traders to build up their resources and capabilities. This approach would incentivise compliance, instead of penalising non-compliance.

### 6.3.1.3. Trader associations

Trader leaders note that trader associations and provincial coalitions suffer from a lack of unity (cf. Chapter 5), but the possible reduction in tensions between associations as a result of the proposals contained in this chapter could allow for consolidated and more representative trader association membership of the Western Cape Informal Traders Coalition (WCITC). The WCITC and UKITA (United Khayelitsha Informal Traders Association) are currently in the process of amalgamating (cf. Chapter 5), and this presents an opportunity for greater bargaining power in negotiations with the City. Representivity and democracy can also be fostered in trader associations and coalitions through organisational and leadership training as highlighted earlier.

The higher profile that a broader trader body would give street trading in Cape Town would not only assist in efforts to highlight the importance of street trading to employment, food security and the economy of the city, but also aid in sourcing funding. In addition to City sources, national and provincial small business development, and private sector CSI and donor funding sources can be sought. An increase in revenue would allow for greater internal capacity in trader associations and provincial coalitions, and enable more extensive lobbying and development efforts. Internal training and support, forming of cooperatives, developing access to credit or bulk buying, and applying for government tenders (cf. Chapter 2; Lindell, 2010) would become more feasible. Radio can also play a role in providing a reliable channel of communication between traders themselves, and with the general public (Roever, 2010; cf. Chapter 2). As such, trader coalitions should look into developing a radio programme, in conjunction with a local NGO (e.g. StreetNet, WIEGO), to promote street trader development, organisational activities, and public expression of issues facing traders. This programme could be aired regularly on a local radio station. The Gente de Confiar (“People of Trust”) radio programme in Lima, Peru serves as a precedent (Roever, 2010).

### 6.3.1.4. Spaces of participation

As argued by Winkler (2011; cf. Chapter 2), state-led public participation in South Africa is ineffective and lacks transformative potential due to the deepening centralisation of decision making, a focus on performance management, and the powerful role of politics in planning. Research findings confirm these elements in the management of street trading in the Cape Town city centre, particularly in the City-led ‘invited spaces’ of
engagement and policy making (cf. Chapter 5). While, the existing and proposed structures for participation may have the potential to lead to more transformative outcomes, I propose that the City moves towards Heller’s “optimist conflict model” of participatory democracy and responsive government (2001, cited in Winkler, 2011). As Winkler notes, active citizenry is one aspect of this model. Hence, the trader association capacity building and self-funding proposals I put forward in this chapter will aid in their abilities to challenge public policy and claim spaces for participation.

Another aspect of the model is a more responsive state “so that the boundaries between claimed and invited spaces for participation may become more permeable” (Winker, 2011:267). This will require that the City re-designs the current and proposed spaces of participation in street trading management and policy, so that they are not merely ‘tick box’ exercises that fulfil constitutional requirements (cf. Chapter 1 and 2). They must become more inclusive, responsive, and effective, even if trade-offs in outcomes are necessary. However, this change will require political will. While the City’s new ‘area-based service delivery’ structure has the potential to improve responsiveness as well as the participatory potential of its street trading management approach, recent shifts towards more pro-poor policies highlight a growing political will. This could hopefully one day lead to a necessary “step-by-step process of radical reform and social learning in all domains of public action” (Friedmann 1987:407).

6.3.2. Street trading policy and management recommendations for the Grand Parade

6.3.2.1. Street trading management function

One of the primary issues affecting street trading on the Grand Parade is the convoluted and ineffectual management arrangement between the City’s Strategic Assets, Property Management and former Economic Development Departments. There is no clear mandate for, or experience with, street trading management in the Strategic Assets Department that is tasked with operational issues on the Parade. Research findings reveal the tensions this arrangement creates and the negative effects on trader livelihoods. I therefore recommend that the responsibility for street trading management on the Parade be moved from the Strategic Assets Department to the new Area Economic Development function within the Area-based Management Directorate. This is the case in the rest of the city centre, which falls under Area North in the City’s new structure (cf. Chapter 5).

Doing so would necessitate an agreement between these two departments, as the Strategic Assets Department would still be the asset owner. However, revenues from trading permits on the Parade should be ring-fenced together with permit revenue from the rest of Area North (stretching from Atlantis to Hout Bay) and used for street trading management and development in these areas, which is not currently the case (cf. Chapter 5). The move of street trading management responsibility to the Area Economic Development will also facilitate inclusion of all traders on the Parade into the city centre Trading Plan. This will allow for trader association engagement with the plan.

