

# New Forms of Social Insurance: The Case of the TUC–UNIWA Pension Scheme in Ghana

Case study for research project titled “New Forms of Social Insurance for the Economic Inclusion of Women Informal Workers”



By Prince Asafu-Adjaye

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This case study was commissioned as part of a joint SNI WIEGO project, *New Forms of Social Insurance for the Economic Inclusion of Women Informal Workers*, to increase the knowledge base of what works for informal workers in relation to social protection. Our aim is to capacitate informal workers and their organizations to develop their work on social protection, whether that is by developing their own social and solidarity economy schemes, advocating for the development of new or the expansion of existing government schemes to cover informal workers, and/or supporting informal workers to partner with governments towards the establishment of hybrid schemes.

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## Key Points

- The TUC-UNIWA Informal Sector Pension Scheme was established in 2017 by the Union of Informal Workers Associations (UNIWA), one of the largest unions representing informal economy operators in Ghana, and is registered as a voluntary group pension scheme with the National Pensions Regulatory Authority (NPRA).
- Support from formal trade unions can play a crucial role in assisting informal economy workers to establish their own social security schemes. In the case of TUC-UNIWA, it was the Trades Union Congress (TUC) parent body that provided valuable direct technical assistance, and spearheaded registration of the scheme as well as recruitment through training and sensitising programmes for informal economy workers.
- Flexibility in the design and operation of the scheme responds to the working conditions of informal economy operators and meets their social security needs. This includes 1) no maximum age limit for membership, no minimum contribution qualification for benefits, and a flexible contribution regime; 2) a package of contingencies and benefits including monthly pensions, lump sum payment, invalidity benefits, survivors' benefits, and the right to withdraw from savings accounts; and 3) the convenience of paying contributions via a mobile money payment system.
- Low income, lack of education and awareness about the scheme, and a lack of trust due to negative experiences with formal social security schemes in the past, all operate as barriers towards joining. At the time of this study – November 2021–March 2022 – the scheme had only 1,511 members – a mere 0.8 per cent of UNIWA's total 185,000 membership. Uptake of the scheme is higher among female UNIWA members at about 55 per cent, speaking to the gendered need and demand of female informal economy workers for social security in later life.
- Individual long-term savings schemes such as the TUC-UNIWA scheme cannot guarantee adequate retirement incomes for most of its informal worker members. The average monthly contribution to the TUC-UNIWA Informal Sector Pension Scheme is US\$15 or 3 per cent of reported average monthly income. At this rate and with the average age of the members being 48, average savings with interest and adjusting for inflation would amount to just US\$2,468 by age 60.
- While worker-led social protection can certainly “show the way” on how to reach informal workers, ensure their active inclusion and potentially provide an important mechanism to complement a social protection floor, informal economy workers should not be expected to shoulder the burden of protection on their own. Government support in the form of matching subsidies could play an important role in enhancing the reach, sustainability and impact of the TUC-UNIWA scheme. This would enable the scheme to extend beyond its current consumption smoothing function to enable insurance, poverty relief and redistribution.

## **Abbreviations**

CUA	Ghana Co-operative Credit Union Association
DTDA	Danish Trade Union Development Agency
ERP	Economic Recovery Programme
FES	Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
FGD	Focus Group Discussions
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GEA	Ghana Employers Association
GFL	Ghana Federation of Labour
GLSS	Ghana Living Standards Survey
GSS	Ghana Statistical Services
ILO	International Labour Organization
NDC	National Democratic Congress
NHIS	National Health Insurance Scheme
NPA	National Pensioners' Association
NPP	New Patriotic Party
NPRA	National Pensions Regulatory Authority
NTHC	National Trust Holding Company
PPT	People's Pension Trust
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme
SSNIT	Social Security and National Insurance Trust
TUC	Trades Union Congress
UNIWA	Union of Informal Workers Associations
USSD	Unstructured Supplementary Service Data

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## SECTION 1: Introduction and Background

Social security, defined by the International Labour Organization (ILO) as “the protection that a society provides to individuals and households to ensure access to health care and to guarantee income security, particularly in cases of old age, unemployment, sickness, invalidity, work injury, maternity or loss of a breadwinner” (ILO, 2022: 1), plays a key role in promoting decent work and higher standards of living among workers, including those who operate in the informal economy. Social security may be delivered as social insurance, providing benefits to recipients based on their attachment to the labour market (occupational nature) or the attachment of their breadwinner to the labour market (derived rights). Typically, social insurance benefits – such as pension, invalidity and death benefits – are conditional or based on individual contributions (contributive nature). Among the many social security benefits, pensions have proved very useful in promoting income security, preventing poverty, and reducing inequality among older persons (ILO, 2018a: 3).

Nonetheless, the majority of informal economy operators in Ghana lack formal pension cover. In 2020, approximately 3 per cent of informal economy operators were members of formal pension schemes (NPRA, 2020: 7). This scenario has been brought about by the absence of a pension floor – a non-contributory pension scheme financed from the general budget (often tax-financed). The Government of Ghana’s participation in pensions has been confined to the payment of pension contributions for public sector workers (as the employer of public sector workers) and regulations, hence informal economy operators who cannot contribute to a formal pension are not covered. There is also reluctance from some formal pension organizations to venture into the informal economy, and an unwillingness or inability of some informal economy operators to join formal pension schemes (Afenyadu, 2014: 38; Adzawla et al., 2015: 43). In this sense, the dearth of formal pension cover among informal economy operators in Ghana can be seen as both a source and a manifestation of the vulnerabilities of informality.

In light of the above, this research examines the efforts by UNIWA to promote formal pensions among informal economy operators in Ghana through the establishment and operation of the TUC-UNIWA Informal Sector Pension Scheme. This research explores the processes that brought about the scheme, its membership, and its governance and administrative structures. It also looks at contributions to the scheme, benefits/contingencies, and the roles of the state and the private sector. Analysis of the elements of the scheme is offered to shed light on the experiences of UNIWA members with the scheme. The insights from this study provide indicators for the improvement of the TUC-UNIWA Informal Sector Pension Scheme and other schemes that seek to promote formal social security among informal economy operators.

The rest of this section provides a general background to the study, highlighting the political and economic context, the labour market – focusing on the informal economy – in Ghana, and the UNIWA. Section 2 highlights the formal and informal social security arrangements in Ghana. Section 3 is about the TUC-UNIWA Informal Sector Pension Scheme and examines its emergence, membership, governance, contributions and benefits, and the roles of the state and the private sector in the scheme. Section 3 also provides insights into informal economy operators’ experiences of the scheme. The conclusions and recommendations of this study are provided in Section 4.

## **Research Methods and Data**

The analysis in this paper draws on primary and secondary data. Primary data were collected through key informant interviews, focus group discussions (FGD) and questionnaires. Interviews were held with two key informants: a member of the pension scheme's Board of Trustees, and an officer of the Corporate Trustees. Another member of the pension scheme's Board of Trustees responded to a questionnaire. Three FGDs were conducted with a total of 26 members of UNIWA: one FGD took place with 10 members of the pension scheme, while the other two FGDs (8 persons in each FGD) took place with members who had not joined the pension scheme. Female participation in the FGDs was approximately 55 per cent, reflecting the predominance of females in UNIWA and the pension scheme.

The analysis in this paper also drew on secondary data: administrative data from UNIWA and the TUC-UNIWA Informal Sector Pension Scheme. National statistics from Ghana Statistical Services (GSS) complemented the data used in this study.

The data collected in this study have been anonymized. Pseudonyms were used to store the data and in writing this report. Hence, responses cannot be attributed to study participants.

## **Political and Economic Context**

Ghana has made remarkable political and economic strides in the past four decades. The country returned to multi-party democracy in 1993, with an independent judiciary and legislature, and has consistently ranked in the top three for freedom of speech and press freedom in Africa (World Bank, 2021a). Since the return to constitutional rule, political power in Ghana has oscillated between two political parties: the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP). The NDC, which identifies as a social democratic political party, ruled the country from 1993 to 2000 and from 2009 to 2016. The NPP, which leans towards the right, was in power from 2001 to 2008, and has ruled the country since January 2017. This multi-party democratic dispensation is the longest period of constitutional rule in the country since political independence in 1957.

Arguably, the most remarkable thing about Ghana's development since the 1980s is the economic turnaround. The country went into an Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) in 1983, followed by a Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in 1986. Prior to these programmes, the country faced significant decline in foreign exchange earnings, substantial external shocks such as the impacts of oil price hikes, high and increasing interest on external debts, and adverse shifts in terms of trade (Gockel and Vormawor, 2004: 4-7). At the start of the ERP, gross domestic product (GDP) growth was -4.6 per cent and the GDP per capita was US\$341 (World Bank, 2020). The dire economic conditions in the country changed following the implementation of the economic recovery and adjustment programmes. GDP growth rate returned to a positive trajectory, averaging approximately 5 per cent since 1984 (World Bank, 2021b), representing a significant economic achievement.

Table 1 shows that annual GDP growth in Ghana was above 6 per cent from 2017 to 2019, until it plummeted in 2020. The overall GDP growth in 2020 was 0.4 per cent due to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. It is important to note that, in recent years, Ghana’s economic growth has been driven by industry, which recorded an average growth of 11 per cent from 2017 to 2019. The growth in agriculture and services averaged 5 per cent and 4.6 per cent respectively from 2017 to 2020.


**Table 1: Sectoral GDP growth in Ghana (2017–2020)**

Sector	2017	2018	2019	2020
Agriculture	6.2	4.9	4.7	7.4
Industry	15.6	10.5	6.4	-3.6
Services	3.4	2.8	7.6	1.5
Overall	8.1	6.2	6.5	0.4

Source: GSS (2022)

Despite the above, the economy of Ghana is dominated by the services sector. Figure 1, indicates that 48 per cent of the country’s GDP came from services in 2020. The contributions of industry and agriculture to Ghana’s GDP were 32 per cent and 20 per cent respectively in 2020.

