Street Vendor Exclusion in “Modern” Market Planning: A Case Study from Kumasi, Ghana

By Victoria Okoye
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Acknowledgements:

I would like to thank Eric Akwesi Prempeh of the Kejetia Traders Association for sharing his time, insights, and energy to this research project, and Enyonom Johnson Quarshie for her hard work, attention to detail, and assistance in the data collection phase of this research. I also thank Dorcas Anshah, Rhonda Douglas, and Laura Alfers for their support in organizing this research project and Sally Roever, Caroline Wanjiuko Kihato, Caroline Skinner, and Megan MacLeod, whose kind attention and essential guidance and comments enriched this work.

Publication date: January 2020
ISBN number: 978-92-95106-28-4


Published by Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing (WIEGO) A Charitable Company Limited by Guarantee – Company No. 6273538, Registered Charity No. 1143510

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Manchester, M2 7EN
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Acronyms

CBD   Central Business District
ERP   Economic Recovery Programme
GH₵   Ghana Cedi
GOG   Government of Ghana
GSS   Ghana Statistical Service
IMF   International Monetary Fund
KMA   Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly
KKTA  Kumasi Kejetia Traders Association
KPTA  Kejetia Petty Traders Association
MLGRD Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development
MOF   Ministry of Finance
MOTI  Ministry of Trade and Industry
TSSP  Trade Sector Support Programme
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Abstract

The rise of “modern” markets is a growing trend in local economic development planning for the upgrading of central business areas in global South cities. However, these developments pose significant impacts for street vendors, who carry out commercial activities in public spaces, including market streets, sidewalks and transport stations. This study, conducted in 2016 during the market construction phase, investigates the local experience of this phenomenon in Kumasi, the second-largest city in Ghana and home to Kumasi Central Market, one of the largest public markets in West Africa. In 2014, the city government announced plans to redevelop the market and adjacent Kejetia Lorry Park through a modernization project. In 2015, the KMA relocated the 1,000 market-stall vendors and 5,000 street vendors who traded at the lorry park in the first phase of construction. This study explored the impacts on Kejetia street vendors through structured interviews with city government and vendor leaders, surveys of relocated Kejetia street vendors, and street-level observations. This paper finds that the KMA’s legal and spatial exclusions of street vendors, including exclusions from the stakeholder engagement and registration processes, and relocating street vendors to a site at the market periphery have created increased commercial uncertainty for these vendors in both the short term and the long term. The findings reinforce previous research examining the critical role of the state in producing and re-producing informality, despite street vendors’ attempts and desires to formalize their livelihoods.
1. Introduction

In many West African cities, street vending is the most visible form of the urban informal economy and also comprises a significant share — as high as 55 per cent — of the total number of informal vendors (Roever 2016; Herrera et al 2012; Budlender 2011). Street vending is not only an important source of livelihood for the urban labour force. Street vendors also provide substantive (yet seldom recognized) contributions to cities, such as through the payment of taxes, fees and levies to local and national governments, and support to food security. In Accra, for example, street vendors pay daily tolls to the city government and in some instances, monthly rents for temporary stalls and kiosks (Adamtey 2014). In Kumasi, the city government amasses an estimated 70 per cent of its internally generated funds from street vendors’ tolls annually (Owusu-Sekyere et al 2016: 916). Street vendors also provide the street-level retail interface for larger enterprises to sell their goods to a wide public — for example, as documented in research from Accra, large importers and wholesalers distribute their goods through middlemen, who in turn sell to street vendors, or street vendors purchase goods directly from supermarkets and large retailers to sell to the public (Anyidoho and Steel 2015). Street vendors also play a critical role in food security in African cities by providing a regular source of locally accessible and affordable foods for urban dwellers, including snacks, fresh produce, and prepared meals (FAO 2016, Sverdlik 2017).

However, with few exceptions, African city governments have framed street vending as encroachment, illegal occupation, hazards to planning, health, and the environment, as well as visual eyesores. In turn, city governments have employed evictions, confiscations, demolitions, and relocations as revanchist urban management mechanisms to dispossess street vendors from the public space of streets, sidewalk pavements, and open spaces (Bob-Milliar and Obeng-Odoom 2011; Steel et al 2014; Morange 2015; Gillespie 2015; Komolafe 2016; Owusu-Sekyere et al 2016; Dankoco and Brown 2017; Msoka and Ackson 2017).

In the city of Kumasi, Ghana, a redevelopment project for the Kumasi Central Market and adjacent Kejetia Lorry Park was designed to replace one of West Africa’s largest markets and its adjacent transport station with a “modern” commercial and transport structure. The project is part of a larger, nationwide strategy to support “modern” commerce in some of Ghana’s largest and most rapidly urbanizing cities. In Kumasi, the Kejetia Lorry Park, home to an estimated 6,500 vendors (including 5,000 street vendors), was demolished in late 2015 and its vendors relocated to make way for the initial construction phase. This project, which was completed in late 2018, has had a major impact on the area’s street vendors and can be understood as part of a wider discourse concerning the ways in which governments employ design and urban management controls to impose particular visions of urban order.²

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¹ Herrera et al’s (2012) statistical research documented the share of street vendors in overall informal trade in 11 cities, including seven cities in West Africa (Niamey, Ouagadougou, Bamako, Dakar, Abidjan, Lomé, and Cotonou). The proportion of street vending to overall informal trade in these cities ranged from 32 per cent in Ouagadougou to 55 per cent in Lomé. Budlender’s (2011) research on street vending in Ghanaian cities found that across Ghana’s cities, street vending accounted for 14 per cent of overall urban informal work.

² Pieterse (2008) describes African city urban authorities’ aims to achieve world-class cities, and Watson (2016) discusses the use of modernist planning to reproduce spatial inequalities in the global South. In Ghana’s cities, these aims have been pursued through large-scale infrastructure projects, elite residential and commercial developments, and land privatization projects (Spire and Choplin 2018). The street vendor evictions that precede these projects are part of patterns of urban dispossession (Gillespie 2015).
This paper contributes to literature on street vendor displacement in African cities within the context of urban revitalization and modernization. It explores the implementation of the Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly's (KMA) modernization project and the experiences of the displaced street vendors from Kejetia Lorry Park demonstrating that the KMA's approach to modernizing the Central Market has excluded Kejetia street vendors from opportunities for formalization and contributed to their further and persistent informal livelihood status.

This case study draws on primary data obtained through individual interviews with government and private sector representatives, including the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MOTI); KMA planning officers and the Kumasi Central Market Manager; the Accra Metropolitan Assembly (AMA) planning officers; the community engagement liaison for Contracta Engineering Limited, being the private construction and design firm contracted to complete the design and construction of the modernization project; and vendor leaders from the Kumasi Central Market and Kejetia Lorry Park. In addition, surveys were administered to 25 relocated street vendors who formerly traded at Kejetia. The primary data collection took place over the course of three visits to the Kumasi Central Market and Kejetia Lorry Park in 2016. Secondary information was collected via comprehensive reviews of local news coverage, legal documents, and academic literature on market redevelopments and street vendor relocations.

To begin, this paper contextualizes government approaches to street vending within Ghana’s larger economic and political environment and traces the government modern market aspirations in Ghanaian cities, followed by an overview of the research methodology, and elaborates the key findings on the specific vectors of exclusion used to displace street vendors and their impacts. The paper concludes with key recommendations from street vendors and vendor leaders, as well as from WIEGO’s global experiences supporting street vendors in inclusive urban planning and management.