6.3.2.2. Permits and leases

Research findings reveal that historical processes, and the precarious nature of street trading, have created the number of different trader associations present on the Grand Parade. However, the scarcity of legal trading spaces in the city centre and the informal permit allocation and revenue collection arrangements on the Parade have served to further exacerbate tensions. In line with the previous recommendation, I suggest that all trading permits and spaces on the Grand Parade be allocated via the electronic permit system used in the rest of the city centre. Not only will this create more transparency in permit allocation and revenue collection, it will also serve to reduce tensions between trader associations. While a shift to the electronic permit system may remove a revenue stream for associations on the Parade, other sources of funding are suggested in section 6.3.1.3 above.

Individual leases for the food kiosks would remain the responsibility of the Property Management Department, but I recommend a thorough audit of these leases and a re-negotiation and signing of new leases to provide tenure security for kiosk holders. Rents should be
determined in conjunction with kiosk holders to ensure affordability. These may be below market value, but the City needs to acknowledge the employment, social development and food security function that street food trading plays on the Grand Parade.

6.3.2.3. Use of space on the Grand Parade

The scarcity of legal trading spaces in the City centre (only 410 street trading bays) promotes sub-letting and hence further informality (cf. Chapter 5). While urban management considerations such as pedestrian movement and safety must be kept in mind, there exists an opportunity to expand the opportunities available to street traders in the city centre. As stated in the 2017 Draft Cape Town SDF, “well-located and appropriately designed” street trading facilities should be provided in “suitable public assembly points, such as transport interchanges, public spaces, parking areas and road reserves (where appropriate)” (CoCT, 2017e:197).

The Grand Parade is such a public space and it experiences significant pedestrian flows to and from the adjacent transport interchange. It is therefore a ‘natural market’ (Sinha and Roever, 2011; cf. Chapter 2). However, only half of the Grand Parade is given over to street trading and the rest is used irregularly as an events space. Even the half of the Parade where trading is allowed is only fully utilised on Wednesdays and Saturdays. I propose a more flexible approach to trading permit allocation on the Parade.

On the western half of the Parade where street trading is currently allowed, further trading permits can be allocated to allow new traders to operate on the remaining 5 days of the week in the same spaces currently allocated to Wednesday and Saturday traders. These new traders would need to vacate the spaces on these days, but could plan around this. On the eastern half of the Parade where street trading is currently prohibited, trading spaces could be allocated for daily trading, 7 days a week, with event planning taking cognisance of sufficient notice to traders in the case of interruptions to trading (e.g. minimum 2 weeks). If events are planned months in advance this schedule could be widely communicated and negotiated by the City with traders. Permit conditions could reflect these uses in both cases.

This proposal would fulfill a number of needs. Firstly, as identified in Chapter 5, the Grand Parade has lost its ‘sense of place’ due to neglect, crime, and a loss of concentrated use and ‘vibrancy’, which are all interlinked. This has negatively affected trader incomes. While many of the socio-economic factors affecting the Parade require broader municipal, provincial and national interventions, it can be argued that more intense use of the Parade would serve to not only support trader livelihoods, but also perhaps reduce current concentrations of homelessness and drug dealing on the Parade. This could in turn improve safety perceptions on the Parade, in turn increasing potential customer numbers. It should be noted, however, that

the intention of this proposal is not to displace homeless persons from the Parade to other areas of the city. There should be stronger involvement from the City’s Social Development Department, in coordination with street trading management of the Parade, to address the needs of the homeless individuals who currently make the Parade their home. Through coordinated long-term support, some of these individuals could perhaps one day trade from a bay on the Parade.

Secondly, from a City perspective, this more intense use would not only provide better ‘asset maximisation’ of the Parade through increased permit revenues, it would also serve to further the developmental goals contained in the City’s Informal Trading Policy, and thus be politically advantageous. It would also focus public attention on the importance of street trading in public spaces, in terms of employment, food security and more broadly acknowledging the right to the city of marginalised citizens.