**Figure 1: Share of GDP by sector (2020)**



Source: GSS (2022)

Most of Ghana’s foreign exchange comes from natural resource export (gold, cocoa, timber and oil). Table 2 shows that the country’s total export revenue was US\$14.7 billion in 2021. Revenues from gold, cocoa and oil exports (US\$11.88 billion) accounted for about 80 per cent of total export revenue in Ghana. Imports for the same year totalled US\$13.6 billion, of which US\$10.9 billion (about 80 per cent) were non-oil imports.

Table 2 shows that Ghana has been posting a positive trade balance since 2019, but this fell in value from US\$2.2 billion in 2019 to US\$1.1 billion in 2021. The decline in the trade surplus cannot be separated from the slump in global demand for natural resources (the bulk of Ghana’s exports is natural resources) and disruptions to international trade caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.




**Table 2: Trade Account (2019–2021)**

	<b>2019</b> (US\$ million)	<b>2020</b> (US\$ million)	<b>2021</b> (US\$ million)
Total exports	15,667.5	14,471.5	14,736.2
Gold	6,229.7	6,799.1	5,083.1
Cocoa	2,288.4	2,328.2	2,851.1
Oil	4,493.1	2,910.6	3,947.7
Total imports	13,410.7	12,428.6	13,628.7
Oil	2,420.3	1,890.5	2,719.2
Non-oil	10,990.4	10,538.0	10,909.5
Trade Balance	2,256.8	2,043.0	1,107.6
% of GDP	3.4	3.1	1.5

Source: Bank of Ghana (2022)

Arguably, economic growth in Ghana has not brought about desired improvements in the socioeconomic conditions of a significant proportion of the population. The multidimensional poverty headcount ratio in Ghana (per cent of total population), which measures poverty beyond monetary deprivations by including access to education and basic infrastructure along with the monetary headcount, was 47.8 in 2018 (World Bank, 2022a). Figure 2 shows that GDP per capita has been on the decline, reducing from US\$2,260 in 2018 to US\$2,205 in 2020. Moreover, income inequality as measured by the Gini index was 43.5 in 2016 (World Bank, 2022b).

**Figure 2: GDP per capita (US\$)**

Source: Adapted from World Bank (2022c)

## Labour Market

The remarkable political and economic developments of recent decades have largely failed to translate into desired labour market outcomes. Informality has remained and has increased, even as the GDP has been on a consistent growth path. Formal employment in Ghana diminished at an average rate of 3.7 per cent per annum from 1985 to 1991 (Baah-Boateng, 2004: 7). The proportion of the workforce in the informal economy rose from about 80 per cent in 1999 (Otoo et. al, 2009: 1) to 88 per cent in 2013 (Otoo et. al, 2015: 48). These figures indicate that the economic growth Ghana experienced over the years did not reverse the already high levels of informality in the economy. The GSS has indicated that the failure of the formal sector to generate jobs in their required numbers has pushed many of the country's workforce into the informal economy (GSS, 2019).

Significantly, the tide of informalization of employment appears to have been reversed recently, at least according to official statistics. The informal economy accounted for 71.3 per cent of the employed population in 2017 (GSS, 2019). The decrease in the share of informality in employment in Ghana – from 88 per cent in 2013 to 71 per cent in 2017 – can partly be attributed to the change in the statistical definition of employment in the country. GSS modified the definition of employment in the Ghana Living Standards Survey (GLSS7) in 2017, exempting “own-use production work ... activities carried out to produce goods and services mainly for one's own final consumption” (GSS, 2019: 64). This is likely to have contributed to the undercounting of informal economic operators in the country. Nonetheless, it remains a fact that in spite of the positive economic growth over the years, informality continues to dominate the labour market in Ghana.

Although informal economic activities are pervasive in Ghana, they are slightly more concentrated in urban areas. Data from GSS indicates that about 51 per cent of informal economy operators lived in the urban centres of Ghana in 2017 (GSS, 2019).

Table 3 shows that educational attainment among informal economy operators in Ghana is low. In 2017, about 41 per cent of informal labour had no formal education. Almost 83 per cent of informal economy operators had no formal education or had completed only basic formal education (6 years). Males in the informal economy had better educational outcomes than females in 2017.

**Table 3: Highest level of education of persons aged 15 years and older in informal employment**

<b>Educational attainment</b>	<b>Male (%)</b>	<b>Female (%)</b>	<b>Both sexes (%)</b>
No formal education	33.6	46.3	40.6
Basic education	44.5	39.8	41.9
Secondary education	15.4	9.7	12.3
Post-secondary education	5.0	3.7	4.2
Bachelor's degree and above	1.5	0.5	1.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: GLSS7 data

Analysis of the industrial distribution of informal employment indicates that agriculture and trade had the highest concentrations of informal economy operators in 2017. Table 4 shows that agriculture, forestry and fishing provide jobs to about 37 per cent of informal labour in the country. Some 48 per cent of women in the informal economy were in agriculture compared with 29 per cent among men. Wholesale and retail trade is the second-most important industry in Ghana's informal economy, employing 26.7 per cent of informal labour. Unlike agriculture, women dominate informal wholesale and retail. Table 4 shows that females and males in informal wholesale and retail trade made up 36 per cent and 13.5 per cent respectively.

**Table 4: Main industry of informal employment by sex (2017)**

<b>Industry</b>	<b>Male (%)</b>	<b>Female (%)</b>	<b>Both sexes (%)</b>
Agriculture, forestry and fishing	48.2	29.0	36.9
Mining and quarrying	1.9	0.6	1.1
Manufacturing	7.1	12.0	10.0
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply	0.3	0.0	0.2
Construction	8.8	0.1	3.7
Wholesale and retail trade	13.5	36.0	26.7
Transportation and storage	4.4	0.1	1.9
Accommodation and food service activities	0.6	6.6	4.1
Information and communication	0.3	0.0	0.1
Financial and insurance activities	0.2	0.1	0.1
Real estate activities	0.1	0.0	0.0
Professional, scientific and technical activities	1.2	0.5	0.8
Administrative and support services	0.1	0.1	0.1
Public administration and defence	0.1	0.0	0.0
Education	0.2	0.3	0.3
Human health and social work activities	0.3	0.3	0.3
Arts, entertainment and recreation	0.8	0.3	0.5
Other service activities	11.8	14.0	13.1
Activities of extraterritorial organizations and bodies	0.1	0.0	0.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Source: GLSS7 data

Table 5 shows that employment status in the informal economy varies among the sexes. About 54 per cent of the females in the informal economy were in non-agricultural self-employment without employees, compared with about 25 per cent among males. In contrast, a higher proportion of males (34.4 per cent) were in agricultural self-employment without employees, compared with females (15.6 per cent).

**Table 5: Employment status of persons in informal employment by sex (2017)**

<b>Employment status</b>	<b>Male (%)</b>	<b>Female (%)</b>	<b>Both sexes (%)</b>
Paid employee	7.3	1.6	3.9
Casual worker	9.0	2.4	5.2
Paid apprentice	0.8	0.1	0.4
Unpaid apprentice	0.9	0.9	0.9
Non-agricultural self-employed with employees	6.7	4.5	5.4
Non-agricultural self-employed without employees	25.4	53.8	42.1
Non-agricultural contributing worker	4.0	7.3	6.0
Agricultural self-employed with employees	1.7	0.3	0.9
Agricultural self-employed without employees	34.4	15.6	23.3
Agricultural contributing family worker	9.5	13.2	11.6
Domestic worker	0.2	0.3	0.3
Other	0.1	0.0	0.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: GLSS 7 data

GLSS7 data indicate that the average informal economy monthly earning (GH¢842 [US\$185]) was slightly higher than the national average earning (GH¢830 [US\$182]), but lower than the average earning in the public sector (GH¢1,047 [US\$230]) in 2017. The gender wage gap in the informal economy, in favour of males, was approximately 41 per cent.

Table 6 shows that, in 2017, about 17 per cent of informal economy operators earned less than GH¢200 (US\$44) – lower than the monthly minimum wage of GH¢237 (US\$62). Among women in the informal economy, more than one-third earned less than the minimum wage, compared to about 11 per cent of men.

**Table 6: Earning category in the informal economy by sex (2017)**

Earning grouping	Male (%)	Female (%)	Both sexes (%)
Less than or equal to GH¢200	11.9	34.1	17.2
More than GH¢200 but less than or equal to GH¢1,000	48.0	61.1	51.2
More than GH¢1,000 but less than or equal to GH¢2,000	28.7	3.5	22.6
More than GH¢2,000 but less than or equal to GH¢5,000	9.5	1.0	7.4
More than GH¢5,000	1.9	0.3	1.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: GLSS7 data

Incidence of poverty is highest in the informal economy in Ghana. Table 7, shows that 16.8 per cent of informal economy operators were poor and very poor in 2017. The proportions of public sector workers and private formal sector workers who were in poverty (very poor and poor) were 4.2 per cent and 6.7 per cent, respectively. About 5 per cent of informal economy operators were below the lower or extreme poverty line (classified as very poor). This means that they did not earn to enough to meet the nutritional requirements of their household members. Extreme poverty in the informal was slightly higher among females (2.39 per cent) than males (1.89 per cent). About 13 per cent of informal economy operators were below the upper poverty line in 2017. These informal economy operators could not meet nutritional requirements and their basic non-food needs. Table 7, shows that the incidence of poverty was higher among females (9.45 per cent) compared with males (7.39).