2. Street and Market Vending in Ghana’s Political and Economic Context

Policy, planning and design approaches to the informal economy in Ghana have been shaped within the country’s wider political and economic context. While Ghana reports economic growth — including the recent re-categorization of its national economy from low-income to lower middle-income — the country still features highly uneven wealth distribution, especially high levels of socioeconomic inequality and poverty (Cooke et al 2016). Ghana also has a significantly large informal economy, comprising an estimated 82.6 per cent of all non-agricultural employment (ILO 2018). Informal economy workers globally not only lack important social protections, they are also more likely to be poor (Chen 2012), and in Ghana they are likely to earn less income than formally employed workers (Budlender 2011).

In Kumasi, the capital of the Ashanti Region, the Ghana Statistical Service (GSS) estimates 80 per cent of the labour force are employed in the informal economy (GSS 2012). The majority of informal workers operate in trade, manufacturing, non-domestic private services, construction and transport — but these sectors feature highly gendered dimensions. Overall, a significantly higher percentage
of women are informal economy workers (80.9 per cent of the female labour force), compared to men (52.5 per cent of the male labour force) (GSS 2014). These women workers are employed most largely in trade (46 per cent of female informal workers), manufacturing (23 per cent), and non-domestic private services (17 per cent); in contrast, the construction and transport sectors across urban Ghana are almost completely dominated by men (Budlender 2011). Street vending — being the commercial trading of goods by individuals or groups of vendors from fixed and mobile locations along streets, sidewalk pavements, open areas and transport stations — constitutes 14 per cent of all urban informal, non-agricultural workers in Ghana, and are disproportionately women (Budlender 2011). Historically, it is women who have dominated Ghana’s market and street vending, both before independence (Clark 1994) and afterward (Robertson 1983; Yeboah 1998; Overå 2007).

Despite the size and scope of Ghana’s informal economy, there is a long history of its marginalization. Colonial town planning and environmental and public health regulations excised transitory vending from the streets and open spaces and relocated trade to metal-roofed sheds in fixed market areas. Kumasi’s Central Market and Accra’s Makola Market, constructed in 1924, were modeled after British markets to house hundreds of vendors (Clark 1994). Market and street trading formed a highly visible form of everyday life in the colonial city, but were left out of official colonial reports and descriptions of commerce (Robertson 1983). The colonial neglect also included low levels of investment in markets, contributing to poor infrastructure and services conditions. The lack of government provision for adequate water, toilets, waste, and sanitation contributed to crowded, inaccessible and unhygienic conditions in the city’s markets (Ministry of Housing, 1958). The colonial government attempted to embrace large-scale industrialization in order to transform a largely self-employed labour force into a large working class (Alfers 2013), but at independence, the majority of Ghana’s workforce were still employed in small-scale trading, carpentry, crafts and farming. Ghana’s national development strategy aimed to expand the economy through large-scale, state-owned enterprises dependent on imported raw materials and state protection (Obeng-Odoom 2012).

Compounding informal workers’ issues, a combination of internal and external factors, including declining national savings, investment, increased inflation, a series of severe droughts, and falling cocoa prices, plunged Ghana’s economy into crisis in the late 1970s and 1980s (Barwa 1995). The informal economy, particularly market and street vendors, became visible and public targets for the country’s economic woes. Market women were accused of smuggling contraband goods, driving up prices, contributing to and benefiting from the country’s economic crisis. The military regime targeted vendors through harassment, interrogations, confiscations, and public beatings. In 1979, soldiers publicly executed a Kumasi cloth vendor accused of profiteering, and military forces demolished Accra’s Makola Market, the heart of the country’s market system and wholesale and retail trade (Harrell-Bond 1980). The demolition of Makola Market was framed by news media as part of a “War on Hoarders”; within two years, the main markets in the cities of Koforidua, Sekondi, and Kumasi were also destroyed. These market demolitions displaced vendors who took up street vending (Robertson 1983).

In the years following this oppressive regime, economic liberalization further pushed large numbers of individuals into informal employment, particularly small-scale trading. In the early 1980s, the Government of Ghana (GOG) began implementing austerity measures designed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to grow the formal economy and formal employment. The Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) policy measures devalued the national currency, reduced government spending
and service provision, and opened the space for increased private sector roles in these and other areas. Although the policies were aimed to support economic stability and accelerate growth, the effect was the opposite: Formal employment opportunities grew only minimally, providing limited options for the nation’s growing labour force (Obeng-Odoom 2012; Huag 2014). The direct result of Ghana’s economic crisis and economic liberalization (structural adjustment) policies were informalization of the labour market: As unemployment increased and formal wages declined, large numbers of workers were forced out of the formal and government sectors and into informal employment. By the 1990s, small-scale vending had become the most common occupation for women and for an increasing number of men in urban Ghana (Overå 2007).

As a consequence of these factors, street vending became a focus for local policies and by-laws. Local government acts (1988, 1993) and the national constitution (1992) facilitated the decentralization process devolving national-level political, administrative and fiscal powers to district, municipal and metropolitan assemblies (Oduro-Ofori 2016). With increased scope for local planning and decision-making, assemblies employed local by-laws to constrict the movements of mobile and fixed street vendors, targeting vendors’ operating with push trucks and kiosks in Kumasi (Owusu 2006) and prohibiting street vending in Accra (Osei-Boateng 2012). These by-laws have laid the legal framework for continued “decongestion exercises,” government street evictions that include confiscation and destruction of vendors’ goods, and vendors’ extortion, harassment, and arrest (Osei-Boateng 2012; Steel et al. 2014; Gillespie 2015) as urban management strategies.3

3 “Decongestion exercises” have also targeted informal settlements and unauthorized housing structures; see Fält (2016) and Gillespie (2015) on the eviction and dispossession of informal vendors and residents as part of state-led urban transformation processes in Accra, Ghana.

3. Modern Markets in Ghana

Economic liberalization and government emphasis on limiting street vending have influenced the current modern markets agenda. Accra’s 1958 masterplan noted colonial attempts to curtail street vending in the city’s central business district (CBD). The plan presented two alternatives: The first option, market redevelopments, was intended to better accommodate vendors. The second option, “special petty trading sites,” were intended as self-designated spaces created through the agglomeration of up to 20 vendors in high-demand street areas. In exchange for vendors’ monthly payments, city government planned to provide floor surfacing, drainage, water points, and trees for shade in these special sites (Ministry of Housing 1958). However, subsequent investments have instead focused on the market redevelopment strategy, in which the government has constructed large-scale, multi-story, enclosed commercial buildings: Accra’s Kaneshie Market was constructed in 1979 as a “modern planned market” to house hundreds of market vendors, and Cape Coast’s 2,500-stall Kotokuraba Market was constructed in 2016 as part of a major redevelopment of the previously existing, open-air market via a $1.3 billion government loan from the EXIM Bank of China (Nwakalor 2016).4

4 City governments outside of Ghana have also embraced large-scale “modern” markets as approaches to addressing the spatial concerns of market and street vending, including in Lagos, Nigeria (Komolafe 2016); Johannesburg, South Africa (Pezzano 2016); and Belo Horizonte, Brazil (de Pádua Carrieri & Dutra Murta 2011).
Structural adjustment policies of the 1980s and 1990s, as mentioned in section 2, ushered in a period of economic liberalization. The policies opened the door to foreign investment and private sector-driven interventions in planning, design and development of urban infrastructure and housing. The policies also enabled private sector priorities, both local and foreign, to play a sizeable role in national and local urban development decisions for markets. The modern markets strategy in Ghana is linked to government policy and plans that have sought to organize commercial market and street vending in line with private sector-facilitated urban development, industry, and economic growth objectives. The Ministry of Trade and Industry (MOTI) has led the shaping of Ghana’s policies on model markets. Furthermore, in the 2005 National Trade Policy, they framed market facilities and infrastructure upgrading within the government’s wider strategic vision to expand the economy through market-oriented interventions supporting private sector and consumer efficiency (MOTI 2005a). The Trade Sector Support Programme (TSSP), the implementation plan for the National Trade Policy, proposed market improvements within the framework of economic indicators: reducing price fluctuations, improving prices for producers and consumers, and improving the overall trade and distribution system (MOTI 2005b). The TSSP also proposed business registration and streamlined trade-related taxes to formalize vendors within the tax net (MOTI 2005b).