The City’s recently stated goal of linking street trading to tourism (cf. Chapter 5) could be achieved on the Grand Parade by attracting tourists through the ‘vibrancy’ that more intense use would create. While heritage concerns could be raised given the history of the Parade and surrounds, these could be addressed through improved maintenance and management of the Parade, as well as involvement of the South African Heritage Resources Agency (SAHRA) in the process. In addition, City-funded permanent trading stalls, designed based on trader inputs and in keeping with heritage-approved
aesthetics, could be installed on the western half of the Parade. These would provide better shelter from the elements, give a sense of permanence to traders (with generational histories on the Parade), and visually demonstrate the City’s commitment to trading on the Grand Parade (cf. Chapter 2 for stall examples from Durban and Johannesburg). The trading stalls could be funded through a combination of permit and rental revenue, the municipal infrastructure grant, as well as donor and private sector corporate social investment funding sources. Permanent trading stalls in other areas of the City could generate revenue through the sale of advertising space on their surfaces.

City officials acknowledge the limited funding and personnel capacity of the Informal Trading function in the City (cf. Chapter 5). However, the increased administration of managing extra traders on the Parade would not present a significant increase to their current workload considering the current number of trading bays in the city centre (410). In addition, the proposal in section 6.3.1.1 above, on how to increase budgets for street trading management, would assist in expanding the capacity of the department. Existing trader associations would be free to recruit members from these new traders. While this may create some competition between associations in the short term, inclusion of new traders into existing structures would decrease the possibility of further associations forming, and thus prevent increased fragmentation and tensions in the long term.

In light of current City plans to renovate the Parade, this proposal comes at an appropriate time when innovative thinking and a new approach to the Parade can be possible.

6.3.2.4. Storage and trolley pushers

The impulse in planning is often to fix and order. This does not allow for flexibility in responding to the fluidity and transience that informality embodies, and the negative impacts and resistance that can be produced among those who planners think they are planning for. Recommendations could be made for the construction of storage space on the Parade. This would mean traders would not have to negotiate and pay for storage space in nearby streets and District Six, or trolley pushers to transport stall components and stock to and from the Parade (cf. Chapter 4). This would particularly benefit female traders who face unequal power balances in such negotiations. However, I choose not to make this recommendation. Providing storage would not only render these trolley pushers unemployed, but would disrupt a network of social relations and informal arrangements that have built up over time. As most of these trolley pushers are allegedly foreign migrants, this may be one of their few livelihood opportunities. In the interests of equity in planning decision-making (Fainstein, 2010; cf. Chapter 2), the interests of these vulnerable individuals should be respected.

6.3.2.5. Self-management

City officials state that they are investigating the possibility of part or full self-management of street trading markets in appropriate contexts (cf. Chapter 5). They suggest that the Grand Parade could be a candidate for such a model. While there are benefits to self-management, I argue in Chapter 5 that this is premature. The current tensions between trader associations on the Parade, and the lack of existing trader capacity, serve to hamper any successful self-management of trading. What is needed, first, is broader unity among associations and capacity building, which will both take time to gain momentum. Shifting to the electronic permitting system will reduce some of the tensions, but greater inclusion of trader associations in decision-making processes, through a commitment by the City to create a city-centre multi-stakeholder street trading committee, a street trader forum, and the holding of regular area-based street trading management committee meetings (cf. section 6.3.1.1) will serve to further reduce tensions. As in the eThekwini model, dedicated municipal support for trader capacitation will help address the fragmentation of trader associations.

This support should take the form of dedicated business development, leadership and organisational training and mentorship programs, thus going some way to fulfilling directives in the Informal Trading Policy. These programmes would be facilitated by independent parties such as NGOs (cf. section 6.3.1.1) and dedicated training and mentorship providers. Funding by the City
could be sourced from a combination of permit revenue, national and provincial small business development funding (eg. via NIBUS; cf. Chapter 2), and private sector CSI and donor funders.

The City has also recently signed an agreement outsourcing street trading management of Greenmarket Square and St Georges Mall to the CCID (cf. Chapter 5). However, research has shown (cf. Chapter 2; Lindell and Appelblad, 2009; Bénit-Gbaffou, 2015) that contracting street trading management to private companies or CIDs can have negative impacts on trader livelihoods. These models are not trader-centric, the managing agents have little experience or understanding of the needs of traders, and the models are not financially secure due to reliance on internal or CID levy funding. In addition, the profit imperative and lack of social development mandate of these operators do not serve the best interests of street traders. I thus caution against any move towards privatised street management on the Grand Parade. In any case, it does not currently fall within the jurisdiction of the CCID, and should remain so in order to prevent further creeping privatised management of important public spaces.