**Table 7: Poverty in Ghana**

Sector	Very poor (%)			Poor (%)			Very poor + Poor (%)		
	Male	Female	All	Male	Female	All	Male	Female	All
Public	0.53	0.37	0.89	2.07	1.33	3.40	2.60	1.70	4.29
Private formal	0.87	0.48	1.35	4.00	1.39	5.39	4.87	1.87	6.74
Informal	1.89	2.39	4.28	5.50	7.06	12.55	7.39	9.45	16.83

Source: GLSS7 data

Some differences exist in participation in informality between the sexes. In 2017, the likelihood of working in the formal economy was higher among females (31.7 per cent) than males (27.2 per cent) (GSS, 2019: 74). This may be accounted for by differences in labour market endowments and opportunities, especially educational outcomes. In 2017, post-primary education attainment among women and men were 55.4 per cent and 73.6 per cent, respectively (ibid.: 72). Low educational attainment among women limits their competitiveness in the formal labour market in Ghana. In addition, sociocultural factors such as the gender division of household labour and the necessity imposed on women to balance labour market participation with domestic tasks (child nurturing and other house chores) make them go into the informal economy because of the flexibility that informality offers (Peprah et. al., 2019: 7).

Moreover, employment vulnerability is higher among women in Ghana. The ILO classifies own-account and contributing family workers as vulnerable workers who tend to lack basic decent work elements such as representation and formal social security cover (ILO, 2018). In 2019, vulnerable employment rates were 76.7 per cent among women (World Bank, 2021b) and 58.4 per cent among males (World Bank, 2021c). The difference in employment vulnerability between the sexes cannot be separated from the different concentrations of women and men in the informal economy. In this sense, the predominance of women in the informal economy has implications for decent work, especially formal social security cover and representation of women.

### **Trade Unionism in Ghana and the Union of Informal Workers Associations (UNIWA)**

There are two trade union centres in Ghana: the TUC and Ghana Federation of Labour (GFL). The TUC is the biggest trade union centre with about half a million members from 21 affiliate national unions that mostly organize formal sector workers, and 19 informal economy associations that make up UNIWA (Otoo et al., 2019: 28). The GFL's nine affiliate national unions had an estimated membership of 10,500 in 2019 (ibid.: 73).

Created in 2015, UNIWA is one of the largest unions representing informal economy operators in Ghana and the umbrella body of TUC's informal economy associations. It comprises associations that organize informal metal fabricators, informal trade and retail workers, and creative arts workers (Asafu-Adjaye, 2021). The associations also cover traditional caterers, domestic workers, and disabled workers in formal and informal economies (ibid.). UNIWA has about 185,000 members of whom about 60 per cent are women (interview with Opanin, 2022).

Since its inception, UNIWA has sought to improve decent work among its members. This effort is important because, by definition, almost all UNIWA members are in vulnerable employment. The members of the associations that make up UNIWA are mostly own-account operators who lack formal social security cover (Asafu-Adjaye, 2021). It is in this context that UNIWA's efforts to promote formal social security among its members by establishing the TUC-UNIWA Informal Sector Pension Scheme are significant.

## SECTION 2: Social Security for Informal Economy Operators in Ghana

In Ghana, social security for informal economy operators manifests itself in informal and formal arrangements. Most informal social security arrangements are personal or group savings schemes administered by external agents or members of the schemes. These schemes are usually bedevilled with insecurity of contributions because most of the external agents are not registered and regulated (Osei-Boateng and Ampratwum, 2011: 26). Nonetheless, informal social security schemes remain common among informal economy operators in Ghana (ibid.). In contrast, formal social security schemes provided by registered entities, which are regulated by the state, are uncommon among informal economy operators in Ghana (NPRA, 2021). This is in spite of the fact that contributions made to such schemes are largely secured because of the presence of state regulations. In addition, most formal social security schemes have flexibilities that respond to informal economy operator income variabilities (NPRA, 2020: 4).

### Informal Social Security Schemes

The most common informal social security schemes in Ghana are *susu* saving schemes, rotation saving schemes, and credit unions (Adusei and Appiah, 2012; Osei-Boateng and Ampratwum, 2011). Such schemes have flexible contribution regimes and their benefits are usually not specified, allowing members to withdraw their savings whenever they meet a basic criteria, which is usually contribution over a period. While this flexibility is good because it permits members to withdraw their savings to address their immediate challenges, it can limit long-term saving towards pensions.

The *susu* saving scheme is a common funds mobilization and financial management scheme (Adusei and Appiah, 2012: 2). It is a personal savings scheme involving individuals who make voluntary and flexible contributions – daily, weekly, monthly – over a given period. *Susu* agents collect contributions and return the accumulated funds to members. Each individual gets what s/he saved at the end of the stipulated period, minus one contribution as commission (Afenyadu, 2014: 82). *Susu* schemes have two significant shortfalls: first, members do not receive interest on their contributions, which can detract from the real value of savings over the long term; and second, some *susu* collectors abscond with, or misappropriate contributions (Adusei and Appiah, 2012: 3; Osei-Boateng and Ampratwum, 2011). Therefore, despite being common, *susu* savings as a form of social security for informal economy operators is fraught with potential financial loss.

Another common informal social security arrangement in Ghana is the rotating saving scheme. This is a group scheme involving the collection of equal contributions from members and allocating total contributions to members in turns (Adusei and Appiah, 2012: 3). This approach makes rotating savings less flexible. Even though membership is voluntary, once a person joins and receives contributions, s/he cannot opt out until the circle is complete. However, rotating saving schemes are not without stories of default by some members (i.e. after receiving their allocation, some members fail to contribute towards the allocations of other members of the scheme).

Credit unions are another common savings mobilization scheme among informal economy operators in Ghana. It is important to note that credit unions do not completely fit into the informal social security taxonomy because they have elected leaders and some administrative machinery, and are regulated by the Bank of Ghana through the Ghana Co-operative Credit Union Association (CUA). Typically, credit unions are formed by individuals who share common interests and characteristics. Credit union members make voluntary and flexible contributions into individual accounts that entitles them to apply for low-interest loans after six months (CUA, 2021). Credit unions secure and boost member contributions because they pay interest on savings and share the surplus they make (from interest on loans and investments) with members at the end of every financial year (ibid.). Yet credit unions do not necessarily lead to income security at retirement. Contributions to credit unions are credited to a single savings account that members can withdraw; there are no separate savings accounts towards pensions. Some studies have shown that most informal economy operators tend to be more interested in immediate loans than retirement benefits (Adzawla et al., 2015; Afenyadu, 2014; Osei-Boateng and Ampratwum, 2011). Hence, the fact that credit unions do not guarantee retirement savings can limit their ability to encourage savings towards income security at retirement.

The above discussion illustrates the importance of *susu* saving schemes, rotation saving schemes, and credit unions among informal economy operators. Noticeably, one element of these saving schemes that has endeared them to informal economy operators is flexibility in contribution regimes and rules on withdrawals. This is important as it allows informal economy operators to make contributions according to variations in their earnings and economic circumstances. Nonetheless, informal saving schemes are not without their shortcomings, especially the insecurity of contributions owing to misappropriation and theft. Together, the useful elements and shortcomings of informal saving schemes offer lessons for the design and implementation of formal contributory pension schemes for informal economy operators.

### **Formal Social Security**

Ghana has established significant legislative and institutional frameworks for the delivery of formal social security. The main legislative framework is the National Pensions Act, 2008 (Act 766). Act 766 established NPRA to regulate and ensure the effective administration of pensions. NPRA's governing body is made up of 11 persons: seven from the Government of Ghana, one from the Ghana Employers Association (GEA), two from organized labour, and one from the National Pensioners Association (NPA). One could argue that the Government of Ghana exerts control over the NPRA because of its majority representation, but this does not completely rule out the fact that the composition of the NPRA's governing body makes pension regulation in Ghana quite inclusive.

Another important aspect of Act 766 is that it provides for a three-tier pension scheme: two mandatory schemes and a voluntary scheme. The first-tier is a mandatory and contributory basic national social security scheme managed by the Social Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT). The SSNIT scheme pays monthly pensions at retirement (the statutory retirement age for most workers in Ghana is 60 years), monthly invalidity benefits, and lump sums to survivors (SSNIT, 2022). By December 2020, the basic national social security scheme had about 1.63 million active contributors and 227,407 pensioners (NPRA, 2020: xvi).




The basic national social security scheme is financed by membership contributions. Act 766 requires that 18.5 per cent of the basic salary of a worker is contributed towards social security: the worker contributes 5.5 per cent of her/his monthly basic salary, while the employer contributes 13 per cent. The SSNIT receives 13.5 per cent of a worker's basic salary, keeps 11 per cent for the first-tier scheme and transfers 2.5 per cent to the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS), which entitles all SSNIT members to national health insurance cover. The remaining 5 per cent goes to second-tier schemes.

Informal economy operators can enrol in this scheme in two ways. First, they can join the basic national social security scheme as employees. This is possible because Act 766 requires all employers, including those who hire informal workers, to contribute towards the scheme on behalf of their workers. Second, own-account operators can register and pay monthly contributions to the SSNIT (NPRA, 2020: 2). In spite of these provisions, the participation of informal economy operators in the SSNIT scheme is very low. In 2021, only about 3 per cent of SSNIT scheme members were informal economy workers (Sam, 2021). This indicates the extent of non-compliance with Act 766 by employers of informal labour in Ghana. There has also been reluctance among some formal pension organizations to venture into the informal economy (Afenyadu, 2014: 38) and an unwillingness or inability of some informal economy operators to join formal pensions schemes (Adzawla et. al., 2015: 43; Afenyadu, 2014: 38). These factors necessitated the emergence of the TUC-UNIWA Informal Sector Pension Scheme (interview with Opanin, 2022).


The second-tier consists of occupational or work-place pension schemes. These schemes are mandatory and contributory, with Act 766 requiring employers to enrol their workers on a scheme. Second-tier schemes pay lump sum benefits under three contingencies: retirement, incapacity, and death. These schemes are managed by private sector firms. As mentioned earlier, Act 766 provides that second-tier schemes receive 5 per cent of each worker's basic salary. The mandatory second-tier occupational pension schemes had over 2.1 million members by 2021 (NPRA, 2020: xvi). Informal economy operators, especially those in paid employment, have the right to enrol in and contribute to second-tier pension schemes (NPRA, 2020: 2).