The national government has embraced modern markets (also referred to as “model” markets or “new” markets) with the stated aim to prevent the “proliferation of hawkers and itinerant traders and ramshackle structures,” and “the menace of market fires and other hazards” (MOTI 2009). MOTI developed generic market conceptual models, emphasizing the inclusion of refrigerated stores, fire protection facilities, market stalls, drainage infrastructure, toilet facilities, day care centres, play grounds and running water. MOTI, in cooperation with the Ministry of Finance (MOF), has also created a public-private partnership (PPP) policy framework for private investments to finance the construction and management of the markets and to oversee the market’s financial structure for operations and management. Through this financial model, metropolitan, municipal and district assemblies acquire loans to fund the construction of a new market; each market is to be financed, constructed and operationalized in phases, on a cost-recovery basis. The local government therefore serves as the legal and policy facilitator, handing over design, construction and possibly even operations of the completed market to the private sector. The market redevelopment construction is undertaken by a contractor agency specializing in engineering and construction. The GOG is charged with repaying in full the loan plus interest, and the local assembly raises the funds for loan repayment via user charges to the market and street vendors who will occupy the new market. These collected fees also finance the overall facility’s maintenance, management, and operations.

Seven cities have been targeted for this MOTI initiative, with major market modernizations planned or completed in Ghana’s three largest cities: Accra, Kumasi and Cape Coast. In Kumasi, the government took a $298 million loan from the Brazilian government to finance the Modern Transport Terminal and Market Complex. The construction work was undertaken by Contracta, a Brazilian construction and engineering firm. The structure’s initial plan included three phases for the construction of a multi-level, semi-covered structure with 6,000 to 10,000 commercial stores, a first-floor semi-open pavilion for

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5 Hawkers and itinerant traders refers to street vendors who operate on foot and from non-fixed locations.
6 The full list of cities is: Accra, Kumasi, Cape Coast, Tema, Tamale, Asokore, Upper Denkyira, and Dambai.
500 tabletop vendors, and a street-level transport station for buses and minibuses. This first phase of construction for the modern market and transport structure redevelopment project took place December 2015 to November 2018. In addition to the KMA's modernization plans at Kumasi Central Market and Kejetia, the KMA had plans to upgrade three smaller “satellite markets” within the city as part of metro-wide local economic development plans.

4. Street Vendors and the Kumasi Market Modernization

4.1 In-Country Research: Objectives, Methodology and Participants

Following from this background context on Ghana’s informal economy and the government approach to market modernization, this paper moves forward to the specific case of the KMA’s modernization process and implications for street vendors’ informal status. In-country research was conducted over a six-month period in 2016 and involved surveys of 25 Kejetia street vendors (19 women and 6 men); semi-structured interviews with two vendor leaders from the Kumasi Central Market; an interview with one vendor leader from Kejetia Lorry Park; semi-structured interviews with one representative from the KMA and one representative of the construction firm implementing the project; participant observations of street vendors in operation at the Central Market and KMA-designated vendor relocation sites; and a wide review of secondary information sources, including local news media coverage on the project and internal legal court documents.

The surveys and interviews were completed over a period of three visits to Kumasi. The street vendors surveyed worked from fixed or semi-fixed locations, such tabletops, small kiosks, stalls, or directly on sidewalk pavement. They operated from various locations in the market, such as at the roadside or sidewalk pavement, in front of stores, and outside the gate of the current construction site — the former Kejetia Lorry Park. Contact with Kumasi vendor leadership was facilitated through StreetNet International’s affiliate in Ghana, the Informal Hawkers and Vendors Alliance of Ghana (IHVAG). Subsequent introductions and contacts with vendors, government, and private sector representation were facilitated through the Central Market Zonal leadership and Kejetia Petty Traders Association (KPTA) leadership. The approach to the surveys and interviews was purposive sampling, with a focus on capturing the various spatial rationalities held by street and market vendors, the KMA, and project implementers.

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7 The publicly available design for the new market is a three-dimensional model on exhibition at the National Centre for Culture in Kumasi.
As described via the following table, the 25 street vendor survey respondents were long-term vendors at Kejetia selling a variety of products and services. The respondents included both members of vendor associations as well as individuals who operated independently of any association. All 25 street vendors reported payment of daily tolls to the KMA, with all but one paying GH¢2 per day (USD$0.518); one vendor selling alcoholic beverages reported paying a toll of GH¢1 (USD$0.25) per day.

Table 1. Street Vendor Survey Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Membership Association (if any)</th>
<th>Total Surveyed</th>
<th>Time at Kejetia (Average Years)</th>
<th>Membership (Average Years)</th>
<th>Types of Goods and/or Services Sold</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Petty Traders Association</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>Electronics, phone repair services, foods, beverages, beauty products, jewelryt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main Pavement Association</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>Clothes, curtains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Odo Ne Nkosuo (Love &amp; Prosperity)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Electronics, clothes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No association membership</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13.25</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>Slippers, sandals, shoes, foods, phone repair services</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.2 Research Findings

“Now, you say this is a new market structure. Day in and day out, people are venturing into petty trading, and the numbers are increasing due to lack of [formal employment] opportunities…there is no provision for them in your new structure. So automatically the purpose of even building the new structure will be defeated.” (Kejetia Petty Traders Association Chairman, 2016)

“The problem in Kumasi is that everyone wants to sell on the street, because they feel they move with cars. So the cars park somewhere, start loading, and that is where they [street vendors] can make their money. So that is why the city is choked.” (Contracta Representative (construction agency managing the market modernization project), 2016)

“We are growing as a nation; we need to plan ahead… So the issue is that we should be able to accept the new system and live with it… We are going to go away from the traditional way of trading where you have people mixed up here and there.” (Kumasi Central Market Manager, 2016)

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8 The exchange rate used is GH¢3.95 equal to USD$1 (as at the time this research was conducted, February 1, 2016; https://www.xe.com).
The above quotes represent the divergent perspectives between street vendors, city government, and the engineering and construction firm on the role of the informal economy as part of the urban visions for the city of Kumasi and in particular for the modernization project in the CBD. Despite the contributions of street vendors to the city, the KMA’s plans and urban management mechanisms continue to marginalize their livelihoods, which leads to further informality.

Kumasi Central Market has grown significantly since its first roofed structures were built in 1924 to accommodate 700 market vendors with the Kejetia Lorry Park as an adjacent public transportation depot. Today the Central Market is the largest market in Ghana and one of the largest in the West African region. Kumasi’s major public markets and lorry parks are overseen by the KMA through a market manager and lorry park manager, respectively. Each manager is a direct employee of the KMA, is stationed in the market or lorry park, and oversees vendors’ activities and the collection of daily tolls and other fees.