6.4 Limitations to the study

Time has been the greatest limitation to this study. This has limited me from spending enough time with research participants prior to engaging in interviews, in order to build a level of trust and rapport. Interviews were disruptive to participants, as their lack of free time necessitated conducting interviews at their stalls. With additional time, I would also have been able to engage more research participants, thereby giving greater depth to the findings.

A second limitation has been the organisational inaccessibility of the City of Cape Town. The convoluted and opaque nature of the street trading management structure on the Grand Parade, as well the City’s organisational structure more broadly, meant that a significant amount of time and effort was spent locating the appropriate City officials to interview. The current organisational restructuring in the City administration exacerbated this. My experience pales in comparison to the difficulty street traders face in deciphering and accessing this structure (cf. Chapter 5).

The final limitation has been the focus on street trading management. While this research is concerned with the impacts of the City’s street trading management approach on the livelihood strategies of traders on the Grand Parade, a major finding has been that broader socio-economic factors, beyond the purview of street trading management, impact on trader livelihoods. These need to be addressed. Unfortunately due to time constraints, I was unable to analyse and address these aspects fully.

A number of the recommendations contained in this study require increased budget allocations, organisational changes, and the political will to do so. I acknowledge this and have sought to provide paths to address these limitations.

6.5. Reflections

Before embarking on research, I held a preconception that the City’s approach to street trading was repressive and lacked any supportive aspects. This was partly based on reports of trader relocations in the run-up to the 2010 Soccer World Cup. Instead, I found significantly developmental aims in the City’s Informal Trading Policy, that were hampered by the context within street trading management occurs. In addition, I found that the City is neither monolithic nor omnipotent (Winkler, 2011), and that there are individuals within the City that have a deep understanding of street trading and empathy for traders. While they operate within the political and structural constraints of municipal administration, they endeavour to actively promote trader livelihoods and provide a degree of resistance to moves that threaten these.

I also knew little of the lived experiences of street traders. While I had an inkling of the struggles they face in securing their livelihoods, they privileged me with a generous sharing of their daily struggles. I found a diverse and fragmented group of individuals still trying to recover from past spatial and social injustices, and using their agency to actively resist efforts by the City to deny them their right to the city.

I feel the allocated time, and the nature of dissertation research, result in an extractive exercise towards the
lives of vulnerable research participants. In the interests of honest research, dissertations should not sit gathering dust on university bookshelves. Research should be framed with a view to ensuring the practical applicability of findings and recommendations. For whom is one researching, and to what end?

I intend to give all trader research participants a copy of my study. I intend sharing my study with City officials involved in street trading management, as well as NGOs involved in street trading activism and broader social justice concerns. And I endeavour to follow up with City officials and these organisations, to ascertain whether the recommendations in this study can be put to use.

6.6. Conclusion

In conclusion, Chapter 1 presented the issue under investigation, as well as the main research question. Chapter 1 went on to introduce the case study area and the research methods used to undertake this study.

Chapter 2 contained an in-depth review of the relevant literature. This literature review was used to establish subsidiary research questions. In turn, criteria for assessing the impact of the City of Cape Town’s street trading management approach on the livelihood strategies of traders on the Grand Parade were derived from these subsidiary research questions.

Chapter 3 outlined the research methods and techniques used to undertake the study, as well as their limitations.

A more detailed context of the case study area was provided. The chapter also contained a discussion on the ethical considerations for completing this research.

Chapter 4 provided a context of the history of street trading on the Grand Parade, as well as current management arrangements.

Chapter 5 described and analysed the data collected, using the assessment criteria established in Chapter 2 in order to evaluate the impact of the City of Cape Town’s street trading management approach on the livelihood strategies of traders on the Grand Parade.