In contrast to the first-tier and second-tier schemes, the third-tier consists of voluntary provident fund and personal pension schemes. Personal pension schemes have flexible arrangements that allow informal economy operators and the self-employed to contribute towards pensions (NPRA, 2020: 4). Informal economy operators may join existing personal pension schemes that have been registered and are administered by a Corporate Trustee, or form their own Group Scheme (*ibid.*). If informal economy operators opt for the latter, they have the right to form a Board of Trustees to administer the scheme or appoint registered Corporate Trustees to manage the scheme (*ibid.*).

**Figure 3: ILO and Ghana Multi-Pillar Pension Systems**



Source: Adapted from ILO (2018)



Source: Adapted from Guven (2019)

Act 766 requires personal and group pension schemes to operate two accounts: a personal savings account and a retirement account. Contributions to these schemes are voluntary and flexible; members decide the frequency and how much to contribute to their schemes. This type of contribution regime is important because it enables informal economy operators to model their contributions in line with the income volatility associated with informal economy work.

Contributions to personal pension schemes entitle informal economy operators to five benefits. The first four benefits – 1) lump sum paid from personal savings account; 2) monthly or quarterly pension paid from the retirement account; 3) invalidity benefit; and 4) survivors' benefit – are consistent with the contingencies covered by social security schemes for formal sector workers. These benefits make personal pension schemes useful to informal economy operators as they guarantee some retirement and invalidity income. In addition, scheme members do not have to make a specified number of contributions or contribute for a certain number of years to be eligible for the benefits. This aligns with the provision that allows informal economy operators to join the scheme at any time.

Furthermore, pension regulations allow members of personal or group pension schemes to withdraw from their savings accounts to improve their economic activities (NPRA, 2020: 5). Importantly, no penalties are imposed on members who make such withdrawals. In a way, the opportunity for informal economy operators to make withdrawals for investment is apt given the difficulties they experience in accessing credit from banks due to the perceived risk associated with informal economy lending (Aliber, 2002). However, the potential impact of informal economy operators making withdrawals from their savings accounts needs unpacking. We know that informal economy operators have limited saving capacity owing to low and unstable incomes. This means that informal economy operators who belong to personal pension schemes can only withdraw from their limited savings, which may be inadequate to expand their businesses. Withdrawals can also undermine income security at old age as they diminish already low savings. We shall see in Section 3.6 that almost half of the funds in the TUC-UNIWA Informal Sector Pension Scheme' savings accounts were withdrawn by members in 2021.

It is important to note that, in spite of the opportunities and benefits three-tier pension schemes provide, formal social security coverage among informal economy operators in Ghana is low. In 2020, only 3 per cent of informal economy operators were members of three-tier pension schemes (NPRA, 2020: 7). Such low coverage was in spite of the existence of 29 informal sector pension schemes in 2020 (ibid.: 16).

Low formal social security coverage among informal economy operators may be explained by two factors. First, there is some reluctance among formal pension providers to venture into the informal economy. This is due to concerns about the viability of operating formal pension schemes for informal economy operators. In 2005, the SSNIT established the SSNIT Informal Sector Pension Scheme (Guyen, 2019: 31). The operational cost of this scheme became prohibitive as SSNIT had to equip and pay people to collect member contributions. This ultimately made it financially unviable and in 2012 the SSNIT transferred the scheme to the National Trust Holding Company (NTHC) (ibid.). Formal pension schemes have difficulties collecting pension contributions in the informal economy (NPRA, 2020: 7). Since informal economy operators hardly operate payrolls, it is impossible for pension deductions to be incorporated into payroll systems. This means additional costs and difficulties in getting pension contributions from informal economy operators, detracting from the willingness of formal pension providers to invest in the informal economy. This disincentive is exacerbated by the fact that not all of the costs can be externalized to contributors because the NPRA sets maximum fees (2.5 per cent at the time of this study) that can be charged by approved trustees, pension fund managers, pension fund custodians, and the authority.

The second factor that has contributed to low formal social security coverage among informal economy operators in Ghana is the reluctance and inability of some informal economy operators to join and contribute to formal pension schemes. We saw previously that average informal economy earnings are lower than average public sector earnings, and that about 17 per cent of informal economy operators earn below the monthly minimum wage. Informal economy workers who do not earn enough income for a decent life today do not see the need to worry about contributing towards social security for the future (Adzawla et al., 2015: 43). Thus, it is not surprising that the first attempt by the SSNIT to provide formal pensions to informal economy operators was characterized by low enrolment (Afenyadu, 2014: 38).

Notwithstanding this scenario, the relevance of formal social security cover for informal economy operators cannot be overemphasized. Many manifestations of employment vulnerability can be ameliorated by adequate formal social security cover. It is in this light that the TUC-UNIWA Informal Sector Pension Scheme is significant.

### **SECTION 3: The TUC-UNIWA Informal Sector Pension Scheme**

#### **The Emergence of the Scheme**

The TUC-UNIWA Informal Sector Pension Scheme emerged out of a participatory process that involved the leadership and members of UNIWA. The process began in 2015 with research commissioned by UNIWA into social protection for informal economy workers in Ghana. Among the objectives of this research was the creation of a database of social protection schemes available to informal economy operators in Ghana that would form the basis for sensitization of informal economy operators to social protection schemes they can access. Following the research, UNIWA organized sensitization workshops on social security for its members until the scheme was established in 2017. It is important to note that participation in these workshops was dominated by UNIWA's female members. Together, the research and the sensitization workshops contributed towards establishing the need for a formal social security scheme for UNIWA members.

The research, sensitization workshops and other processes that brought about the scheme were financed by international solidarity support, including Mondiaal FNV of the Netherlands, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES), and the Danish Trade Union Development Agency (DTDA) (Osei-Boateng, 2019: 11). According to a UNIWA national officer: "Through FES-Ghana, we [UNIWA] had nationwide sensitization workshops to educate informal workers on the need to save for retirement. Through that we got some members to sign up to the scheme" (interview with Opanin, 2022).

In addition to international solidarity support, the TUC provided necessary technical support in the establishment of the TUC-UNIWA Informal Sector Pension Scheme. A key informant of this study recounts that "TUC led the registration of the scheme. It also educated the people [UNIWA members] and helped them get on board" (interview with PPT officer, 2022). It was also intimated that "TUC did a lot by organizing training and sensitizing programmes for informal economy workers and helping them to enrol" (interview with Opanin, 2022).

Four lessons can be learned from the approach that gave birth to the TUC-UNIWA Informal Sector Pension Scheme. First, the sensitization workshops generated shared understanding of the need for and the possibilities of establishing a formal pension scheme for informal economy operators within UNIWA. Thus, the decision to establish the scheme was not handed down from the leadership of the union, but rather emerged out of discussions between the rank-and-file members and the leadership of UNIWA.

The second lesson was about the support that informal economy workers and their associations can get from trade unions in establishing social security schemes. With a very lean secretariat and part-time elected officers, UNIWA could not set up the scheme without direct technical assistance from the TUC. As such, the TUC spearheaded the registration of the scheme and recruitment into the scheme.

The third lesson was about the involvement of key pension stakeholders from the onset. From 2015 to 2017, “there were several consultations between TUC, UNIWA and the People’s Pension Trust [the eventual Corporate Trustees of the scheme]” (interview with Opanin, 2022). In addition, the sensitization workshops involved resources and persons from the pension’s regulatory authority and Corporate Trustees (private-sector pension scheme operators). This introduced the leadership and members of UNIWA to the regulations and practices of formal pension schemes, enhancing understanding and promoting acceptability and ownership of the scheme within UNIWA.

The final lesson was gleaned from how strict adherence to the provisions of Act 766 on voluntary pension schemes – which is good in many ways – seemed to undermine the emergence of innovations in the TUC-UNWA Informal Sector Pension Scheme. As we shall see shortly, the scheme follows the blueprint of Act 766 for informal pension schemes: constituent accounts, contributions, benefits, and contingencies covered. According to a UNIWA officer, the “rules and regulations that govern the scheme follow the provisions of Act 766” (interview with Opanin, 2022). Strictly following the provisions of Act 766 is good, but this means that no benefits beyond those stipulated by the law are provided by the TUC-UNIWA Informal Sector Pension Scheme. Hence, even though women dominated the processes that established the scheme, it only covers contingencies stipulated by Act 766 and no innovations emerged to take care of the specific needs of informal economy women such as paid maternity leave, childcare support, and health care. The variegated vulnerabilities of informal economy operators further point to the fact that their social protection needs go beyond pensions (i.e. the contingencies covered by the TUC-UNIWA Informal Pension Scheme are limited). For instance, most UNIWA members operate in public spaces, do not have secure tenure, and their economic units are sensitive to external factors. A participant in this study expressed that “as a musician, COVID-19 really disrupted my work. There were so many programmes that we could not attend” (Danny, FGD, 2022). Incomes were lost, but the scheme did not offer income-replacement benefits. Rather, members had to draw from their savings accounts – meant for investment – to support themselves during the pandemic (Sullo, FGD, 2022).

### **The Scheme**

The TUC-UNIWA Informal Sector Pension Scheme was established in 2017 (Osei-Boateng, 2019: 8). It is registered with the NPRA as a voluntary group pension scheme (NPRA, 2019: 37). The registration formalizes the scheme, giving it legitimacy and security as it is regulated by the NPRA. The scheme is flexible, allowing members to determine how much and when to contribute (the rules of the scheme do not stipulate regularity of contributions), and when to retire from work (Maffei, 2018: 25). We shall see what such legitimacy and flexibility mean for the TUC-UNIWA Informal Sector Pension Scheme membership shortly.