The KMA estimates that the market’s overall daily carrying capacity, including building owners, tenants, and shoppers who operate in and pass through the market on a daily basis, is 50,000 people, including 20,000 market vendors (KMA 2016b). The Kejetia Lorry Park was constructed adjacent to the Central Market in the early 1920s as a major bus and trotro (local minibus) depot station. Over time, the space diversified commercially to hold thousands of street vendors. The KMA estimates that the Kejetia Lorry Park was home to 1,000 market stall vendors and almost 2,500 street vendors, but the Chairman of the Kejetia Petty Traders Association (KPTA) estimated that the figure is much higher — between 6,000 to 6,500 traders, including 5,000 street vendors, 846 vendors with lockable stores, and 200 vendors with container stores.

Two organized groups represent vendors at Kejetia Lorry Park: The Kumasi Kejetia Traders Association (KKTA), with 402 registered members who are vendors operating from market stores and container stores, and the Kejetia Petty Traders Association (KPTA), with 2,283 registered members who are street vendors, including mobile and tabletop vendors operating on the street. The KKTA is registered with the Registrar General’s Department, while the KPTA is registered with the National Youth Authority and is a member of the Registered United Clubs of Kumasi. Neither group is affiliated with national unions or federations of formal or informal workers — such as the Ghana Trade Union Congress, which is the main umbrella organization for trade union activities in Ghana.

Market stall vendors and street vendors pay fees to the KMA in the form of rent (for stall vendors), and daily tolls (both market stall vendors and street vendors); in turn, the KMA is to provide infrastructure and basic services. The KMA was unable to provide figures for revenue collected from market stall vendors and street vendors’ payments, but the KPTA, its members, non-member street vendors and Kumasi Central Market stall vendors reported the fees they now pay on a daily or regular basis to the KMA.

9 The term “lorry station” or “lorry park” refers to transport stations where minibuses (trotro) as well as buses arrive and depart.
10 “Petty trader” is a local term referring to a street vendor.
Kumasi Market and Kejetia Vendors: Daily Toll Payments to KMA

* Fees as of March 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Daily toll</th>
<th>Daily (as group)</th>
<th>Monthly (as group)</th>
<th>Yearly (as group)</th>
<th>Other Fees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>per vendor</td>
<td>(as group)</td>
<td>(as group)</td>
<td>(as group)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPTA Street Vendors</td>
<td>GH¢2.00</td>
<td>GH¢4,566</td>
<td>GH¢118,716</td>
<td>GH¢1,424,592</td>
<td>(N/A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n=2283)</td>
<td>(US$ 0.51)</td>
<td>(US$ 1,1556)</td>
<td>(US$ 30,055)</td>
<td>(US$ 360,656)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kejetia Street Vendors*</td>
<td>GH¢2.00</td>
<td>GH¢10,000</td>
<td>GH¢260,000</td>
<td>GH¢3,120,000</td>
<td>(N/A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n=5000)</td>
<td>(US$ 0.51)</td>
<td>(US$ 2,532)</td>
<td>(US$ 65,823)</td>
<td>(US$ 789,873)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Market Stall Vendors</td>
<td>GH¢0.50</td>
<td>GH¢10,000</td>
<td>GH¢260,000</td>
<td>GH¢3,120,000</td>
<td>Rental fees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n=20,000)</td>
<td>(US$0.13)</td>
<td>(US$2,532)</td>
<td>(US$65,823)</td>
<td>(US$789,873)</td>
<td>(depends on stall size)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This is the higher estimate provided by the KPTA Chairman, rather than the (lower) figure provided by the KMA

The KPTA said its street vendors pay on average GH¢760 (USD$190) per vendor per year to the KMA. The KMA amasses an estimated 70 per cent of its internally generated funds from Kumasi street vendors’ tolls (Owusu-Sekyere et al, 2016: 916). Yet growth and expansion of the Central Market and Kejetia without the KMA’s corresponding investment in infrastructure and services has resulted in traffic congestion due to oversubscribed and under-resourced market, street and sidewalk spaces, as well as deteriorating infrastructure, poor sanitation and drainage, and vulnerabilities to disasters, including fires and flooding. In January and March 2016, fires at Kumasi Central Market destroyed more than 200 shops and vendors’ property (Boakye-Yiadom 2016). In addition, in Kumasi and other Ghanaian cities, local governments execute “decongestion exercises” to evict vendors from their selling spaces at streets, sidewalks and other open spaces, citing traffic congestion, market fires, and floods as rationale (Timah 2018; Baah 2018).

In late 2015, Kejetia Lorry Park was demolished to make way for construction, and all of the survey respondents were relocated. The street vendors surveyed had little concrete knowledge about the project plans, timeline, or their inclusion in the new commercial complex. The respondents felt strongly that the project would play an important role in the CBD, as a major commercial development and centralized commercial area. Eighteen out of the 25 survey respondents expressed strong interest in acquiring vending space within the structure once complete if possible, but thirteen expressed concern about the affordability of vending space. As one respondent said, “My fear is I might not be able to afford…I don’t have an idea of the exact amount involved.”

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11 Street vendors in other Ghanaian cities also pay tolls to their local government authorities (Owusu-Sekyere et al 2016; Adamtey 2014).
12 In addition, in September 2016, 19 shops at Adum Shopping Centre, adjacent to the Kumasi Market, were destroyed in a fire. A recent fire in April 2017 took place at Roman Hill, an adjacent commercial area located near Kumasi Central Market, destroying hundreds of thousands of cedis worth of goods and products (Dapatem 2015; Nyabor 2017).
Within the context of the KMA’s modernization programme, street vendors’ livelihoods remain informal, and they have been unable to improve their circumstances. The vendors and vendor leaders highlighted negative impacts from the KMA’s approach to the modernization process. The KMA’s means of consulting stakeholders and planning the market precluded street vendors’ voice and contributions in a very political planning process, and street vendors have been unable to formally register their businesses with the KMA in a bid to formalize their livelihoods. Following relocations, vendors experienced reduced incomes and reduced safety and security. Their business instability has also meant increased uncertainty for their households who depend on their financial contributions from street vending for survival. In the context of the modernization process, street vendors expressed that their livelihoods have become more precarious. As national and local authorities in Ghana and globally wrestle with the complexities of formalizing the informal economy, Kejetia street vendors’ experiences demonstrate that inclusive plans and processes are essential to formalization that supports decent work and improved livelihoods.

4.2.1 Imbalanced Structures of Stakeholder Engagement

The KMA possesses bold visions for the city’s local economic development, yet street vendors and their livelihoods have not been included in the planning and implementation process. Imbalanced and exclusive structures of stakeholder engagement characterize the KMA’s approach to the Kejetia street vendors, their livelihoods and priorities, beginning with the KMA’s strong focus on market vendors but not street vendors in its stakeholder consultation mechanism to share information about the market.