Chapter 6 synthesised the research findings used to inform my recommendations. These involved broader organisational and policy changes to municipal street trading management. Specific recommendations were also given for changes to street trading management on the Grand Parade, as well as suggestions aimed at street trader organisations. All these recommendations have the potential to better enable street trader livelihood strategies on the Grand Parade, the city centre and the broader city of Cape Town.
### Table 6.1 Summary of Recommendations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OVERARCHING CRITERIA</th>
<th>ASSESSMENT CRITERIA DERIVED FROM LITERATURE REVIEW (CF. CHAPTER 2)</th>
<th>SUBSIDIARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS DERIVED FROM ASSESSMENT CRITERIA</th>
<th>SUMMARY OF RESEARCH FINDINGS</th>
<th>SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Restrictive Street Trading Management Approach</td>
<td>Criminalising the poor and hindering livelihood strategies</td>
<td>To what extent is the City of Cape Town’s street trading management approach on the Grand Parade restrictive?</td>
<td>• The City’s street trading management approach on the Grand Parade bears all the hallmarks of being restrictive. • It produces informal arrangements, aggression and resistance on the part of traders.</td>
<td>• The number of street trading bays in the city centre and on the Grand Parade should be increased by making use of unused space on the Parade for daily trading. • Investigations into relaxing permit conditions around food trading be conducted</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Engendering municipal corruption, violence and mismanagement</td>
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<td>Fostering informal arrangements, patronage and aggression between traders</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Producing resistance and adaptation on the part of traders, both individually and collectively</td>
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<tr>
<td>Genius loci</td>
<td>Concentrated use</td>
<td>To what extent does the City of Cape Town’s street trading management approach affect the ‘genius loci’ or ‘sense of place’ of the Grand Parade, and does this support or hinder trader livelihood strategies?</td>
<td>• The former ‘genius loci’ or ‘sense of place’ of the Parade has been lost due to crime and neglect. • The inability of the City’s street trading management approach on the Parade to successfully address issues of crime and neglect hinders trader livelihood strategies.</td>
<td>• Interdepartmental cooperation to address issues affecting the Parade should be facilitated through the adoption of area-based and city centre multi-stakeholder street trading management forums.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Feelings of safety</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**OVERARCHING CRITERIA FOR PROGRESSIVE STREET TRADING MANAGEMENT**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Developmental Ease of access for new entrants with limited financial capital</th>
<th>To what extent is the City of Cape Town’s street trading management approach on the Grand Parade developmental?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support and services to sustain livelihoods</td>
<td>• The developmental aims of the City’s Informal Trading Policy are not borne out in practice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Differentiated support structures for survivalist and entrepreneurial street traders.</td>
<td>• Access for new entrants is difficult, there is limited support to traders, and no area-based multi-stakeholder engagement forum exists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• No differentiated support structures between survivalist and entrepreneurial street traders exist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pragmatic Street trading management based on participatory processes</td>
<td>To what extent is the City of Cape Town’s street trading management approach on the Grand Parade pragmatic?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple stakeholder street trading forums</td>
<td>• The City’s street trading management approach is not pragmatic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consolidated and capacitated street trader organisations</td>
<td>• There are limited spaces for participation, and the forums that do exist lack sufficient relevant stakeholders, offer limited opportunities for traders to voice their concerns, and the City exerts strict control over the narrative of discussions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existence of a dedicated street trading management institution</td>
<td>• There has been limited City effort to capacitate street trader organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area-based street trading management processes and institutions</td>
<td>• No dedicated street trading management institution or area-based street trading management processes currently exist.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The City’s restructuring process, together with the convoluted street trading management structure on the Parade serve to limit any pragmatic management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Accessibility of the permit application process should be improved through use of multiple languages, communication channels, and flexibility in document requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Renting multiple bays should be allowed to lower costs and improve access to survivalist traders through cross-subsidisation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pragmatic Street trading management based on participatory processes</td>
<td>To what extent is the City of Cape Town’s street trading management approach on the Grand Parade pragmatic?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple stakeholder street trading forums</td>
<td>• The ‘eThekwini model’ should be used as a precedent for a participatory and area-based approach to street trading management in Cape Town</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consolidated and capacitated street trader organisations</td>
<td>• A multi-stakeholder street trading committee for the city centre must be formed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existence of a dedicated street trading management institution</td>
<td>• A street trader forum for the city centre must also be formed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area-based street trading management processes and institutions</td>
<td>• Organisational and skills development training for trader organisations must be provided</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The Informal Trading function in the new ‘area-based service delivery’ structure of the City must be provided with sufficient human and financial resources</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| To what extent does the City of Cape Town’s street trading management practice on the Grand Parade align with national developmental policies? | • A disjuncture exists between the stated developmental approach of the City’s Informal Trading Policy (informed by national developmental policies) and its practices.  
• The combination of organisational restructuring processes, confused mandates as well as the low political and funding priority given to street trading management has meant that the complex of socio-economic factors and persistent management issues on the Parade, that require interdepartmental cooperation to address, continue to negatively impact trader livelihoods. | • The responsibility for street trading management on the Parade must be moved from the Strategic Assets Department to the new Area Economic Development function within Area-based Management.  
• Monitoring and evaluation must be used to make the case for increased budget for the Informal Trading function amid growing political will towards pro-poor policies. |
7.1 References


Bénit-Gbaffou, C., Bokasa, P., Jackson, A., Manzini, S., Mhlogo, M., Mohlobi, M., & Nkosi, M.