## Membership

The rules and regulations of the TUC-UNIWA Informal Sector Pension Scheme provide two main membership eligibility criteria. First, any person in the informal economy in Ghana qualifies to join the scheme. Under this criterion, no proof of employment or business is required to join the scheme. Proving informal work or business may be difficult for UNIWA members due to the sector's volatility and that most informal establishments are not registered. In this sense, the requirement of proof of employment or business could disqualify many UNIWA members from joining the scheme.

The second eligibility rule is that self-employed persons over the statutory retirement age (60 years) can become members of the scheme. The absence of an upper age limit is one of the useful flexibility elements of the scheme, recognizing that some informal economy operators work beyond the statutory retirement age. It is important to note that the scheme's eligibility criteria do not stipulate a qualifying minimum age, but one would not expect persons below the age of 16 to be members of the scheme as this is the minimum legal age for entering the labour market in Ghana (Hodges and Baah, 2006).

An individual becomes a member of the scheme by completing a registration form issued by the Board of Trustees. This can be done on paper or by mobile phone (PPT, 2021). According to a People's Pension Trust (PPT) officer, mobile phone registration has made "the registration process simple ... all you need to do is to dial \*789\*11#. Straight away, you start registering" (interview with PPT officer, 2022). A member of UNIWA extolled the possibility "for new members to register through their mobile platform" (Danny, FGD, 2022).


In spite of the above, membership of the TUC-UNIWA Informal Sector Pension Scheme has been low. In 2019, the scheme had only 1,000 members (Osei-Boateng, 2019: 8). This number had increased to 1,511 at the time of this study (PPT, 2022), indicating that only about 0.8 per cent of UNIWA members have joined the scheme. The scheme appears to be popular among female members of the UNIWA, with about 55 per cent representation at the time of this study (PPT, 2022). However, low overall enrolment translates into formal social security cover for approximately 830 out of 111,000 female UNIWA members.

Moreover, the share of women in the membership of the TUC-UNIWA Informal Sector Pension Scheme (55 per cent) is lower than their share in the membership of UNIWA (60 per cent). In other words, the participation of women in the scheme does not match their concentration in UNIWA. Nonetheless, accounts by the participants in this study do not reveal any noticeable difference between women and men on their reasons for joining or not joining the scheme. The women and men participating in this study pointed to the flexibility of the scheme, the importance of pensions, and the involvement of UNIWA in reaching their decision to join the scheme (Boateng, FGD, 2022; Danny, FGD, 2022; interview with Opanin, 2022).

Aside from female predominance, another feature of the membership of the TUC-UNIWA Informal Sector Pension Scheme is the predominance of persons in the 26–60 age cohort. Figure 3 shows that scheme membership is low among youth (16–25 years), increases with age, and drops sharply after the statutory retirement age (60 years).

The lower proportion of persons in the scheme within the 16–25 cohort and above age 61 reflects their overall representation in UNIWA (interview with Opanin, 2022). Figure 3 also shows that there are no significant differences between the sexes within the various age cohorts in terms of scheme membership.

**Figure 4: Age and Sex Distribution of Scheme Members (2022)**



Source: Adapted from PPT (2022)

Study participants suggest that low membership of the TUC-UNIWA Informal Sector Pension Scheme could be attributed to three factors. The first factor is low income.

*Most of us haven't joined the scheme because ... our earnings are low and inconsistent. You could make an income today and it will take about a week or sometimes even more before you get another income. This makes it difficult to save some of our income for the future, given that we have numerous present needs. (Baako, FGD, 2022)*

This assertion is supported by the earnings reported by study participants. The daily earnings of scheme members are higher than those of non-members. The daily earnings reported by participants who had not joined the scheme were between GH¢20 (US\$3) and GH¢100 (US\$15), with an average of GH¢58 (US\$9). The lowest earning of this group was about GH¢6 (US\$1) or about 48 per cent higher than the national minimum wage in Ghana (GH¢13.53 [US\$2]) at the time of this study. The lowest reported earning was about GH¢14 (US\$2) or 263 per cent higher than the inflation adjusted daily national poverty line (GH¢5.50 [US\$0.88]) in Ghana for 2022. Thus, earnings of the non-members of the scheme in this study are higher than the national

minimum wage and the national poverty line. However, the earnings of non-members compare unfavourably with members' reported daily earnings, which ranged between GH¢30 (US\$4) and GH¢200 (US\$31), with an average of GH¢70 (US\$11). The lowest earning of the members of the scheme who participated in this study was GH¢16 (US\$2) or about 120 per cent higher than the national minimum wage in Ghana GH¢13 (US\$2). Moreover, the lowest earning that was reported by this group was GH¢24 (US\$3) or 444 per cent higher than the inflation adjusted daily national poverty line (GH¢5.50 or US\$0.88) in Ghana.

Even though the earnings of scheme members who participated in this study were higher than the national poverty line, any substantial increase in contributions to the scheme by the lowest earners would push them below the national poverty line. For instance, should the lowest earners decide to contribute GH¢25 (US\$4) a day towards the pension scheme, this would yield only GH¢9,136 (US\$1,4607) in a year, and the remaining GH¢4.97 (US\$0.79) of their daily earnings would be below the national poverty line.

How low incomes constrain TUC-UNIWA Informal Sector Pension Scheme membership is consistent with the available literature on informal economy operators and formal pension schemes in Ghana. We have already seen that, even though informal economy workers acknowledge the importance of pensions, those who do not earn adequate income for a decent life today do not see the need to contribute towards social security for the future (Adzawla et al., 2015: 43). We also know that the first attempt by the SSNIT to provide formal pensions to informal economy operators in Ghana was characterized by low enrolment partly due to low incomes (Afenyadu, 2014: 38).

The second factor that inhibited some of the study participants from joining the TUC-UNIWA Informal Pension Scheme was inadequate information about the scheme. Even though UNIWA undertook some sensitization programmes about the scheme, these appear not to have engendered adequate understanding of the scheme among some of its members.

*Most of us are aware of the scheme but are not part of it because of inadequate education on it. UNIWA came here [workplace] once to give us information on the scheme. We developed interest to join ... but the understanding of how the scheme works wasn't there. They told us that they would give us more information on it later. Since then, we haven't heard from them. (Mansa, FGD, 2022)*

As a result, some of the UNIWA members who participated in this study have misperceptions about the scheme, which discouraged them from joining it. Although the rules of the scheme allow self-employed persons above retirement age to join the scheme, Manu, a self-employed seamstress and UNIWA member, has not joined the scheme because she believes she would not make enough contributions before dropping out of the scheme at the statutory retirement age.

*For me, although we are told you can join at any age before 60 years, I'm not part of the scheme because I have few years to reach the retirement age. I don't think I can make enough contributions before I retire. (Manu, FGD, 2022)*



The third factor that prevented some UNIWA members from joining the TUC-UNIWA Informal Sector Pensions Scheme is previous negative experience with formal pension schemes. These include contribution payment problems and challenges in accessing funds, which have engendered some mistrust and misconceptions about formal pensions among informal economy operators. A key informant in this study recalls:

*SSNIT launched a pension scheme for the informal workers, which some of the UNIWA members signed up to. Unfortunately, something happened and SSNIT had to stop that scheme. This affected some of our members because their monies were left in that account. (Interview with Opanin, 2022)*

According to Daavi, a trader and UNIWA member:

*Some of us are not part of the scheme because of bad experiences we had in the past with other schemes such as over-deductions, stress of long queues to make payment and accessing funds, and not having access to our statements to know the status of our contributions regularly. (Daavi, FGD, 2022)*

Another participant stated:

*I also joined the SSNIT Informal Scheme. They brought us a booklet for us to register and we contributed for some time. But after a while those who come round to collect the contributions stopped coming. We followed up to the SSNIT office and we were told they would come. Due to this some of our members are still not sure about joining. (Ohene, FGD, 2022)*

### **Governance and Administration**

The TUC-UNIWA Informal Sector Pension Scheme has two main governance and management structures. The first is a Board of Trustees whose functions include the appointment of pension fund managers, fund custodians and other service providers, and ensuring compliance with regulatory requirements (NPRA, 2021). The Board of Trustees is made up of seven persons: two from UNIWA, one from the TUC, and four from the PPT (the Corporate Trustees of the scheme). This appears to skew the balance of power in favour of the PPT, but the composition of the board has not prevented UNIWA from exerting influence. According to a UNIWA officer:

*The workers [UNIWA members] have representatives on the Board [of Trustees]. They contribute to decisions and the smooth running of the scheme. (Interview with Opanin, 2022)*

Another UNIWA officer recounts:

*Before the outbreak of the COVID-19 [pandemic], the leaders of UNIWA started a discussion with PPT about using our savings as collateral ... but the pandemic has stopped this discussion. The union and the PPT would resume this discussion to encourage contributions. (Adam, FGD, 2022)*

The involvement of UNIWA has engendered some level of trust among UNIWA members, influencing some to join the scheme.

*The reason why I joined the PPT scheme [the TUC-UNIWA Informal Sector Pension Scheme] is UNIWA ... they came to discuss the scheme with us. I accepted to join. (Boateng, FGD, 2022)*

It is important to note that the Board of Trustees has low female representation. At the time of this study, only two women were on the Board of Trustees despite the fact that women constitute about 55 per cent of the scheme's membership. Such low representation of women can 1) promote gender neutral decisions, 2) bring about and perpetuate gender bias against women, and 3) undermine gender mainstreaming of the scheme.

The TUC-UNIWA Informal Sector Pension Scheme's second governance and management structure is the Corporate Trustee. The functions of Corporate Trustees include maintaining investment policy statements and internal control procedures, processing transfer and payment requests, keeping accounting records and a members' register, and providing quarterly benefit statements to members of the scheme (NPRA, 2022). The Board of Trustees signed a Scheme Management Agreement with the PPT, making it the Corporate Trustee of the scheme.