**KMA Stakeholder Consultation with Vendors**

First, the KMA’s consultative process, which was intended for information dialogues and sharing planning and design information with stakeholder representatives, was a highly imbalanced operation that privileged Central Market vendor leadership and excluded the participation of Kejetia street vendors. In 2013, a 13-member central committee was established as a stakeholder engagement mechanism for the project that included the KMA government members, Contracta staff, and two Central Market vendor leaders. This central committee was the KMA’s main consultative platform for providing information and updates on redevelopment plans and market designs. The KMA Market Manager for the Central Market contended that this mechanism enabled inclusive decision-making and perspectives for “those that would be affected more” by the redevelopment. The KMA and Contracta intended that committee members disseminate information to all levels of market stakeholders, but did not track whether this information dissemination took place. It is also unclear whether any feedback the Central Market vendors provided to KMA and Contracta was integrated into designs and plans.

The central committee included two prominent vendor leaders from the Kumasi Central Market. One was a queen mother and president of the Cloth Sellers Association in the market who has been vending in the Central Market for more than 40 years. The other vendor leader was a zonal leader who sells home utensils and has been vending in the Central Market for 30 years. The queen mother recalled two meetings of the central committee, and she said Contracta invited her and the other committee members to see the designs of the new Kejetia market and to deliberate on the project.
concept, despite their limited background knowledge of Kejetia. Her understanding of the market redevelopment plan was to modernize and beautify Kejetia and the Kumasi Central Market “so everyone would have a place of business.” She expressed trust that the new market would possess the key amenities needed by vendors, such as toilet facilities, security, a hospital clinic and a police station.

However, despite these positive views from Central Market vendors, “with respect to our issues at Kejetia, there was no meaningful dialogue,” said Eric Akwesi Prempeh, chairman of the Kumasi Petty Traders Association (KPTA). While the KMA first announced plans for the new complex in 2013 and shortly after began the selective process of consultative engagement with Central Market vendor leaders, it was not until February 2015 that the KMA formally met with Kejetia stakeholders to confirm plans. The one-way communications of local radio, television broadcasts, and a three-dimensional model exhibited at the nearby National Centre for Culture were the main channel of information for street vendors, who were excluded from participation in the central committee. “The KMA only invited us [Kejetia vendors] to give us the two-month time period to vacate from our place,” Prempeh said, referring to early March 2015 when the KMA provided Kejetia vendors two months’ notice to relocate to KMA-designated sites. It was shortly after this two-month notification that the government delegation of parliamentary representatives, government officers, the KMA mayor, and the Central Market vendor leader traveled to Brazil for the market tour for discussions on the modernization project. “When they [the KMA] sent people to Brazil to see what has been done there, none of the vendors from Kejetia were involved,” recounted Prempeh.

As a result, few surveyed street vendors could demonstrate a firm understanding of the plans taking place. Perceptions varied, from ideas such as that the KMA was constructing only a transportation bridge over the lorry park, or that the KMA intended to completely re-construct the lorry park. Even among those who had a general idea of the conceptual plans, none had any sense of their own inclusion in the new market. Christina, a vendor selling cooking provisions including rice and oil, said, “I understand that they [KMA] want to put up a [multi]story building with a car park under it…In Kejetia, I had a permanent place and sales were booming. Now I don’t have a permanent workplace.” When asked if she would be interested to try and sell her goods in the new market, she responded: “Yes, but I don’t know what it will require.”

Thus, the information gained from the central committee does not demonstrate a deep engagement with market vendor representatives as collaborators or partners. Dorcas Ansah, WIEGO’s Focal City Coordinator for Accra, explained that this engagement with market vendor leadership enables local authorities like the KMA to meet a consultation requirement while also gaining buy-in from the market leadership to facilitate planning processes. In addition, local authorities commonly interface with market leaders as a means of “checking off” a stakeholder consultation requirement to engage with vendors. All too often, city government consultation with market vendors takes the form of one or two meetings to inform lead stakeholders of imminent plans, rather than a process of deep, authentic participation to allow a diversity of inputs and perspectives drawn from all sides of stakeholder engagements to substantially inform planning and design.

**Vendors’ Legal Attempts Against the KMA**

Vendors’ legal attempts demonstrate an important challenge to the KMA’s exclusive consultation process, as well as the KMA’s plans more generally. The Kejetia vendors pushed for continued
opportunities to participate in the process beginning from February 2015, requesting additional meetings with the KMA mayor, organizing demonstrations, and delivering a petition articulating their grievances to the regional and national government. However, on March 31, 2015, via radio broadcast, the KMA mayor notified Kejetia vendors that they had one month to vacate the Kejetia premises (Prempeh 2016a). In response, the Kejetia Traders Association (KTA) and the Kejetia Petty Traders Association (KPTA), jointly representing 2,685 street and market vendors, filed a claim against the KMA in court to halt construction. In their claim, the associations outlined 12 points of dispute centred around the lack of adequate notification and consultation with Kejetia vendors, the lack of compensation to Kejetia vendors for their investments to be demolished as part of the plan (four blocks of commercial stalls and protective infrastructure, which they had independently valued at GH¢438,000 (USD$109,500)), the lack of compensation for their relocation to alternative sites, expected economic losses relating to their relocation, lack of transparency in the relocation process, and lack of any written guarantee that Kejetia vendors would be allocated vending spaces in the completed complex (Afrifa 2015).

The KKTA and KPTA requested the opportunity to work with KMA to set up proper guidelines to deal with the relocations; they also demanded an assurance that their vending activities would be included in the scope of the new complex (Prempeh 2016a). In response to their claim, the Kumasi High Court granted an injunction, halting the KMA’s plans to relocate Kejetia vendors to make way for the first phase of construction (Ansah 2015). Four days after the court’s injunction, the KMA barricaded the entrances to Kejetia to prevent vendors’ entry (Tornyi 2015). Immediately, the vendors sought further legal action to hold the KMA and KMA Mayor in contempt of court for continuing the relocation exercise despite the court’s injunction ruling (Dapatem 2015). However, their efforts failed. In July 2015, the Human Rights division of the Kumasi High Court dismissed the suit filed by the KKTA and KPTA against the KMA, stating that the associations failed to follow the proper procedural rules in filing their claims against the KMA Mayor, rather than the Regional Coordinating Council, which was the official body overseeing the project (Donkor 2015). The following day, the KMA began a wave of demolitions to clear the Kejetia Lorry Park for construction of the new market. The demolitions were completed in a series; the final demolition took place in January 2016.

The vendors appealed the court’s legal decision, but in July 2016, the Kumasi High Court acquitted and discharged the KMA and KMA Mayor from the contempt case brought by Kejetia street vendors (Donkor 2016). During interviews, KMA officials acknowledged that the street vendors were not happy with the project or process. However, the KMA officials also demonstrated a distinct lack of knowledge regarding what grievances the street vendors were bringing forward. They believed that the street vendors brought their issues to court because of their perception that they were not going to be provided a place to vend. Despite the pushback of the street vendors, in particular regarding the lawsuit, first-phase construction for the modern market continued.

**4.2.2 Legal Exclusions: Registration Exercise**

Exclusions in vendor registration, and the KMA’s evictions and relocations demonstrate concrete legal and spatial processes that have negatively impacted Kejetia street vendors in particular. In 2015, the KMA and Contracta initiated a registration process to build a digital information database on existing shop owners, market vendors, and street vendor from the Kejetia Lorry Park. The KMA stated an
intention to use this information database to ensure Kejetia vendors would acquire vending space in the new market once complete. Over a two-month period, the KMA collected vendors’ basic information, including vendors’ names (and shop owners’ names, if applicable), vendors’ age, mobile phone number, and products sold or services provided. As a fully digital process, the information was recorded on an electronic tablet. No cards or receipts were issued to vendors. Instead, Contracta maintained an online website through which vendors were asked to check to confirm their information.\textsuperscript{13}

The KPTA reported that vendors were not given adequate opportunity to record their information during the in-person registration exercise, that only a small number of street vendors were registered, and that even among those registered, many were unable to find and confirm their status via the online database platform. In these instances, Kejetia vendors without confirmed registration status have no assurance of accessing any of the limited spaces in the market complex once it is completed. Therefore, although the KMA claims that space in the new market would be made available for Kejetia street vendors, Kejetia street vendors have been deprived of the evidence they will need to access this opportunity.