Chetty, I. 2017. Cape Town’s City Hall closed as R27m revamp gets underway.


Holstein, J.A. & Gubrium, J.F. 2004. The active interview. *Qualitative Research: Theory,


Informal Economy Policy. Policy memo.


Muller, R. 2017a. Address at the Leadership Training Graduation Ceremony organised by the City of Cape Town. Cape Town, 20 June 2017.


van der Heijden, T. 2012. *Making the Informal Economy Visible: Guidelines for*


APPENDIX A: 
TRADING PLAN FOR 
WARD 77
GEORGE MUNICIPALITY
NOTICE NO: 099/2016
REMOVAL OF RESTRICTIONS AND DEPARTURE: ERF 4148, GEORGE

Notice is hereby given in terms of Section 45 of the George Municipality’s By-Law on Municipal Land Use Planning that the undermentioned application has been received and is open to inspection during weekdays between 07:45 and 16:30 at the Department: Human Settlements, Land Affairs and Planning, Civic Centre, 5th Floor, York Street, George.

Any comments or objections with full reasons thereof, should be lodged in writing in terms of Section 50 of the said legislation at the office of the Senior Manager: Land Use Planning, PO Box 19, George, 6530, on or before 12 September 2016, quoting the reference number, your property description and physical address. Telephonic enquiries in this regard may be made at 044–801 9473 (Marisa Arries) or e-mail: marisa@george.org.za. Any person, who is unable to write, can submit their objection verbally to the Council’s office where they will be assisted by a staff member to put their comments in writing. Any comments received after the aforementioned closing date may be disregarded.

Applicant: Jan Vrolijk, Town Planner

Nature of application

1. Removal in terms of Section 15(2)(f) of the Land Use Planning By-Law (2015) of condition C6(a) and (b) out of the Title Deed of Erf 4148, George;

2. Departure in terms of Section 15(2)(b) of the mentioned By-Law for the following on Erf 4148, George:
   (a) Additional dwelling unit;
   (b) Relaxation for the north western side building line on Erf 4148, George from 3.0m to 0,0m for an additional dwelling unit.

T BOTHA, MUNICIPAL MANAGER, Civic Centre, York Street, GEORGE, 6530. Tel: (044) 801 9473, Fax: 086 570 1900
Email: marisa@george.org.za

12 August 2016 54028

CITY OF CAPE TOWN
INFORMAL TRADING PLAN FOR WARD 77, BEING CAPE TOWN CBD AND IMMEDIATE SURROUNDS

Notice is hereby given that Provincial Gazettes 5099 dated 13 Dec 1996, 5447 dated 13 June 1997, 5195 dated 7 November 1997, 5301 dated 6 November 1998 and 6379 dated 8 September 2006 has been repealed and replaced with this amended Notice.

Notice is hereby given in terms of the City of Cape Town Informal Trading By-law promulgated on 20 November 2009 that:

(1) The areas bounded by Kloofnek Road, Signal Hill, Buitengracht Road, Somerset Road, Table Bay Boulevard, Tennant Road and De Waal Drive, as indicated on Annexure 1 which accompanies this notice, is an area in which the carrying on the business of street vendor, pedlar or hawker is prohibited with the exception of certain defined informal trading areas as indicated on attached plans namely Annexures 2 to Annexure 62.

(2) The area constituted by trading bays, reflected on the attached plans of the demarcation, be declared as an area in which carrying on the business of street vendor, pedlar or hawker is restricted to persons in possession of a valid permit or lease; and

(3) The abovementioned trading bays be let out by means of a permit or lease and that no street vending, peddling or hawking be permitted in the demarcated bays in the area indicated above if a person is not in possession of a valid permit or lease for that particular trading bay.