In some ways, the selection of the PPT to manage the scheme is appropriate. The PPT has substantial experience in running formal pension schemes for informal economy operators. It is one of the first private-sector organizations that ventured into pensions for informal economy operators (Osei-Boateng, 2019: 8). It has 44,144 informal economy operators in its informal sector pension schemes (PPT, 2022) and is listed among the Corporate Trustees in good standing by the NPRA (NPRA, 2021: 34). This listing certifies the status of the PPT, indicating that the TUC-UNIWA Informal Sector Pension Scheme is in safe hands.

*What drove me to join the scheme is the money that is secured. We have the assurance that the company would not abscond with our money. (Danny, FGD, 2022)*

### **Contributions**

The rules of the TUC-UNIWA Informal Sector Pension Scheme provide for flexible contribution options. There is no minimum contribution requirement and members of the scheme are allowed to make lump sum contributions of up to 35 per cent of declared income at any point in time, or pay contributions on an annual or half-yearly basis (an option for seasonal workers). Importantly, the scheme allows members to suspend their contributions when their incomes cease. No sanctions are applied for suspension of contributions and members can resume contributions when they start receiving income again.

The contribution options enable members to decide how much and when to contribute to the scheme. Danny, a member of the scheme, broached that:


*We are informal workers, our income is not fixed. I may get GH¢1,000 today and GH¢5,000 tomorrow. So the [flexibility of the] scheme is tailored to meet our conditions ... it makes the scheme the right pension scheme for us. (Danny, FGD, 2022)*

Similarly, an officer of PPT, maintains that:

*[Contributions to the scheme are] very flexible, we do not have a fixed amount. Today I can pay GH¢2 and tomorrow pay GH¢10. I can decide to pay GH¢5 the next day. (Interview with PPT officer, 2022)*

Figure 5 shows that weekly contributions are the most common. About 54 per cent of the scheme’s members have set up recurring weekly payments. Monthly contributions are the least common (19 per cent of scheme members). In a way, the predominance of weekly contribution payments cannot be separated from the volatility/unpredictability of earnings in the informal economy, and the many present and competing needs of informal economy operators. Faced with unpredictable circumstances, informal economy operators may be less willing to contribute to pensions daily because of income uncertainty in the days ahead. Weekly contribution payments are more tenable because, at least by the end of the week, informal economy operators have a fair idea of their earnings. Waiting a month to make a contribution payment may also be too long for informal economy operators as they might have spent their earnings.

**Figure 5: Regularity of Contributions**



Sources: Adapted from PPT, 2022

Aside from flexibility, the PPT has introduced technology that has ameliorated some of the difficulties that characterize pension contribution payment among informal economy operators in Ghana. Scheme members can make contributions or set up automatic debit payments by mobile phone (PPT, 2021). A member of the scheme stated that:

*The PPT has helped me to make contributions because it is automatically deducted from the mobile wallet. It has helped me to make savings. (Pat, FGD, 2022)*

A non-member of the scheme mentioned that:

*What used to be the barrier for me and others was the mode of payment, where an agent would have to come round for contributions on a monthly basis or you have to walk to the various offices to make payment. That was demotivating because if you miss the agent or if he doesn't come and you cannot go to the offices, you can't make contributions. If the payment through mobile money is maintained and managed well, it will be more convenient and attractive for most of us to join. (Yaw, FGD, 2022)*

The mobile money payment system has become the most popular way for scheme members to pay their contributions. At the time of this study:

*About 85 per cent of contributions were coming electronically ... when you dial our SSD code, you can set up to pay say GH¢10 a week. Once there is money on your mobile wallet, the funds would be moved to your pension account on the set day. (Interview with PPT officer, 2022)*

In spite of the above, one feature of the contributions to the TUC-UNIWA Informal Sector Pension Scheme is that they are low. The average monthly contribution is GH¢93 (US\$15) (PPT, 2022). This is approximately 3 per cent of the average monthly income of GH¢1,890 (US\$303) reported by members of the scheme participating in this study. The forecast points to low savings accumulation over the long term. At the time of this study, average contributors could accumulate only GH¢1,126 (US\$180) in a year. Table 8 shows that, given the current average contribution rate and the average age (48 years) of the scheme members in this study, the average accumulated savings will be just GH¢14,639 (US\$2,352) plus interest of GH¢2,486 (US\$399) at statutory retirement age (60 years). Net savings come to GH¢16,697 (US\$2,683). The real value of net savings would be GH¢15,361 (US\$2,468) after adjusting for inflation. This is not enough to guarantee decent life on retirement at age 60.

**Table 8: Savings Accumulation Forecast**

Age	A	B	C	D Gross Value (Savings + Interest)	E	F Net = Savings – Charges	G Real Value (Net – Inflation <sup>1</sup> )
	Annual Contribution	Cumulative Contribution	Interest <sup>2</sup>	B+C	Charges	D-E	
48	1,126.08	1,126.08	191.29	1,317.37	32.93	1,284.44	1,181.68
49	1,126.08	2,252.16	382.58	2,634.74	65.87	2,568.87	2,363.36
50	1,126.08	3,378.24	573.87	3,952.11	98.80	3,853.31	3,545.04
51	1,126.08	4,504.32	765.16	5,269.48	131.74	5,137.75	4,726.73
52	1,126.08	5,630.40	956.45	6,586.85	164.67	6,422.18	5,908.41
53	1,126.08	6,756.48	1,147.74	7,904.22	197.61	7,706.62	7,090.09
54	1,126.08	7,882.56	1,339.03	9,221.59	230.54	8,991.05	8,271.77
55	1,126.08	9,008.64	1,530.32	10,538.96	263.47	10,275.49	9,453.45
56	1,126.08	10,134.72	1,721.62	11,856.34	296.41	11,559.93	10,635.13
57	1,126.08	11,260.80	1,912.91	13,173.71	329.34	12,844.36	11,816.81
58	1,126.08	12,386.88	2,104.20	14,491.08	362.28	14,128.80	12,998.50
59	1,126.08	13,512.96	2,295.49	15,808.45	395.21	15,413.24	14,180.18
60	1,126.08	14,639.04	2,486.78	17,125.82	428.15	16,697.67	15,361.86
61	1,126.08	15,765.12	2,678.07	18,443.19	461.08	17,982.11	16,543.54
62	1,126.08	16,891.20	2,869.36	19,760.56	494.01	19,266.54	17,725.22
63	1,126.08	18,017.28	3,060.65	21,077.93	526.95	20,550.98	18,906.90
64	1,126.08	19,143.36	3,251.94	22,395.30	559.88	21,835.42	20,088.58
65	1,126.08	20,269.44	3,443.23	23,712.67	592.82	23,119.85	21,270.27
66	1,126.08	21,395.52	3,634.52	25,030.04	625.75	24,404.29	22,451.95
67	1,126.08	22,521.60	3,825.81	26,347.41	658.69	25,688.73	23,633.63
68	1,126.08	23,647.68	4,017.10	27,664.78	691.62	26,973.16	24,815.31
69	1,126.08	24,773.76	4,208.39	28,982.15	724.55	28,257.60	25,996.99
70	1,126.08	25,899.84	4,399.68	30,299.52	757.49	29,542.04	27,178.67

Sources: Field work, and authors calculations

- 1 Using the lower band of the medium-term inflation target (10 per cent + or -2).
- 2 Using the current 364-day bill (treasury bill) rate of 16.98 per cent. The maximum investment limit is permitted by the NPRA (60 per cent of pension funds may be invested in securities issued by the Government of Ghana).

Table 8 indicates that, even if average contributors make payments to the scheme until age 70, the net contributions would be GH¢29,542.04 (US\$4,749.52). If inflation is taken into account, the real value of net savings of average contributors at age 70 may be GH¢27,178.67 (US\$4,369.56). Thus, contributions to the TUC-UNIWA Informal Sector Pension Scheme is low, with implications for income security and welfare in old age.

In line with the requirements of Act 766, contributions to the TUC-UNIWA Informal Sector Pension Scheme are deposited into two separate accounts: a savings account and a retirement account. “Contributions are divided into two. Half is put into the savings account and the other half is deposited into our pension [account]” (Sullo, FGD, 2022). The PPT is required “to send statements of account to members but it is now digital. You go to our websites or use a mobile phone USSD to check your statement of account” (interview with PPT officer, 2022). In spite of the convenience of digital access to information, some scheme members participating in the study were unaware of the digital options, leading one of them to suggest that “[The PPT] should send us monthly statements through the phone. This would help us realize how our contributions are growing” (Sullo, FGD, 2022).

Members’ contributions are invested in prescribed investment portfolios. The NPRA has established guidelines for the investment of pension funds (NPRA, 2022). These guidelines set investment matrix and investment limits, which include:

- a maximum of 60 per cent of pension funds may be invested in securities issued by the Government of Ghana;
- a maximum of 15 per cent of pension funds may be invested in local Government and Statutory Agency securities;
- a maximum of 35 per cent of pension funds may be invested in corporate debt securities;
- a maximum of 35 per cent of pension funds may be invested in bank securities and other money market securities;
- a maximum of 20 per cent of pension funds may be invested in the ordinary shares and non-redeemable preference shares of companies quoted on an approved stock exchange, of which no more than 10 per cent of the shareholders’ funds of any one corporate entity may be purchased by an approved trustee or pension fund manager;
- a maximum of 15 per cent of pension funds may be invested in collective investment schemes. Not more than 5 per cent of the value of pension fund shall be invested in any collective investment established by any one corporate entity; and
- a maximum of 15 per cent of pension funds may be invested in alternative investments. Not more than 10 per cent of pension funds, shall be invested in any alternative sub-asset class except external investment which shall be a maximum of 5 per cent.