An additional result is that the KMA lacks a complete profile of the size, names, and activities of street vendors who operated at the Kejetia Lorry Park, some of whom operated there for more than a decade. Although the KMA frames the proliferation of street vending as an urban problem, the lack of accurate data collection is part of the KMA’s refusal to inclusively design commercial urban spaces and plan for adequate infrastructure and basic services to accommodate these stakeholders. The KMA’s allocated pavilion space for street vendors (with a capacity for 500) is far below the KPTA’s own estimate of 5,000 street vendors who traded at Kejetia Lorry Park, or even for its own 2,283 members. Together, the registration and design plans limit these street vendors’ access to serviced commercial spaces in the new market.

Eighteen out of the 25 Kejetia street vendors surveyed (72 per cent) expressed the desire to acquire a commercial space in the completed market. However, without registration to enable their priority in accessing new space in the market, Kejetia street vendors may be forced to compete for limited trading space in the new market, or may be excluded from the new market altogether, depending on the KMA’s prerogative. A number of street vendors expressed fears that they would not be able to afford space in the new market, expecting that once spaces become available, street vendors from across the city may seek to trade there. This shortage of trading space in the new market is also likely to drive up demand for the available space, and therefore rental prices, which may price out many street vendors from accessing these spaces. Many street vendors will likely be forced to seek alternative open spaces in which they can carry out their livelihoods. Without government recognition (registration) and inclusion in government plans, street vendors lack formal arrangements that would guarantee them secure places to trade long-term. Without formal registered status and corollary legal protections, vendors remain susceptible to harassment, and any investments in infrastructure that could improve the urban space and their operations remains risky.

\textsuperscript{13} The KMA and Contracta have encouraged vendors to use their full names and mobile phone numbers to verify whether their information has been correctly recorded.
4.2.3 Spatial Exclusions: Evictions and Relocations

From the Kejetia construction site, the KMA designated three official relocation spaces for the vendors: An existing area called Race Course (where the KMA has relocated street vendors since 2005), and two existing multi-story commercial buildings, Adehyeman Market and Acheamfour Shopping Mall, for store vendors. The KMA secured the three spaces to provide space for relocated market vendors and street vendors free of charge for two years while the market was under construction. After this period, the KMA has claimed that the market redevelopment would provide sufficient space for street vendors to rent, although the numbers of vendors from the Central Market and Kejetia far outstrip the KMA’s planned capacity at the new market. The KMA’s physical displacement of Kejetia street vendors to inadequate and inaccessible relocation sites and without accommodation for their livelihoods in the new market represents a form of spatial exclusion with direct and negative consequences for the vendors’ income-generating opportunities.

The following table provides additional information on the three KMA-designated relocation sites for Kejetia vendors:

Table 2. KMA-Designated Relocation Sites for Kejetia Shop and Street Vendors

| Race Course: Relocation site formally allocated by the KMA for street vendors. The space is a lorry park and transport depot where trotros (minibuses) and taxis load and drop off customers. The open, undeveloped area is situated approximately 500 meters off the main Mampong Road of the Central Market area and accessible only via two unpaved, dusty roads at either end. Street vendors operate from wooden tabletops and kiosks. The area is partially occupied by approximately 200-300 street vendors. Street vendors surveyed said they assembled their own infrastructure (wooden tabletops and kiosks) to trade here. The KMA has continually relocated street vendors to the Race Course area since at least 2005 and prohibited street vendors from investing in their commercial spaces to permanently establish themselves, a strategy the KMA employs to “keep [street vendors] away from public sight and for the purpose of maintaining city aesthetics” (King 2005). |
Adehyeman Market: One of two relocation sites for Kejetia store vendors. Adehyeman is multistory (three and four-story) shopping structure with capacity for approximately 400 market vending stores. Similar to the design of Acheamfour (below), this market has stores with a central, enclosed area with additional stores at the ground level. Street vendors operate throughout the ground level.

Acheamfour Shopping Mall and Lorry Station: One of two relocation sites for Kejetia store vendors. A multilevel (three and four-story) commercial shopping structure with capacity for approximately 600 market vending stores. The structure is a two-part development built by a private owner and located in the Kumasi Central Market area. The structure is designed as a series of multi-level shopping stores that enclose a major transport depot for buses and trotros (mini buses). At the time of the research study, additional construction of new stalls was underway behind the major structure as an annex to accommodate the relocated Kejetia market stall vendors. Street vendors operate throughout the ground level and at nearby streets.
The relocation process has presented numerous problems for both street vendors and store vendors from Kejetia. First, the KMA’s stated policy was to provide Kejetia vendors with new spaces at no charge for the two-year period of construction, and to work through intermediaries to allocate these spaces. However, the street vendors relocated to Race Course assert that they were charged between GH¢200 (US$50) and GH¢500 (US$125) to access a 25 square foot trading space. “If you wanted a parcel of that land, you had to go and see them [KMA Monitoring Team], they will collect money from you,” said Prempeh of KPTA. “If you don’t pass through them, you won’t get a space.” Another street vendor who had been trading at Kejetia for 25 years corroborated Prempeh’s story: “We were not supposed to pay for the space. Some officials were selling the spaces, and because I didn’t have the funds to acquire I didn’t go there.” Other vendors surveyed also said that they were unable to acquire space at Race Course due to their inability to pay these informal fees.

Despite these fees, and despite the fact that the practice of relocating street vendors to Race Course has been in play since at least 2005, the KMA has not invested in basic infrastructure and services in the area, and street vendors reported health, safety, and security issues. In contrast to the facilities available to street vendors at Kejetia, which included permanent work stands, shelter, storage and lockable storage options to secure their goods, Race Course is an undeveloped, unpaved and dusty area, where the street vendors have been required to provide their own infrastructure. In addition, the open space is only accessible via a 500-meter long unpaved road that customers must access by car or foot, further dislocating vendors from the customer traffic that thrives inside the Central Market area and CBD.

At the time this study was conducted, an estimated 200 vendors operated at Race Course out of self-provisioned wooden kiosks and tabletops. A number of vendors made attempts at setting up larger-sized wooden stalls and kiosks, evidenced by the now abandoned, half-built structures among the overgrown, knee-high grass and weeds at the edge of the Race Course area. However, vendors who acquired spaces were not allowed to roof their structures, as the space is meant as a temporary location. Vendors are therefore left at the mercy of the weather, including the hot sun and rain. In addition, there is no security or storage space provided, making it difficult for vendors to secure their goods at night. Due to the unfavourable relocation conditions, many street vendors abandoned Race Course and chose to conduct their vending activities in other parts of the Central Market or outside the Central Market in the CBD or other areas of the city. In the Central Market, the street vendors have stationed themselves along the high-traffic areas of the main roads as well as along the pavement adjacent to the former Kejetia Lorry Park.