ACHMAT EBRAHIM, CITY MANAGER

STAD KAAPSTAD
INFORMELEHANDELSPLAN VIR WYK 77, NAAMLIK KAAPSTAD-SAKEKERN EN ONMIDDELIKE OMGEWING


Kennisgewing geskied hiermee ingevolge die Stad Kaapstad: Verordening op Informele Handel, afgekondig op 20 November 2009, dat:

(1) Die gebied omgrons deur Kloofnekweg, Seinheuwel, Buitengrachtstraat, Somersetweg, Tafelbaai-boulevard, Tennantweg en De Waalrylaan, soos aangetoon in bylae 1 by hierdie kennisgewing, ‘n gebied is waar die bedryf van die besigheid van straatverkoper, venter of smous verbied word, met die uitersondering van sekere omkragte informelehandelsgebiede soos aangetoon op die aangehegte plante, naamlik Byle 2 tot Byle 62.

(2) Die gebied bestaande uit die handelsplekke op die aangehegte planne van afbakening, verklaar word as ‘n gebied waar die bedryf van die besigheid van straatverkoper, venter of smous beperk word tot persone in besit van ‘n geldige permit of huurkontrak; en

(3) Bogenoemde handelsplekke verhuur word deur middel van ‘n permit of huurkontrak en dat geen straatverkoper, venter of smousery toegelaat word in die afgebakende handelsplekke wat hierbo aangetoon word indien ‘n persoon nie in besit van ‘n geldige permit of huurkontrak vir dié betrokke handelsplek is nie.

ACHMAT EBRAHIM, STADSBESTUURDER
INFORMAL TRADING SITES: CAPE TOWN (CBD)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>NUMBER OF BAYS</th>
<th>DAYS OF OPERATION</th>
<th>SIZE OF BAYS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cnr Lower Plein Str &amp; Darling Str (on the post office side)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>7 days a week</td>
<td>3m x 3m</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**APPLICATION FORM**

**Please Note:**
Any person planning to undertake research in the Faculty of Engineering and the Built Environment (EBE) at the University of Cape Town is required to complete this form **before** collecting or analysing data. The objective of submitting this application **prior** to embarking on research is to ensure that the highest ethical standards in research, conducted under the auspices of the EBE Faculty, are met. Please ensure that you have read, and understood the EBE Ethics in Research Handbook (available from the UCT EBE, Research Ethics website) prior to completing this application form: [http://www.ebe.uct.ac.za/usr/ebe/research/ethics.pdf](http://www.ebe.uct.ac.za/usr/ebe/research/ethics.pdf)

### APPLICANT’S DETAILS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of principal researcher, student or external applicant</th>
<th>Jens Horber</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Department</td>
<td>School of Architecture, Planning and Geomatics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preferred email address of applicant:</td>
<td><a href="mailto:HRBJEN001@myuct.ac.za">HRBJEN001@myuct.ac.za</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If a Student</td>
<td>MCRP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Your Degree: e.g., MSc, PhD, etc.,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name of Supervisor (if supervised):</td>
<td>Associate Professor Tanja Winkler</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If this is a research contract, indicate the source of funding/sponsorship

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>An investigation of the City of Cape Town’s current management of informal trade, its informal trade policies, and ways in which the participatory processes followed by the City can be made more equitable, in an effort to better enable informal trading in the Cape Town city centre.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I hereby undertake to carry out my research in such a way that:

- there is no apparent legal objection to the nature or the method of research; and
- the research will not compromise staff or students or the other responsibilities of the University;
- the stated objective will be achieved, and the findings will have a high degree of validity;
- limitations and alternative interpretations will be considered;
- the findings could be subject to peer review and publicly available; and
- I will comply with the conventions of copyright and avoid any practice that would constitute plagiarism.

### SIGNED BY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Full name</th>
<th>Signature</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Principal Researcher/Student/External applicant</td>
<td>Jens Skouboe Christensen Horber</td>
<td>22 Jun 2017</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### APPLICATION APPROVED BY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Full name</th>
<th>Signature</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Supervisor (where applicable)</td>
<td>Tanja Winkler</td>
<td>24 May 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOD (or delegated nominee) Final authority for all applicants who have answered NO to all questions in Section 1; and for all Undergraduate research (Including Honours).</td>
<td>Click here to enter text.</td>
<td>Click here to enter a date.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chair : Faculty EIR Committee For applicants other than undergraduate students who have</td>
<td>Click here to enter text.</td>
<td>31 July 2017</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>