## Benefits

The TUC-UNIWA Informal Sector Pension Scheme provides three benefits: retirement benefit, invalidity benefit and death benefit. It is important to note that there are no minimum requirements in terms of years of membership or contributions to qualify for these benefits. Retirement benefit includes a lump sum payment equal to the total accrued in the savings account and a monthly or quarterly pension from the retirement account guaranteed for 15 years. Invalidity benefit is payable on grounds of total incapacity – when a member loses the capacity to manage their affairs due to illness, mental disorder, or some other reason – certified by an appropriate competent authority. Death benefit is a lump sum payable from the accrued benefits of the savings and retirement accounts of a deceased member to their nominated beneficiaries. In many ways, these benefits are significant, ameliorating the lack of pensions among informal economy operators in Ghana.

Benefit payments are low, partly due to the low contributions that members make to the scheme. In 2021, GH¢800 (US\$128) was paid in death benefit to the survivors of a deceased member of the scheme (PPT, 2022). In the same year, another member received GH¢1,258 (US\$202) as retirement benefit (ibid.). Significantly, the retirement benefit paid out in 2021 translates into GH¢3.44 (US\$0.55) per day, which is lower than the daily national poverty line amount of GH¢5.50 (US\$0.88).

In addition to the above benefits, scheme members can draw from their savings accounts six months after initial deposit (PPT, 2021). Figure 6 shows that withdrawals from savings accounts have been on the rise, increasing from approximately 10 per cent in 2019 to 49 per cent in 2021.

**Figure 6: Withdrawals from savings accounts (as percentage of savings accounts)**



Source: Adapted from PPT (2022)

Amu “recently fell sick and run out of money ... requested for GH¢500 [US\$79] from my savings. Although there was a delay of about a week, I received my money” (Amu, FGD, 2022). Similarly, Sullo “made a withdrawal during the COVID-19 to pay fees” (Sullo, FGD, 2022). These instances show that the opportunity for scheme members to draw from their savings accounts is important, especially when one considers the difficulties informal economy operators face in accessing credit from banks (Aliber, 2002).

However, the fact that contributions are low means that the amount members can draw from their savings accounts is low, especially for significant investments in their businesses. In 2021, total contributions in the scheme's savings accounts amounted to approximately GH¢30,199 (US\$4,825) (PPT, 2022). Arguably, even if the full amount was given out as loans, it would still be too low to stimulate substantial investments, bearing in mind that there were 1,500 scheme members at the time of this study. It is therefore not surprising that some of the scheme members who participated in this study want to use their savings as collateral for bank loans.

*As informal workers, when we apply for loans, the banks ask for collateral such as a car or house. So, if PPT can use our savings as collateral for us to get loans, I will be happy. (Kwame, FGD, 2022)*

*Using our savings as collateral for loans would help us a lot. (Danny, FGD, 2022)*

These statements suggest that allowing scheme members to draw from their savings accounts has not completely solved their credit needs.

### **The Government of Ghana's Role in the Scheme**

The Government of Ghana regulates the TUC-UNIWA Informal Sector Pension Scheme through NPRA. NPRA regulations set out the rules for the establishment and running of pension schemes. These include eligibility criteria for trustees, requiring that persons applying to be trustees must be of good reputation and character, and that chief executive officers and the majority of directors must have the skills, knowledge, experience and qualifications necessary for the successful administration of pension schemes. The regulations also provide basic rules for the operations of Corporate Trustees, specifying statutory reserve funds, constituent funds of personal pension schemes, investment standards, and reporting requirements (annual reports and audit reports) for personal and group pension schemes.

Other NPRA rules and practices promote the integrity of pension schemes, and it approves the administrative charges that can be deducted from personal and group scheme members' accounts, which guards against excessive administrative charges. Together, corporate trustees, fund managers and fund custodians were allowed to charge 2.15 per cent of the net value of contributions at the time of this study (interview with PPT officer, 2022). NPRA also publishes the names of Corporate Trustees in good standing in its annual reports. These lists should guide personal and group pension schemes in selecting Corporate Trustees.

So far, the regulation of personal and group pension schemes by NPRA appears to have worked well. We do not have significant instances of mismanagement and loss of pension funds. This gives some confidence that members' contributions to personal and group pension schemes, including those to the TUC-UNIWA Informal Sector Pension Scheme, are safe. In this sense, the Government of Ghana is playing an important regulatory role in formal social security for informal economy operators through NPRA.



Nonetheless, the fact that the Government of Ghana has confined itself to the regulation of formal social security schemes for informal economy operators is problematic. We have already seen that incomes are low among most informal economy operators, preventing them from setting aside significant amounts towards pensions. This is where the Government of Ghana needs to come in and offer matching contributions that would serve as incentives for informal economy workers to contribute towards pensions, and enhance the savings and pensions of informal sector operators. To date there is no matching contribution programme in Ghana and the state does not provide any other tangible incentives to informal economy operators to encourage them to join formal pension schemes. Consequently, some UNIWA members, especially those who cannot afford to contribute towards a pension, are precluded from joining and contributing to the TUC-UNIWA Informal Sector Pension Scheme.

### **The Private Sector's Role in the Scheme**

The PPT – the Corporate Trustee of the TUC-UNIWA Informal Sector Pension – is a private sector entity. Arguably, the selection of a private sector firm to administer the scheme cannot be separated from the experiences of some informal economy operators with the management of an earlier informal sector pension scheme run by SSNIT. SSNIT transferred its scheme for informal economy operators to the NTHC due to high operational costs (Guven, 2019: 31), generating some scepticism about the reputation of the scheme (Afenyadu, 2014: 83).

*I joined the SSNIT informal scheme ... they did not have workers who went round taking contributions. Even going to the SSNIT to pay contributions yourself was a problem ... they stopped the scheme but we have not had any benefit from the contributions we made there. We were told that our contributions would be ported to our new scheme but as at now, we do not know how our contributions would be transferred for us. (Adam, FGD, 2022)*

In view of the above, this study posits that the uncertainty about the security of contributions that informal economy operators previously made to SSNIT contributed to making the private sector (in this case the PPT) the alternative. Moreover, we have seen that the PPT has a good reputation (NPRA, 2021; Osei-Boateng, 2019).

Apart from the PPT, two other private sector entities play important roles in the TUC-UNIWA Informal Sector Pension Scheme as fund custodians and fund managers. Standard Chartered, a private bank, is the fund custodian of the scheme.

*[It is in charge of] administering the funds. This involves keeping records and ensuring that payments are made when they are due. The fund manager is Databank. Databank advises us on investments ... we then tell the fund custodian to push the funds where we have been advised. (Interview with PPT officer, 2022)*

These private sector entities receive fees for their services.

*The Corporate Trustee [PPT] receives 1.33 per cent of the net asset value. The fee for the Fund Manager [Databank] is 0.56 per cent of the net asset value. The Fund Custodian [Standard Chartered] is entitled to 0.26 per cent ... in addition the Regulator's [NPRA] fee is 0.33 per cent. The total fee is 2.48 per cent. (Interview with PPT officer, 2022)*

The total fee charged for the TUC-UNIWA Informal Sector Pension scheme is high. The forecast shows that average contributors to the scheme would pay GH¢2,997 (US\$481) as fees out their gross savings (savings plus interest) of GH¢17,125.82 (US\$2,752.10) at statutory retirement age (see Table 8). This translates into a 17.5 per cent loss of gross savings. The proportion of gross savings that would be lost to fees increases to about 30 per cent if the forecast is extended a further 10 years. Thus, by the age of 70, out of the GH¢30,299.52 (US\$4,869) that the average contributor would have accumulated in savings plus interest, s/he would pay GH¢9,089.86 (US\$1,460) in charges. Such high fees have detracted from the pensions that scheme members can receive.

### **The Impact of COVID-19**

The impact of COVID-19 on the TUC-UNIWA Informal Sector Pension Scheme has been mixed. On the one hand, the pandemic had a positive effect in that it accelerated the transition from cash payment of contributions to a mobile money payment system.

*I will say that as much as COVID has been bad, it has also brought its good side. Because of COVID, we were not able to go the field [to visit members of the scheme to collect contributions], so we had to push and do a lot more of electronic payments. Currently we have about 85 per cent of our contributions coming electronically. I am sure that without COVID we would have taken our time [to roll out mobile money payment system]. But because of COVID we needed to reach out to people so we were pushed to do it and the result has been good. (Interview with PPT officer, 2022)*

We have already seen the importance of the mobile money payment system in enabling scheme members to conveniently pay their contributions.

On the other hand, COVID-19 had some negative impacts on the scheme. Some members' businesses were affected, reducing their ability to contribute to the scheme.

*COVID has affected our scheme drastically. Most of the members haven't been able to keep up with contributions and others have reduced the amount they used to contribute due to the impact of the COVID on their businesses. (Interview with Opanin, 2022)*

A female member of the scheme also stated that:

*COVID-19 disrupted our work. When we initially joined the PPT, we used to contribute daily. But now most people can't afford to contribute daily and so they contribute weekly and even with a lesser amount. (Pat, FGD, 2022)*

In addition, a significant proportion of funds have been drawn from the scheme's savings accounts in the last two years. Figure 6 illustrates that withdrawals have been increasing, rising to about 49 per cent in 2021. We have seen that a scheme member who participated in this study made withdrawals from his savings account because of COVID-19 (Sullo, FGD, 2022).

Moreover, COVID-19 seemed to have affected the efforts of the PPT:

*Because of COVID, we could not grow the way we expected to grow. We could not do a lot of things we wanted to do. (Interview with PPT officer, 2022)*

*PPT was helping us to reach out to our members. But they slowed down their services due to the loss of their CEO to COVID. This has really affected us... Since then, it seems that the interest of PPT in UNIWA [the scheme] has gone. We are hoping things get better with time. (Interview with Opanin, 2022)*

## **SECTION 4: Conclusion, Lessons Learned and Recommendations**

This study examined the TUC-UNIWA Informal Sector Pension Scheme, focusing on the processes that led to its establishment, its organization and regulation, the contingencies it covers, and the experiences UNIWA members have had with the scheme. Insights into these are helpful, enabling members and managers to improve the scheme, and others to know what works and does not work well in the formulation and implementation of formal pensions for informal economy operators.