All of the street vendors surveyed had formerly traded at Kejetia, but only seven vendors (28 per cent) were still doing so at Race Course, while eight street vendors (32 per cent) had resumed trading in the vicinity of the former Kejetia Lorry Park area amid ongoing construction. Ten street vendors (40 per cent) were trading in alternative locations outside both former and designated relocation sites, such as at Adehyeman market building, or near the National Centre for Culture, which is situated next to the Central Market.

In some cases, the challenges experienced by Kejetia store vendors relocated to Acheamfour and Adehyeman pushed them from selling in their commercial stores to moving their goods to the street. At Acheamfour, construction delays left the relocated Kejetia market stall vendors stranded without commercial trading spaces for eight months. With their former vending spaces off limits, and their
designated commercial spaces not yet available, numerous vendors were forced to find alternative spaces to sell their goods. Prempeh of the KPTA explained that “some have decided to bring parts of things to the roadside to sell, others are [at home] finding other alternatives.”

At both Acheamfour and Adehyeman, Kejetia store vendors were relocated to the buildings’ top levels or an annex. While customer traffic thrived at each buildings’ ground levels, most particularly at Acheamfour, which also contains an inner transport station, there were fewer and fewer customers at each higher level of stores or passing behind the building. Due to the low or nonexistent customer traffic, many vendors, especially those on the top two floors, have opted to use their market stores as storage spaces and sell in alternative areas, including at the street.

The Impacts for Kejetia Street Vendors and Vendors’ Households

All of the street vendors surveyed reported negative impacts since planning and implementation started in 2015. The disruptions have increased the economic uncertainty of their businesses as well as their households that depend on their livelihoods. Many reported direct sales declines due to losing their existing customer base, reduced access to customers, lost capital, and lack of access to storage space for their goods. Many also reported business impacts that resulted from sales declines, such as general economic instability, inability to pay back loans, and being forced to change their business in order to cope economically. The frequency of the street vendors’ responses is visualized below in Figure 6.

![Figure 6. Frequency of Reported Impacts: Relocated Kejetia Street Vendors](image)

Declining sales were the most immediate, tangible, and universal impact expressed by the Kejetia street vendors since their relocation. At Race Course, lack of customer traffic is a key concern, because it has meant lower income earnings than the vendors previously earned at Kejetia. Twelve street vendors shared information on the differences between their former incomes from trading at Kejetia Lorry Park and their current incomes in their relocation spaces. The street vendors surveyed were earning between 6 to 50 per cent of what they formerly earned while trading at Kejetia. Two street vendors reported that they were earning half of their previous income while trading at Kejetia. In the worst case, a street vendor who previously earned GH¢500 (US$ 126.58) per day, was now earning GH¢30 (US$ 7.60) (6 per cent of previous income). On average, the street vendors were earning 24 per cent of their previously earned income.
The relocation process and lack of storage options at Race Course have also made a deep hit to street vendors’ turnover: Because most vendors are only able to sell what they can carry or safely store, they have little scope for scaling up their enterprises. The lack of safe, secure storage spaces means reduced sales, reduced access to capital, and reduced ability to grow their businesses.

Regarding their numerous health issues, street vendors point to Race Course’s poor environmental conditions. Both vehicular and pedestrian movement up and down the unpaved road and in the lorry park kick up dust, which fills the air and creates a challenging environment. “Race Course was very bad and dusty,” said Christiana, a street vendor selling rice and oil who formerly traded at Kejetia, then temporarily relocated to Race Course. “This place is dusty; it is making me sick. This place isn’t safe, no security,” said Akua, a street vendor selling engine oil at Race Course. Few vendors currently operate in the grassy area, and workers complained that the grassy area is filled with snakes and other dangerous insects. The vendors have recorded one death from a snake bite.

Street vendors’ reduced economic stability has also impacted their households. Thirteen of the 25 street vendors (52 per cent) reported that their reduced incomes directly and negatively affected the wellbeing and economic security of their households, including their ability to afford meals and educational fees for children and other dependents. In some cases, as a result of this economic insecurity within their household units, some street vendors reported having to send their children to stay with other family members. One street vendor reported: “I sent my child to my mum in Brong Ahafo Region because I can no longer care for her.” Another street vendor became divorced due to his financial difficulties.

In summary, in the midst of KMA’s attempts to modernize the CBD, Kejetia street vendors’ livelihoods have become more precarious. In the short term, after their exclusion from the registration exercise, eviction from Kejetia and temporary relocation to Race Course, the street vendors earn lower incomes and operate in more insecure conditions with increased uncertainty for their businesses and dependent households. Although the KMA has framed the relocation of street vendors as a temporary measure, the KMA has not provided a long-term plan or intervention to accommodate street vendors as part of its approach to modernizing the market area, nor has the KMA elaborated...
on plans to improve the conditions of their current operating spaces at Race Course. Their legal status (registration) and access to improved commercial space remains in question. The KMA’s plans for the modern market include only 500 street vending spaces, far from sufficient for the estimated 5,000 street vendors who previously operated at Kejetia. This $298 million modernization project is a substantial investment by the KMA in upgrading the CBD for commercial vending and transport. Yet the continued poor conditions at Race Course, without plans for upgrades or street vendors’ relocation to the new market or other decent spaces of work, mean that the hardships of street vendors operating there will persist in the long term. Even once the new market is complete and opened to vendors for rental, the vast majority of Kejetia vendors will have no other available option but to continue in the same challenging vending conditions they presently experience.

These experiences challenge broad narratives about the positive contributions of modernizing markets for informal vendors and to local economies. The ILO Recommendation 204, which provides guidance for authorities on the transition from informal to formal economies, frames informality as a structural and governance issue (ILO 2015: 2). However, efforts by authorities like the KMA to improve conditions for informal workers, if not implemented correctly, can actually push these workers into greater economic precarity — and with accompanying threats to their health, wellbeing, and household stability. It therefore becomes essential that the processes authorities adopt towards formalizing their informal economies are implemented inclusively. Otherwise, they can undermine the very stakeholders whom their formalization processes seek to support.

5. Conclusions and Recommendations

Operating from streets, sidewalk spaces, open spaces, and transport stations, street vendors are essential economic agents upon which urban dwellers, large retailers, distributors, and local governments depend. The street vendors surveyed for this study sell a variety of commercial goods — electronics, beverages, beauty products, clothes, and shoes manufactured locally and globally. They are the front-end retailers in diverse supply chains that connect local customers to regional and global producers (see Table 1). In turn, large retailers, enterprises, manufacturers and supermarkets depend on street and market vendors to supply their goods to the public, either directly or through middlemen (Anyidoho and Steel 2015).

Street vendors in Ghana’s cities provide significant contributions to local government revenues through their value-added tax payments when purchasing goods from larger retailers and distributors, as well as through their direct payments to local authorities (e.g., tolls and other fees) in exchange for access to public spaces (Anyidoho and Steel 2015; WIEGO 2016). At Kejetia, street vendors made substantial payments to the KMA, and in Kumasi, street vendors are the KMA’s largest source of local revenues — 70 per cent annually (Owusu-Sekyere 2016). Many local governments depend on street vendors to finance government operations and require payments for street vendors to access public spaces, yet allocate government resources to other city activities. A conspicuous result is oversubscribed and under-resourced markets and street-level vending spaces, which become susceptible to floods and fires. The numerous fire outbreaks at the Kumasi Central Market between 1993 and 2017 stand out as a prominent example (KMA 2017).
Space and legal status are particular means through which street vendors’ activities are politicized. The study findings reinforce work by Roy (2005) and Anyidoho (2013) on the role of local and national authorities in re-producing categories of informality through spatial and legal exclusions and marginalization. Public spaces like Kejetia are an essential “livelihood resource” for street vendors (Brown 2006). Street vendors stake collective claim to these spaces through sustained usage and investment — and in a survivalist attempt to generate income (Gillespie 2016). Yet despite their payments to local authorities, street vendors’ access to these spaces are persistently provisional. Vendors are constantly threatened with eviction, relocation, and demolition of their commercial spaces, equipment and goods. The KMA has continually relocated street vendors to the Race Course area since at least 2005 and prohibited street vendors from investing in their commercial spaces to permanently establish themselves, a strategy the KMA employs to “keep them [street vendors] away from public sight and for the purpose of maintaining city aesthetics” (King 2005). This is another means through which the local authorities maintain vendors’ provisional status.

The legal and spatial exclusions embedded into the government’s market modernization planning and processes demonstrate the local authorities’ role in producing and re-producing informality. The KMA registration process distinguished legitimate vendors (those recognized by the KMA as possessing legal claims to formal status) from by those deemed as illegitimate (with neither government recognition nor the opportunity to gain recognition). Specifically, the KMA has employed its governance powers to encourage and support market store vending, which exists as part of its modernist vision for the city, in contrast with street vendors, which one might assume the KMA attempts to make disappear. The KMA’s practices and policies perpetuate Kejetia street vendors’ informal status and corresponding precarity. By excluding the Kejetia street vendors from the planning process, from the registration exercise, and by relocating street vendors to the Race Course site at the market’s periphery and failing to upgrade this space for commercial vending, the KMA actively sets the categories of its modern vision and designates street vending as outside of that vision. Local and national authorities spatially marginalize street vendors by refusing to provide adequate, convenient and decent commercial spaces in which vendors can operate with state authorization (Anyidoho 2013). These practices and exclusions play a critical role in re-creating statuses of illegitimacy, despite street vendors’ demonstrated desires to achieve government recognition and correlating support for their livelihoods.

The KMA’s vision of urban order reflects a modernist, westernized urban orientation originating from the colonial period (Mbembe 2003). Modernity in African cities has become synonymous with the aesthetics of urban order, formality and symmetry; efficiency through a functional specialization of land and activities and the free flow of traffic; and modernization through slum-free urban areas featuring high-rise buildings and open green spaces (Watson 2009). Planning and design continue to serve as the tools for achieving and re-producing these modernist ideals, which protect and attract private investments and properties, while excluding the urban poor (Watson 2009; Gillespie 2016). Street vendors’ physical presence in public spaces represent a persistence and survival that challenge local authorities and their visions, market-oriented approaches, and aims for a “world-class city” (Watson 2009). The Kejetia vendors legal challenge to the KMA’s modern market plans mark an important contestation to the government’s urban vision and revanchist urban management mechanisms of eviction, demolition, and relocation.
These street vendors’ challenges to the KMA, the International Labour Conference Recommendation 204 (Transition from the Informal to the Formal Economy), and experiences from global South cities also point toward the potential of inclusive planning and design approaches to produce positive outcomes for street vendors and the spaces in which they operate. Recommendation 204, adopted in June 2015 at the International Labour Conference, recognizes the governance and structural issues that contribute to informality and provides guidance on employment policies, social protection, enforcement, collective bargaining, data collection and monitoring, and implementation to facilitate inclusive transitions from informal employment to formal employment for all workers, including street vendors. For example, Recommendation 204 cites the root cause of informality as the inability to create sufficient formal work opportunities to meet the demand of new entrants to the labour market and existing workers trapped in the informal economy.

Experiences from global South cities highlight opportunities to support street vendors’ livelihoods through more inclusive planning. The Indian government developed the 2004 National Policy on Urban Street Vendors, following a participatory policy process with organized groups of street vendors. The policy gave legal status to street vendors and brought street vending into the realm of spatial planning and regulatory policy, acknowledging and promoting vendors’ work as well as formalizing the demand-driven locations of vendors’ natural markets. The plan also promoted additional supports to street vendors such as their access to credit, skills, development, housing, and security (Sinha and Roever 2011). In Durban, South Africa, street vendors and municipal officials worked together to identify and map fire hazards, developing first aid stands, a fire prevention plan, and institutionalizing health and safety guidelines that have increased vendors’ health and safety in the marketplace (Alfers et al 2016).

In conclusion, modernization that incorporates inclusive dialogue, planning, and urban management can improve local urban economies as well as street vendors’ livelihoods. Achieving this goal, however, is dependent on the implementation of the following recommendations:

- **For authorities:** Quests to build modern markets must be part of a wider inclusive strategy that encourages and enables street vendors to formalize their work while preserving their existing livelihoods. This includes recognitions and regulations to enable vendors’ access to public space, business registration, and decent working conditions (ILO 2015). Street vendors comprise a significant proportion of Ghana’s urban informal workers, and the process of modernizing markets requires corollary interventions that address the everyday employment realities of these workers. Their material, economic, and legal conditions along with their health and wellbeing are implicated in these projects, but these can be positively impacted through inclusive implementation along with the improvement of market spaces.

- **For authorities:** Documentation and planning with street vendors is an opportunity to formalize street vendors’ livelihoods and improve their working conditions and incomes, while also contributing to a vibrant CBD and city. Street vendors’ key demands include registration of fee-paying street vendors by providing them with cards and documentation to legalize vendors’ economic work and contributions to the city, and to enable vendors to transition from the informal to the formal economy. This documentation also enables the state to better track the vendors’ numbers and the products and services they sell in order to better plan for this stakeholder group.
• **For authorities:** Street vendors’ financial contributions must be channeled into investments in decent and safe commercial work spaces. Vendors depend on the long-term stability of their commercial street vending locations, including adequate basic infrastructure and services and facilities that meet occupational health and safety standards. The vending that takes place on the street and the fees paid to government make streets commercially productive spaces where basic infrastructure and services are essential to decent work. In the Central Market area, Kejetia and other street vendors already pay daily tolls to the KMA; in turn, the KMA must allocate budget expenditure to support vendors’ productive work. Local governments can achieve this by investing a portion of street vendors’ contributions (e.g. daily tolls) into the basic infrastructure and services to support their work and the city’s economic environment. Electricity access, rubbish collection and public toilets, as well as collectively managed water points are essential, along with security, available storage for goods, and shelter from everyday weather, including both sunlight and rain.

• **For organized groups of street vendors:** Building affiliations with national-level vendor federations can provide support and leverage in negotiating with local authorities. The KKTA and KPTA represent a sizeable constituency of market vendors and street vendors in the Kumasi Central Market area, but neither is affiliated with national unions or federations of formal or informal workers, such as the Ghana Trade Union Congress (GTUC), the main umbrella organization for trade union activities in Ghana. Affiliating with the GTUC, given its established history of experience, capacity and knowledge in negotiating improvements for its members, could support the KPTA and KKTA as they push to establish collective bargaining platforms with local authorities. Collective bargaining platforms can support constructive social dialogue through regular, ongoing engagements with local government to address challenges and propose solutions. In Accra, the GTUC have engaged with the Accra Metropolitan Assembly officials as bargaining counterparts. Globally, organized groups of informal workers have used collective bargaining in order to negotiate improved status with regards to laws and policies, organizational recognition, authorization to vend in public spaces and markets, participation in decision-making, as well as access to social protections and to address evictions and harassment (Horn, 2014: 16).
6. References


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