In many respects the scheme has useful features and operates in ways that meet the working conditions and the social security needs of informal economy operators. Starting with the conception of the scheme, we have seen that the participatory approach enhanced its acceptability among rank-and-file members and leaders of UNIWA. This is important in voluntary schemes. Furthermore, this study has shown that the participation of UNIWA in the governance of the scheme inspires confidence, encouraging some of UNIWA's members to join the scheme. Significantly, such confidence is shared among the female and male members of the scheme who took part in this study. This shows us that the inclusion of representatives of informal economy operators into the administration or governance of pension schemes helps to improve acceptability and willingness to join the scheme among informal economy operators.

The flexibility of some of the key elements of the scheme enhances its appropriateness in many ways. First, the flexible contribution rules recognize income volatility in the informal economy. Second, the absence a maximum age limit allows informal economy operators who are older than the statutory retirement age to continue to earn pension rights. Third, the dearth of a minimum contribution (years and number of contributions) to qualify for the scheme's benefits is important because it recognizes that informal economy operators may not be able to meet these requirements given income flow inconsistencies that limit their ability to consistently contribute to pensions. Finally, the scheme's contingencies are appropriate, offering retirement income for members. Importantly, the option that has been given to scheme members to draw from their savings accounts can ameliorate some of their immediate credit needs. We have seen that female and male members of the scheme who participated in this study have a positive assessment of this flexibility. Therefore, this study shows that improving formal pension coverage among informal economy operators requires flexibility to be incorporated into the design of some of the elements of pension schemes.

At the time of this study, making contribution payments using a mobile money payment system has become widespread among members of the TUC-UNIWA Informal Sector Pension Scheme. Mobile money payment systems offer convenience and eliminate some of the costs and theft that characterize cash payment of social security contributions in the informal economy. Hence, this study indicates that efforts to enhance social security contributions among informal economy operators need to include digital technologies that are simple and accessible.

In spite of the above, membership of the TUC-UNIWA Informal Sector Pensions Scheme is significantly low. In this study, we have seen how low incomes, inadequate education about the scheme, and previous negative experiences with formal social security schemes, have detracted from the ability and willingness of some UNIWA members to join and contribute to the scheme. Notably, no noticeable distinctions were apparent in how these factors affect male versus female UNIWA members who participated in this study. In essence, low incomes, inadequate education, and previous negative experiences equally expose female and male UNIWA members to risks of income insecurity in retirement.

The only demographic characteristic that matters in the membership of the scheme is age, with persons aged 26–60 dominating. Membership is low among youth (16–25 years) and those over the statutory retirement age of 60. It should be noted that differences in the concentration of the age cohorts in the scheme reflect their proportions in the membership of UNIWA.

Some scheme members may not have adequate retirement income because the contributions they make to the scheme are too low. The forecast in this study indicates that, at the current rate, average contributors to the scheme and those who contribute below the average may not accumulate enough savings to guarantee adequate pensions.

Aside from the low contributions, the fees charged to the scheme are too high, detracting from members' pension rights. We have seen how the average contributor loses a substantial proportion of their gross savings (savings plus interest) to fee deduction. Such losses have adverse implications on the ability of pensions to sustain their beneficiaries.

While this study has shown that one of the useful elements of the TUC-UNIWA Informal Sector Pension Scheme is the option offered to members to make withdrawals from their savings accounts to improve their businesses, how this opportunity can bring about meaningful impacts remains doubtful. This is due to the low contributions and for that matter low savings accumulation. Almost half of the savings accounts were depleted by members in 2021. In spite of such huge withdrawals, all the study participants called for an amendment of the rules of the scheme to allow them to use their accumulated contributions as collateral for credit from banks. This indicates that informal economy operators need more than the withdrawals from their TUC–Informal Sector Pension Scheme savings accounts can offer. They need to be able to access substantial credit that can be invested in growing their businesses and thereby enhance their capacity to contribute more towards pensions.

The foregoing insights into the emergence and operation of the TUC-UNIWA Informal Sector Pension Scheme show that informal economy operators can accept the necessity to contribute to formal pension schemes, but may not or cannot enrol in such schemes because of personal and external factors. Hence, the establishment of formal pension schemes is necessary but may be insufficient to improve formal social security cover among informal economy operators. As such this requires the identification and removal of factors that can inhibit membership and contributions to pension schemes.

This study makes the following recommendations:

### **1. Improve uptake of the scheme**

UNIWA needs to reach out to more members with sensitization programmes and ensure communication is done in ways that improve understanding of the rules and benefits of the scheme. This should address any misinformation that some members have, which has prevented them from joining the scheme.

### **2. Improve communication with existing members**

The PPT needs to improve its communication with members, especially on contributions and savings. Scheme managers need to make members adequately aware of the mobile money payment system and digital platforms for accessing information about their contributions.

### **3. Improve gender balance**

Current female representation on the scheme's Board of Trustees is low and does not reflect the female predominance in the scheme's membership. Such representation may undermine gender mainstreaming. Efforts should be made to improve female representation during the next selection of members to the scheme's Board of Trustees.

### **4. Improve contributions and benefits**

As a way to encourage more informal economy operators to join the scheme, UNIWA needs to campaign for the Government of Ghana to implement a matching programme that will supplement members' contributions. This should encourage informal economy members who have not joined the scheme to do so, and boost the savings and the pension rights of existing members. It would also be helpful for the scheme to include income replacement insurance to help members in times of income loss.

### **5. Improve the business of informal economy operators**

One of the factors that limits contributions by the members of the scheme that took part in this study is low earnings. This means that the current earning capacity of informal economy operators cannot be separated from their ability to contribute towards pensions. Therefore, the campaign to improve contributions must take into account the necessity to improve their businesses through better access to financial credit and improved capacity in fund utilization.

## **6. Utilize past contributions**

UNIWA and the TUC need to engage with SSNIT and the NTHC to ensure contributions made by UNIWA members to the SSNIT Informal Sector Pension Scheme are transferred into the accounts of those who joined the TUC-UNIWA Informal Sector Pension Scheme. Having all contributions in one portfolio would enable informal economy operators to easily monitor their funds and enhance the return on their investment.

## **7. Reduce the cost of the scheme**

The current fees charged to the scheme are high, detracting from members' savings. The fees need to be reduced, but this must happen in a way that does not compromise the integrity and sustainability of the scheme. Efforts also need to be made to increase the number of people enrolled in the scheme. This way, reducing the charges would not compromise the sustainability of the scheme.

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## List of Participants

### Interviews

1. Interview with PPT officer, 12 January 2022
2. Interview with Opanin, UNIWA, 21 January 2022

### Questionnaire

1. Waters – Member of the scheme’s Board of Trustees

### Focus Group Discussion

1.	Baako	46 years male self-employed without employees	FGD, 13 January 2022
2.	Pat	39 years female self-employed without employees	FGD, 13 January 2022
3.	Daavi	34 years male self-employed without employees	FGD, 13 January 2022
4.	Rita	44 years female self-employed without employees	FGD, 13 January 2022
5.	Manu	40 years female self-employed without employees	FGD, 13 January 2022
6.	Thess	40 years female self-employed without employees	FGD, 13 January 2022
7.	Joy	48 years female self-employed without employees	FGD, 13 January 2022
8.	Grace	40 years female self-employed without employees	FGD, 13 January 2022
9.	Clara	33 years female self-employed without employees	FGD, 13 January 2022
10.	Priscilla	43 years female self-employed without employees	FGD, 13 January 2022
11.	Mansa	50 years female self-employed without employees	FGD, 13 January 2022
12.	Rosina	53 years female self-employed without employees	FGD, 13 January 2022
13.	Lizzy	33 years female self-employed without employees	FGD, 13 January 2022
14.	Dede	39 years female self-employed without employees	FGD, 13 January 2022
15.	Yaw	33 years male self-employed without employees	FGD, 13 January 2022
16.	Amu	43 years male self-employed without employees	FGD, 13 January 2022
17.	Boateng	45 years male self-employed without employees	FGD, 13 January 2022
18.	Ohene	49 years male self-employed without employees	FGD, 13 January 2022
19.	Emma	54 years male self-employed without employees	FGD, 13 January 2022
20.	Danny	42 years male self-employed without employees	FGD, 13 January 2022
21.	Sullo	41 year male self-employed without employees	FGD, 13 January 2022
22.	Lillian	41 years female self-employed without employees	FGD, 13 January 2022
23.	Adam	49 years male self-employed without employees	FGD, 13 January 2022
24.	Kwame	53 years male self-employed without employees	FGD, 13 January 2022
25.	Adoma	39 years female self-employed without employees	FGD, 13 January 2022
26.	Mann	29 years female self-employed without employees	FGD, 13 January 2022



## About WIEGO

Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing (WIEGO) is a global network focused on empowering the working poor, especially women, in the informal economy to secure their livelihoods. We believe all workers should have equal economic opportunities, rights, protection and voice. WIEGO promotes change by improving statistics and expanding knowledge on the informal economy, building networks and capacity among informal worker organizations and, jointly with the networks and organizations, influencing local, national and international policies. Visit [www.wiego.org](http://www.wiego.org)



## About StreetNet International

StreetNet International is an alliance of street vendors. It was launched in Durban, South Africa, in November 2002. Membership-based organizations (unions, co-operatives or associations) directly organizing street vendors, market vendors and/or hawkers among their members, are entitled to affiliate to StreetNet International. The aim of StreetNet is to promote the exchange of information and ideas on critical issues facing street vendors, market vendors and hawkers (i.e., mobile vendors) and on practical organizing and advocacy strategies. Visit <http://streetnet.org.za/>